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Abstract 
 
This study makes an argument for a constructionist understanding of crime in 
Antigua and Barbuda. Specifically, the study argues that the way in which 
members of the public and the news media talk about crime is important because 
understanding how crime is framed in terms of causes and remedies necessarily 
influences who we criminalise, what legislation we pass and how we allocate our 
tax dollars.  As such, framing crime in ways that are tinged with hyperbole, or 
that run contrary to evidence is unlikely to result in effective policy responses.  
The way in which crime is currently framed in Antigua and Barbuda – as a 
relatively recent phenomenon that is spiralling out of control and is characterised 
by increasing violence, as a phenomenon that is perpetuated by predatory young 
people with individual pathologies, as a phenomenon that is increasing largely 
because police and politicians are corrupt and young people are being inculcated 
with foreign cultural values – has resulted in punitive policy and ‘tough on 
crime’ rhetoric that do not appear to have had a substantial effect on the 
country’s crime rate. However, this study finds that there might be room for 
more progressive crime policy – policy that is informed by an understanding of 
crime that does not have at its heart notions of law and order or getting ‘tough on 
crime’.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
‘For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see.  In 
the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture 
has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in 
the form stereotyped for us by our culture.’ 
-- Walter Lippman (1922: 81) 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Whether it is a spirited debate during one of the country’s most popular talk radio 
programmes, a casual conversation among laypersons fervently advancing policy 
approaches with the authority of an expert, or the shocked gasp of a neighbour who 
has recently learned of a gruesome crime that took place ‘just down the road’, if you 
spend enough time in Antigua and Barbuda you are bound to encounter talk about 
crime.  And, when you do, you will likely hear claims that crime has increased 
significantly over the past 20 years and continues to do so largely unabated.  You may 
hear a throne speech in which the Governor-General confirms and denounces the 
increase in crime and outlines what her or his government plans to do about it.  You 
may hear a politician vowing to get ‘tough on crime’ or you may hear people 
lamenting the way in which criminals have become so bold – daring to commit armed 
robbery in ‘broad daylight’. You may hear regret that the ‘serial rapist’ was never 
caught or you may hear whose dogs are about to have pups and who may be interested 
in taking those pups because after all, dogs are the best security system – ‘Black 
people tend to be afraid of dogs’.  You may even hear people discussing how much 
they have had to adjust their behaviour because of crime, how much of an 
inconvenience life has become.  These claims usually echo that made by Bolivar, an 
older Black Antiguan professional who says: 
there are some places I just don’t go at night...when I’m going to the 
airport in the daytime I always go through Barnes Hill.  I would never 
go through New Winthropes at night.  
Or, that made by Regine, a middle-aged Black Antiguan professional who explains: 
Well, [crime] makes for an uncomfortable lifestyle... I remember 
when I moved to where I am now, or when I built [my house].  It took 
me a long time to start sleeping there because of the location.  It’s 
dark down there, it still is.  But, my house got finished at a time when 
crime was just rampant – they were raping people – it was just crazy 
and I was afraid to be there.  So, having worked as hard as I think I 
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have, to build a comfortable house, and can’t sleep in it because of 
what I know crime can do, it was not good. 
In all of this crime talk you may hear people calling for stiffer penalties including the 
death penalty or you may hear people lament, simply, that as a result of increased 
crime, life in Antigua and Barbuda is not like ‘before time’1. 
Indeed, a 2010 victimisation survey conducted by the United Nations 
Development Programme (“UNDP”) found that more than half of all respondents 
living in Antigua and Barbuda felt insecure because of crime or uncertain because of 
crime and security. According to the survey, nearly a quarter of respondents frequently 
worried that their house would be broken into at night or that they would be robbed at 
gunpoint.  Additionally, almost 20 per cent of both men and women frequently 
worried about being sexually assaulted.  Consequently, in an attempt to feel more 
secure, just over a quarter of respondents said that they kept a weapon at home (UNDP 
2012).   
If you read The Daily Observer, Antigua and Barbuda’s most widely circulated 
newspaper, you would have reason to believe that all the crime talk you have heard is 
accurate.  You may read headlines such as ‘Tourist Held At Gunpoint On Runaway 
Beach’, ‘Seventy Year Old Woman Brutally Attacked in Her Home’, or ‘Courts 
Should Impose Appropriate Sanctions’. You may even come across a letter to the 
editor entitled ‘Capital Punishment: A Biblical Perspective’.  Or, you may encounter a 
headline that boldly declares, ‘2007 Crime Stats Confirm Public Opinion’, with a 
corresponding story explaining to readers that:  
[c]rime statistics show that overall there were 310 more reported 
incidents of crime in 2007 than 2006.  This confirms the publicly held 
sentiment that crime is on the increase. Police figures show that there 
were 3,869 incidents of crimes on the blotter in 2007, compared to 
3,559 in 2006 – an 8.71 per cent increase (The Daily Observer 
2/8/2008: 20).  
From the newspaper accounts of crime, you may get the general feeling that most 
crime in Antigua and Barbuda is violent, both violent crime and property crime are on 
the rise, and that very young people, the elderly and women are the most frequent 
victims of this crime. 
But, when you look at official crime data from 1970 to 2010, you will realise 
that much of what you have heard and read is not borne out by the data.  For example, 
                                                
1 Antiguan and Barbudan parlance for ‘generations ago’. 
 10 
notwithstanding spikes in the recorded crime figures, the rate of violent crime has 
remained relatively stable since 1970 and the rate of property crime is continuing to 
decline from its peak in 1995.  In fact, the overall crime rate has been on the decline 
since 1995.  Additionally, in 2010 the rate of violent crime was the lowest that it had 
been over the 40 year time period.  Similarly, if you look at the UNDP survey, you 
will find that despite the feelings of insecurity and media reports suggesting otherwise, 
only 11 per cent of residents admitted to being victimised in the year preceding the 
survey.  This self-reported victimisation rate compares favourably to the rates among 
30 nations that participated in the 2004-2005 round of the International Crime 
Victimisation Survey (the “ICVS”).  The ICVS found that 16 per cent of respondents 
reported that they had been victims of crime during the previous year (UNDP 2012).  
This is not to suggest that crime is not a problem in Antigua and Barbuda, it 
may well be.  However, there is a clear disconnect between the crime narrative told by 
official crime data and those told by members of the public and the news media. There 
is a clear disconnect between the ‘objective’ indicators of crime and the way in which 
crime is experienced or treated. This study is about the disconnect – how it emerges, 
why it exists and its implications for criminal justice policy. As such, the primary 
purpose of this study is to develop a more comprehensive understanding of Antigua 
and Barbuda’s crime situation by investigating the ways in which the news media and 
members of the public explain crime in terms of its causes and remedies.  Put 
differently, the study is primarily about the ‘social construction’ of crime and the 
crime ‘frames’ that the news media and members of the public draw on to make sense 
of the phenomena.  The study proceeds largely on the constructionist assumption that, 
‘the world may be in one state, but people can believe it is in another state and act 
accordingly’ (Surette 2015: 31).  
To achieve its primary purpose this study uses frame analysis, a research 
strategy widely attributed to Erving Goffman (1974/1986).  Frame analysis is 
commonly used in constructionist research on crime and criminal justice policy 
(Sasson 1995; Surette 2015) and operates on the presumption that because making 
sense of one’s social world is inherently complex, people must necessarily draw on 
their past experiences, which can be reduced to ‘frames’.  According to Goffman 
(1974/1986: 21), a frame is a ‘schemata of interpretation’ that ‘allows its user to 
locate, perceive, identify and label’ events and experiences.  Frame analysis then is a 
‘slogan’ for analysing the frames that govern social events and experiences and our 
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subjective involvement in them (Goffman 1974/1986). Frames employed in the 
context of crime and criminal justice often articulate broad statements about the causes 
of crime, provide explanations for the nature of the crime problem and prescribe 
ameliorative policy responses. Using Theodore Sasson (1995) and Boda et al.’s (2011) 
working catalogue of culturally available crime frames, this study identifies the most 
prevalent crime frames used by the news media and members of the public.  
Equally, this study is concerned with the processes through which people and 
the news media arrive at the explanations they offer with respect to crime (see Sasson 
1995).  That is, how members of the public and the news media come to ‘frame’ crime 
in a particular way.  As a result, this study employs Surette’s (2015) model of social 
construction.   However, this study is not rooted solely in social constructionism.  The 
study also proceeds on the basis that there is a world of material reality that exists 
independently of our perceptions of it.  Exploring the dissonance between the ways in 
which crime is experienced and the way in which it is reflected in official crime data 
relies in part on this premise.  In seeking to understand how crime is constructed in the 
media and public discourse, the study identifies biases and alternative interpretations 
through a comparison to official crime data.  While this study acknowledges that 
official crime data are themselves socially constructed, it also acknowledges as 
Maguire (2012) and Newburn (2007) have, that official crime data are important in 
shaping what we think we know about crime and providing some empirical basis for 
critically assessing the claims that are made about crime.  To this end, the study adopts 
a mixed methods approach that included the collection and analysis of quantitative 
data as well.  To create an empirical account of historical crime trends and patterns, 
which did not exist previously, I collected and analysed 40 years of official crime data 
to determine the overall scale of crime, the relative incidence of different types of 
offences, trends in those offences over time and their geographical distribution.  My 
methodology is further detailed in chapter three.   
Rationale 
Despite the important strides that Caribbean crime literature has made with respect to 
methodological rigour and diversity of focus and perspective (see Harriott 2003), 
studies that focus on the crime experience of the smaller countries in the Eastern 
Caribbean are relatively rare.  Specifically, there have been few attempts to understand 
Antigua and Barbuda’s crime situation beyond the context of the Caribbean region as 
a whole.  Where Antigua and Barbuda is included in regional studies, the analysis is 
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often based on incomplete data as Antigua and Barbuda’s criminal justice agencies do 
not collect crime data in a systematic and uniform manner over time and the data 
collected are often not stored in a database that is conducive to easy extraction or 
manipulation (see Bennett and Lynch 1996/2007).  Additionally, scant consideration 
has been paid to the social construction of crime in the Caribbean and existing studies 
pay little attention to the development of Caribbean crime policy (see for example 
Harriott 2003).   This study is an attempt to fill some of these gaps in the Caribbean 
crime literature. 
Although some work has been done with respect to Trinidad and Tobago, 
much of the existing literature on the social construction of crime is focused on Europe 
and North America.  Few studies contemplate the experiences of smaller, developing 
countries.  This gap in the literature is most acute with respect to frame analysis.  To 
the extent that crime frames allow policy and decision makers to quickly process 
crime events and prescribe particular policies, a limited catalogue of culturally 
available frames necessarily limits the way in which crime is understood.  Similarly, a 
catalogue of frames based strictly on the experience of Europe and North American 
may not apply to other jurisdictions and policy and decision makers in these 
jurisdictions may process crime events in a manner ill-suited to the jurisdiction.  This 
study adds to the literature on frame analysis the experience of a small developing 
country. 
Structure and Content of the study 
Chapter two locates the study within the relevant literature.  Specifically, the chapter seeks 
to provide the rationale for the study’s research questions and strategy and it establishes 
the theoretical framework that anchors the study’s qualitative research.  The chapter 
begins by describing how I arrived at the research question.  The chapter then proceeds to 
explore the literature pertaining to crime statistics and official records as well as public 
knowledge and newspaper portrayals of crime.  From here, the chapter moves on to 
consider the literature pertaining to social constructionism and frame analysis.  Chapter 
two concludes with an explanation of how the literature outlined frames my research 
questions. 
Chapter three outlines the mixed methods approach that I used to conduct the 
empirical research for this study.  The chapter begins with a justification of the 
research approach and choice of methods before proceeding to discuss the tensions 
between the various epistemological tenets of the study. The chapter then discusses 
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mixed methods research within the context of social policy and describes the research 
design.  At this point the chapter describes the research setting, process of conducting 
the peer group discussions and analysis of the resulting transcripts.  Additionally, the 
chapter outlines the collection and analysis of political rhetoric as well as the use of in-
depth interviews with relevant stakeholders.  Chapter three also describes the 
quantitative aspects of the research design – the collection and analysis of official 
police data as well as the collection and analysis of newspaper stories on crime and 
crime control.  The chapter ends with a discussion of the study’s limitations and an 
acknowledgement of my role as researcher questions surrounding my own 
subjectivity. 
Chapter four uses police recorded data from 1970 to 2010 combined with 
secondary research to establish for Antigua and Barbuda what Maguire (2007) calls the 
‘basic contours of crime’.  That is, the overall scale of crime and the relative incidence of 
different types of offences, trends in crime over time and its geographic distribution.   The 
chapter begins with a description of Antigua and Barbuda’s socio-political environment 
and proceeds to a trend analysis of both property and violent crime.  With respect to 
violent crime, particular attention is paid to robbery, homicide, rape and indecent assault.  
Chapter four concludes with a discussion of the geographic distribution of crime in 
Antigua and Barbuda.  This chapter is important because it provides the ‘objective’ 
indicators that are used to assess the claims made in chapters five to seven.  
Chapter five focuses on the first of three major themes emerging from the 
qualitative analysis.   The chapter describes socio-economic factors that the media and 
focus group participants blame for Antigua and Barbuda’s current crime situation.  
Informed by a Mertonian (1938) understanding of anomie and strain theory as well as The 
Chicago School’s social disorganisation theory (1942; 1969) and Hirschi’s (1969) theory 
of social control, the chapter is divided into two sections organised around two separate 
frames.  The first section discusses the Blocked Opportunities frame while the second 
section discusses the Social Breakdown frame. Each section of the chapter articulates the 
various components of the respective frame, discusses their theoretical underpinnings, 
reports the frequency with which the frame appeared in the newspaper discourse and 
describes the reactions to the frames by participants in the peer group discussions.  This 
chapter concludes by discussing the claim that Antigua and Barbuda is not the peaceful 
close-knit society that it once was as it provides the segue to chapter six. 
Chapter six focuses on the second of three major themes emerging from the 
analysis and is a logical extension of the themes presented in the preceding chapter.   If 
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Antigua and Barbuda is not the peaceful close-knit society it once was, it is in part 
because of ‘alien influences’ or those elements, foreign to Antigua and Barbuda’s 
culture, which Antiguans feel are criminogenic.  Such influences include immigration, 
Jamaican dancehall music, cable television broadcasted from the United States, 
including the Black Entertainment Television station, criminal deportees sent back to 
Antigua and Barbuda from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, the 
internet and policy seen to be a response to United States imperatives.  This chapter is 
largely informed by the imitation theories advanced by Jean-Gabriel Tarde (1843-
1904), Edwin Sutherland’s (1939) differential association and Thorsten Sellin’s (1938) 
contributions to culture conflict theory.  Additionally, this chapter illustrates how 
social disorganisation theory and anomie, which were discussed in chapter five, apply 
to the Poor Immigration Control frame.  Like chapter five, the chapter is divided by 
frame into two sections.  The first section focuses on Foreign Cultural Influences 
while the second section focuses on Poor Immigration Control. Each section of the 
chapter articulates the various components of the respective frame, discusses their 
theoretical underpinnings, reports the frequency with which the frame appeared in the 
newspaper discourse and describes the reactions to the frames by participants in the peer 
group discussions.  This chapter closes with the claim that crime in Antigua and Barbuda 
is associated with particular types of immigrants permitted into the country and the 
chapter serves as a segue to chapter seven which discusses the concern that immigration 
officers are susceptible to bribery and are contravening immigration rules by allowing 
people into the country who would be otherwise ineligible to permanently settle.   
Chapter seven focuses on governance, crime, culture, and control, the last of the 
three major themes emerging from the analysis. The chapter is a logical extension of 
chapter six as it focuses, in part, on the claims that corruption is endemic in Antigua 
and Barbuda.   These claims include arguments that wealthier people are able to 
manipulate the system in their favour while poor people are unfairly victimised by the 
system.  Additionally, this chapter discusses claims that people are happy cutting 
corners and committing seemingly victimless crimes.  This chapter also interrogates 
claims that Antigua and Barbuda’s criminal justice system is antiquated, inefficient, 
too lenient and in dire need of reform.  The chapter is steeped in the differential 
association theory, which was discussed in chapter six, and 18th century classical 
criminology built around the reformist ideas of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. 
Like the chapters before it, chapter seven is divided by frame into two sections.  The 
first section focuses on the Criminal Culture frame while the second section focuses 
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on the Faulty System frame. Each section of the chapter articulates the various 
components of the respective frame, discusses their theoretical underpinnings, reports the 
frequency with which the frame appeared in the newspaper discourse and describes the 
reactions to the frames by participants in the peer group discussions.    
Finally, chapter eight concludes the study summarising the study’s main 
findings and discussing its contributions to the extant literature.  The chapter begins by 
reviewing the primary and secondary research questions and summarising the findings 
with respect to each. The chapter then moves on to discuss the contributions that this 
study makes to Caribbean crime literature, the literature on the public knowledge of 
crime, newspaper portrayals of crime and the social construction of crime and criminal 
justice.  Additionally, the chapter discusses the significance of this study outlining 
policy implications and recommendations.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter seeks to provide the rationale for the study’s research questions and 
strategy and establishes the underlying theoretical framework that anchors the study.  
To this end, section I reviews the literature pertaining to public knowledge and media 
representations of crime as well as the meaning of criminal statistics.  It also traces the 
evolution of criminological work in the Caribbean and illustrates the gaps in the extant 
literature.  Section II describes social constructionism and frame analysis.  In so doing, 
it discusses criminological research and illustrates why the method is useful to this 
study,  
 
I 
 
Competing Constructions of Antigua and Barbuda’s Crime Story 
In formulating the research questions and devising a research strategy for this study, I 
conducted preliminary research in order to get a sense of some of the issues 
surrounding crime in Antigua and Barbuda.  I listened to popular talk radio 
programmes on two major radio stations and in my personal capacity, spoke 
informally with residents I encountered. During introductory meetings with several of 
the key stakeholders I would eventually interview, I tried to ascertain what they 
believed to be pressing crime issues.  Additionally, I conducted an initial review of 
various newspapers dating back to 1970 and political manifestos, budget and throne 
speeches dating back to 1994. The narrative that emerged from this preliminary 
research was one in which crime was held to be virtually non-existent until the mid 
1990s when the country’s crime rate increased significantly and continued to climb, 
largely unabated, well into the 2000s.  In this narrative, the sitting government and 
each major political party decried increasing crime as a threat to public safety and 
vowed to implement a series of corrective measures that would restore Antigua and 
Barbuda to the peaceful society it once was (see for example Antigua Labour Party 
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Manifesto 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009; United Progressive Party Manifesto 1994, 1999, 
2004, 2009; Government of Antigua and Barbuda Throne Speech 1995, 1997, 1998, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009). In this narrative there were frequent references 
to riots and serious security breaches in the country’s sole prison, a 1999 prison fire – 
allegedly started by inmates – that destroyed most of the prison facility (United States 
Department of State 2000), and residents who were nostalgic for the days, not so long 
ago, when prison inmates were better behaved – when they could leave their 
belongings unattended and their homes unlocked without fear of theft or violation. 
When I began an initial review of official reports, however, a different 
narrative unfolded.  Annual reports produced by the Royal Police Force of Antigua 
and Barbuda (the “RPF”) between 1970 and 1989 documented the raw number of 
specific crimes recorded by the police as well as explanations by the head of the RPF 
regarding noteworthy crime trends and cases.  In this narrative, pre-1990 Antigua and 
Barbuda was not as peaceful as my preliminary research suggested. Homicides and 
robberies occurred more frequently than the residents and stakeholders in my 
preliminary research implied. The types of violent crimes described in the pre-1990 
annual reports did not appear drastically different from the types of violent crimes 
reflected in contemporary police data.  In the narrative told by these pre-1990 annual 
reports, police officers bemoaned the fact that residents left their belongings 
unattended and their homes unlocked.  In fact, in these reports the RPF attributed 
much of the country’s property crime to property owners’ ‘carelessness’ and their 
failure ‘to secure their property despite frequent advice by the police’  (see Annual 
Report on the Organization and Administration of the Royal Police Force and Fire 
Service of Antigua and Barbuda 1987: 3, 1979: 5).  Contemporary police records 
pointed to a similar dissonance. The narrative told by the raw number of crimes 
recorded by the police between 1994 and 2010, was not one in which crime was 
increasing exponentially.  To the contrary, official police data suggested that overall 
rates of both violent crime and property crime were declining although the homicide 
rate experienced a slight upward trend. 
To better understand these competing narratives, I reviewed the literature on 
the usage of crime statistics as well as the literature on public and media constructions 
of crime.  
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Crime Statistics and Official Records 
In Antigua and Barbuda the official crime statistics are comprised of all ‘major 
offences’ or ‘serious crimes’ known or reported to the police in a given year (see for 
example Antigua and Barbuda 1979).  From at least 1970 to 1989 these figures were 
published annually in a report entitled Annual Report on the Organization and 
Administration of the Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda. The terms ‘major 
offences’ and ‘serious crimes’ were used interchangeably across the 19 volumes to 
describe those crimes tried on indictment in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court2 by 
a judge and jury.  Although the annual report has not been published since 1989, 
internal police records have retained the terminology and the crime figures are still 
compiled annually.  
As is the case elsewhere (see for example Reiner 1996; Maguire 2012), 
Antigua and Barbuda’s official crime statistics feature prominently in news media and 
public debate as ‘the crime rate’.  The suggestion is that these official crime statistics 
are an accurate assessment of national crime levels and trends over time.  But, from as 
early as 1897 researchers have warned against interpreting official crime statistics in 
this manner (see for example Morrison 1897).  Although sustained challenges to the 
interpretation of official crime statistics were rare, the late 20th Century saw an 
explosion of critical engagement with questions surrounding the social construction 
and meaning of crime statistics (Maguire 2012).  Building on work by Biderman and 
Reiss (1967), Maguire (2012), Reiner (1996, 2000), MacDonald (2002) and others 
have demonstrated that the flaws inherent in discovering, reporting, recording and 
solving crimes mean that official crime statistics reflect only an unknown and selective 
portion of total crimes.  For example, Maguire (2012) explains how recorded crime 
levels can be affected by proactive ‘discovery’ by the police through their own 
investigative efforts (see also Coleman and Moynihan 1996). If police intensify foot 
patrols, engage in stop and search practices, or target particular communities, the total 
number of recorded crimes will likely rise.  Phillips and Bowling (2012: 381) offer the 
example of a 1960s report, which described police officers as going ‘nigger 
hunting...to bring in a coloured person at all costs’.  The inappropriate use of 
paramilitary tactics, mass stop and search operations, excessive surveillance and 
unjustified armed raids employed to ‘bring in’ ‘coloured persons’, very likely created 
a skewed picture of offending patterns.  Conversely, if police were to choose not to 
                                                
2 Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court is comprised of the High Court and the appellate court.  These terms describe crimes that are 
tried in the High Court of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. 
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prioritise certain crimes such as possession of drugs for personal use or if they were to 
change their pattern of patrol, the total number of recorded crimes would likely fall, 
also changing the patterns of offending (Maguire 2012).  
Similarly, Coleman and Moynihan (1996) have shown how recorded crime 
levels can vary according to the crime reporting behaviour of the public. For example, 
in Britain between 77 and 96 per cent of recorded crimes are initially discovered by 
members of the public.  If these crimes were never reported, in the absence of a 
corresponding increase in the number of crimes discovered by the police, much of the 
crime in Britain would not be captured by official crime statistics (Coleman and 
Moynihan 1996). Understanding crime reporting is therefore critical to interpreting 
official crime statistics.  Although the literature suggests that people are generally 
more likely to report a crime when they believe the police to be competent and 
effective (Peak et al. 1992), researchers have found that the decision to report a crime 
to the police is largely ‘incident-specific’ determined by the particular features of the 
event (Skogan 1984: 129; Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979; Garofalo 1979; Bennett 
and Wiegand 1994).  Of the range of possible incident-specific determinants, Skogan 
(1984) found the seriousness of the crime to be the strongest determinant by far.  The 
more serious the crime, the more likely it is to be reported (see also Hindelang and 
Gottfredson 1976). Block (1974) found the relationship between the victim and the 
offender to be an important determinant as well.  The closer the relationship of the 
victim to the assailant, the less likely it is that she or he will report the offence to the 
police.  Similarly, researchers have found that ‘individual-specific’ features such as 
age, gender, race, income, past victimisation and education play a role in whether 
people report a crime to the police although these features are far less significant than 
those that are incident-specific (see for example Skogan 1984; Block 1974). Of the 
individual-specific determinants of crime reporting, Hindelang and Gottfredson (1976) 
found age to be the strongest.  Victims under the age of 35 are less likely to notify the 
police of criminal incidents than those 35 and older.  Other significant individual-
specific determinants of reporting include victimisation history and, in cases of 
property crime, the property insurance status of the victim (Skogan 1984; van Dijk 
2001).  Although researchers such as van Dijk (2001: 33) and Kidd and Chayet (1984) 
have found that victims who have been previously victimised are less inclined to 
report crimes to the police, others (see for example Bennett and Wiegand 1994) 
suggest that past victimisation or vicarious experiences of victimisation through 
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friends or neighbours, increases the likelihood of crime reporting.  Conaway and Lohr 
(1994) argue from a slightly different perspective that victims are more likely to report 
crime in the future if they have had or know of positive experiences with the police in 
past victimisation.  In the case of property crime, Skogan (1984) suggests that when 
property is insured the victim is more likely to report the crime to the police in the 
hopes of securing restorative services, claiming compensation or receiving a private 
insurance payment.  Finally, researchers have found that ‘environment-specific’ 
features such as neighbourhood size, cohesion and wealth are the weakest 
determinants of crime reporting behaviour.  Most studies show that when the 
seriousness of the offense is controlled there is no significant relationship between 
environment-specific features and reporting practices (see for example Gottfredson 
and Hindelang 1979; Bennett and Wiegand 1994; Fishman 1979) although some 
studies suggest that the neighbourhood in which a victim lives may have some 
influence on whether the crime is reported (see for example Ruback et al., 1984).   
While this body of research on crime reporting behaviour largely contemplates highly 
industrialised, socially and economically developed urban nations, Bennett and 
Wiegand (1994) found that the crime reporting behaviour in these places, can be 
largely generalised to Belize, a Caribbean country geographically located in Central 
America but culturally, politically and socially similar to Antigua and Barbuda.  In 
Belize the decision to report a crime to the police is similarly ‘incident-specific’, 
determined by the seriousness of the crime, although certain individual-specific 
determinants – past victimisation and socioeconomic status – play an important role as 
well (Bennett and Wiegand 1994).   
Flaws also abound with respect to how crimes are recorded.  Of those crimes 
that come to the attention of the police, officers select which crimes to record based on 
internal policies and procedures, existing legal definitions or their subjective 
assessment of the incident (see Reiner 2000; Maguire 2012; Bottomley and Coleman 
1981; see also Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 2014).  Farrington and 
Dowd’s (1985) comprehensive study of police recording practices best exemplifies the 
point.  This study found that, compared to neighbouring counties, the Nottinghamshire 
police were much more likely to record crimes involving property of little monetary 
value and crimes admitted to them during the course of interrogations. Thus, 
Nottinghamshire’s comparatively high crime rate was not a product of significantly 
higher levels of criminal activity, but of police recording practices.  Moreover, police 
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departments may have ulterior motives with respect to the information they report and 
how they report it.  For example, there may be institutional attempts to protect the 
reputation of the force or jurisdiction (Wolfgang 1963; Wittebrood and Junger 2002). 
In the case of Antigua and Barbuda, attributing property crime to the carelessness of 
property owners may absolve the RPF of having to admit its own failures and 
shortcomings.  Additionally, Maguire (2012) explains that some police departments 
engage in the practice of ‘cuffing’ or hiding offences as a means of work avoidance or 
to improve the overall clear up rate while others record large numbers of minor 
offences to artificially inflate the crime rate in an attempt to justify requests for 
additional resources.  As Reiner (2000: 76) notes, ‘to a large extent the better name for 
“crimes recorded by the police” might be “crimes which the police wish to make 
known”’.   
But, police recording practices are not always dependent on internal policies 
and procedures or subjective assessments by police officers. In many cases changes in 
legislation or counting rules may determine how crimes are recorded and which are 
included in the crime rate. Maguire (2012: 213) offers the example of the Theft Act 
1968, which expanded the definition of burglary, eliminating such offences as 
‘shopbreaking’ as well as the Public Order Act 1986, which created several new 
offences including ‘violent disorder’.  Therefore, even after adjusting for those crimes 
that never come to the attention of the police, official police data may not accurately 
reflect true crime levels.  Rather, official police data may more accurately reflect the 
particular normative perspectives and inner workings of the police and as such say 
more about police working practices (Biderman and Reiss 1967), the changing legal 
definitions of various crimes (Glaser 1967), and reporting behaviour by the public 
(Block 1974; Skogan 1984).  
These critiques of crime statistics notwithstanding, some scholars concede that 
they provide an empirical basis, albeit an imperfect one, for critically assessing claims 
that are made about crime. In the example of England and Wales, Maguire (2012) and 
Newburn (2007) have observed that crime trends emerging from police recorded crime 
figures and those emerging from annual household victimisation surveys have 
followed a similar trajectory.  Additionally, other indicators, including the number of 
suspects arrested by the police, have corroborated these trends.  These scholars agree 
that the fact that multiple sources lead to a similar conclusion suggests that crime 
statistics have some validity although the knowledge is always partial.  While crime 
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statistics cannot provide raw numerical truth, Maguire (2007: 255) argues that they do 
help to establish the ‘basic contours of crime’.  That is, the overall scale of crime and 
the relative incidence of different types of offences, trends in crime over time, and its 
geographical distribution.  This observation is especially important in the context of 
Antigua and Barbuda where there are few other ways to assess crime levels. Although 
crime statistics are supplemented by an annual household victimisation survey in 
many countries (see for example Newburn 2007; Maguire 2012; Reiner 2000), no such 
survey exists in Antigua and Barbuda. While Antigua and Barbuda was recently 
included in a 2010 UNDP victimisation survey, there is no consistent regional survey 
nor does the country systematically participate in the ICVS (UNDP 2012).   
Understanding that Antigua and Barbuda’s crime statistics are an imperfect but 
legitimate basis for critically assessing the claims that the public and the news media 
make about crime, I then turned to the literature on public and media knowledge of 
crime to better understand the dissonance between these claims and the official crime 
data. 
Public Knowledge of Crime 
It is well established that most people are ill informed about crime and criminal justice 
(see for example Hough and Roberts 2012).  While some studies have shown that 
people seem better at estimating the magnitude and direction of crime the closer the 
area in question gets to their own neighbourhood (Ditton and Chadee 2006; Hough 
and Roberts 2012), researchers have found that when compared to official crime data 
most people routinely overestimate the magnitude and direction of crime nationwide 
(Hough and Roberts 2012). For example, in countries where official crime data 
suggest the crime rate has declined or remained stable, most members of the public 
believe that crime was actually increasing (Hough and Roberts 2012).  In the United 
States, despite declining crime rates in 2011, 68 per cent of Americans believed that 
crime had increased from the year before (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 
2011).  In 2008 nearly 70 per cent of Australians erroneously believed that crime rates 
in Australia had increased over the past five years and in New Zealand, Canada and 
the United Kingdom, most people believed that crime rates were on the rise even 
though crime rates had fallen or remained stable (Butler and McFarlane 2009).  
Similar trends have been documented in contemporary South Africa (Govender 2013; 
Pharoah 2008).  Even in countries where crime rates have increased incrementally, 
researchers have found that most members of the public grossly overestimate the level 
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of increase.  As one of the few Caribbean countries for which such a study exists, the 
Barbados case is instructive.  In Barbados where crime rates increased modestly 
between 1997 and 2002, 70 per cent of Barbadians believed that crime rates increased 
significantly (Nuttall et al. 2003).   
Similarly, researchers have demonstrated that although people have a more 
accurate sense of the relative frequency of certain types of crimes in their own 
neighbourhoods (Ditton and Chadee 2006; Hough and Roberts 2012), on a national 
level, most members of the public have a skewed sense of the proportion of crime that 
involves violence generally (Butler and McFarlane 2009; Hough and Roberts 2012), 
and murder specifically (Mitchell and Roberts 2010).  For example, while official 
crime data show that only 20 per cent of the crime that occurred in Barbados between 
1997 and 2002 involved violence, over 40 per cent of Barbadians believed that more 
than 75 per cent of crimes involved violence and nearly 70 per cent of Barbadians 
believed that it was more than 50 per cent (Nuttall et al. 2003). The same applies to the 
United States, Britain, Australia and Canada where a review of official crime data 
suggested that no more than approximately 10 per cent of crimes involved violence yet 
more than 75 per cent of the public thought the percentage was much higher (Butler 
and McFarlane 2009; see also Hough and Roberts 2012). With regard to murder, and 
irrespective of jurisdiction, the bias towards overestimation remains.  Although an 
early study conducted by Hough and Roberts (1992) expressed doubt as to whether the 
British public tended to overestimate the country’s murder rate, later studies have 
found otherwise.  For example, Mitchell and Roberts (2010) found that a relatively 
small percentage of the British public accurately characterised the murder rate as 
declining while close to two-thirds erroneously believed that it had risen.  Despite a 
stable murder rate in Barbados between 1997 and 2002, 53 per cent of Barbadians 
believed there was a significant increase in murders during that time period (Nuttall et 
al. 2003).  In Trinidad and Tobago, Chadee et al. (2007) argued that the reason why 
more than 40 per cent of Trinidadians expected to be murdered in the next 12 months 
was due, in part, to them grossly overestimating the frequency of murders occurring in 
the country.  According to Chadee et al. (2007) the Trinidadian case is an extreme 
example of the general tendency for people to rate undesirable and involuntary events 
as more likely to occur than those that are desirable and voluntary.  However, finding 
that 31 per cent and 25 per cent of Jamaicans below the age of 25 and above the age of 
56, respectively, overestimated their risk of being murdered, Harriott (2003a) has 
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attributed such staggering overestimations to a combination of national economic 
vulnerability, a highly competitive media environment, and the small size of the 
society. 
Finally, researchers have demonstrated that most members of the public have a 
skewed sense of the criminal justice system as well.  For example, when compared to 
official crime data most people overestimate rates of recidivism (Roberts 1992) while 
underestimating the length of time that offenders serve in prison (Mitchell and Roberts 
2010) and the severity of judicial sentencing in general (Hough and Roberts 2012).  
For example, Roberts and White (1986) found that Canadians substantially 
overestimated the rate at which convicted first-time offenders went on to reoffend.  
Mitchell and Roberts (2010) found that in England and Wales most people 
underestimated the amount of time a convicted offender served in prison and believed 
that judicial sentencing was too lenient.  In fact, Hough and Roberts (2012) conclude 
that in general, most people believe that the criminal justice process is plagued by 
excessive leniency.  
The dissonance between public perception of crime and criminal justice and 
official crime data remains for many reasons (Hough and Roberts 2012).  Several 
commentators, including Maguire (2012) and Reiner (2000), have noted that it is 
misguided to use official crime statistics – the very standard against which public 
perception is measured – as a reliable barometer of true crime levels.  These scholars 
have long argued that official crime statistics are a more accurate measure of crimes 
that are recorded by the police than of crimes that actually occur, although they do 
concede that there may be some validity to the crime statistics even if information they 
provide is always partial (see also Newburn 2007).  
Other reasons for the dissonance between the public perception of crime and 
official crime data include the fact that politicians often politicise crime, attacking 
opponents who draw attention to declining crime rates.  For example, although 
academic criminologists and statisticians in Britain agreed that crime had fallen 
between 2000 and 2010, during this time politicians took every opportunity to attack 
their opponents if they emphasised the deline (Hough and Roberts 2012).    
Additionally, many countries did in fact experience sustained increases in crime for 
much of the 20th century.  For example, in Britain the crime rate increased 
dramatically in the mid 1920s and increased almost every year between 1955 and 1992 
(Reiner 2000).  According to David Garland (2001), within a single generation these 
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increased crime rates made crime a prominent fact of life for the British middle class 
thus creating new sensibilities around the phenomena. Hough and Roberts (201: 282) 
argue that such prolonged periods of increasing crime may lead members of the public 
to believe that crime always rises thus hindering their ability to recognise immediately 
reversing trends and cite the mass media’s emphasis on ‘dramatic and worrying’ crime 
stories for the public’s dystopic view of crime and criminal justice. Indeed, crime and 
criminal justice are similarly distorted in their newspaper representation. 
Newspaper Portrayals of Crime 
The crime narrative most often told by newspaper crime stories is one that embodies 
Surette’s (2003: 41; 2015: 59) ‘law of opposites’ or ‘backwards law’.  That is, 
newspaper crime articles overwhelmingly emphasise the opposite of whatever crime 
trends and patterns emerge from official crime data.  Where official crime data suggest 
that incidents of property crime outstrip those of violent crime, articles focused on 
violent crime are more prevalent (see for example Surette 2003; 2015).  Where official 
crime data identify the elderly, children and women among those least likely to be 
victimised, newspaper crime articles exaggerate the crime risks faced by these very 
people (see for example Greer and Reiner 2012). Where official crime data suggest 
that the overall crime rate is declining, crime related articles become increasingly 
numerous, focusing on individual incidents without engaging in any meaningful trend 
analysis or discussion of the causes of crime.  Moreover, beyond demonising 
individual offenders, these stories fail to investigate the nature of criminals (Marsh 
1991; Graber 1980; see also Greer and Reiner 2012; Sasson 1995).  According to 
Surette (2003), this law also holds true for most characteristics of criminal justice 
including the severity of judicial sentences and prison conditions. Additionally, 
newspaper crime stories are overwhelmingly concerned with the early stages of the 
criminal justice process – the planning and commission of the crime, the subsequent 
police investigation and the apprehension of the offender.  Less represented are articles 
focused on the seemingly more mundane aspects of the process – court procedures and 
corrections (Surette 2015, 2003).  This kind of distortion transcends individual news 
organisations or jurisdiction. 
Analysis of newspapers in a number of jurisdictions confirms these findings.  
According to Reiner et al. (2003), the patterns of crimes reported in British newspaper 
articles since the Second World War have generally been the ‘opposite’ of official 
crime data.  For example, approximately two-thirds of newspaper crime articles focus 
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on violent crime or sexual violation even though such offences account for less than 
10 per cent of crimes recorded by the police.  In fact, Reiner et al. (2003) maintain that 
newspapers are unlikely to publish articles on property crime at all unless the incidents 
involve celebrities. The study further found that British newspaper crime articles 
exaggerate the risks of victimisation faced by older middle-class members of the 
public and represent crime as increasingly menacing and unyielding.  In contrast, 
British crime data suggest that it is poor and socially marginalised members of the 
public who are at greater risk of victimisation and that crime rates are not unyielding 
as they actually declined during the relevant time period (Reiner et al. 2003).   
A content analysis of four daily newspapers in the United States mirrors these 
trends.  Graber (1980) found that when compared to official crime data murder is 
grossly overrepresented in newspaper articles while property crimes are grossly 
underrepresented.  Additionally, Graber (1980) found that American newspapers 
supply a large amount of data about specific crimes without commensurate analytical 
or evaluative information that might facilitate a broader understanding of the data.  
Marsh’s (1991) research supports Graber’s  (1980) findings in the United States and 
draws similar conclusions with respect to 14 other countries including countries – such 
as Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda – that are not often represented in the literature.  In 
Trinidad and Tobago, one of the very few English speaking Caribbean countries 
represented in the literature, Chadee and Ditton (2005, 2007) found the ‘law of 
opposites’ to be most acute with respect to murder specifically though pertinent to 
violent crime more generally. 
Like the dissonance between the public perception of crime and official crime 
data, the extant literature offers clear reasons for the dissonance between newspaper 
representations of crime and official crime data (see for example Hough and Roberts 
2012).  One important reason for this dissonance is ‘newsworthiness’. In their seminal 
work, Galtung and Ruge (1965) identified 12 ‘news values’ or criteria by which news 
organisations determine the events they deem newsworthy. Among these news values 
are immediacy, negativity, unpredictability, clarity and novelty.  According to Galtung 
and Ruge (1965), the more of these news values an event satisfies, the more likely it is 
to be included in newspapers. Moreover, once the event is selected, the very news 
values for which it was selected are accentuated.  This process of selection and 
distortion (Galtung and Ruge 1965) encourages news organisations to emphasise 
individual incidents featuring violent crime, sexual violation, and the victimisation of 
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people who, statistically, are the least likely to be victimised – especially those people 
who best comport with Nils Christie’s (1986) composite of the vulnerable and 
blameless ‘ideal victim’.  Equally, the process discourages nuance, complexity and the 
type of trend analysis or evaluative information that would facilitate a broader 
understanding of crime and criminal justice. Thus, the ‘news values’ of newspaper 
organisations play a pivotal role in ensuring that certain crime narratives receive 
significantly more coverage than others (Hough and Roberts 2012: 282). Or, as a 
former Antiguan and Barbudan newspaper publisher excitedly explained in an 
interview conducted for this study, ‘if a guy chops off a woman’s head or like in 
Grenada comes to the police station with a bucket with two heads in it, now that 
there’s big news! You’ll need to print extra papers!’ 
But, although two severed heads in a bucket may satisfy nearly all of Galtung 
and Ruge’s (1965) news values, researchers have long argued that newsworthiness by 
itself does not explain the distorted representation of crime in newspapers (see for 
example Greer and Reiner 2012; Schudson 2011; Halloran et al. 1970).  Beyond 
newsworthiness, researchers such as Hall et al. (1978) argue that it is the very 
newspaper production process – the transformation of a newsworthy event into a story 
– that ensures crime news is written from a particular perspective.  Thus, the 
newspaper production process is itself value-laden. This approach to understanding 
media representations of crime is a structuralist approach most closely associated with 
the control paradigm.  The control paradigm, one of two theoretical paradigms that 
shaped news media research in the 20th Century, has been influential in the academy 
and dominates academic research on news media, crime and justice (Greer 2010; see 
also Hall 1982).  
 
The Control Paradigm 
Control approaches, including the structuralist approach, are informed by Marxist and 
critical theory and emphasise the unequal distribution of economic and cultural power 
throughout society  (Greer 2010; Greer and Reiner 2012). Structuralist researchers 
operating within this paradigm argue that newspapers exist to reproduce dominant 
ideology, promote the interests of the ruling elite and legitimate the capitalist system 
(Greer 2010; Greer and Reiner 2012).  According to these researchers, implicit and 
explicit constraints on journalists’ professional autonomy, the dominance of a narrow 
range of powerful sources and the normalisation of ruling class values throughout 
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societies structured around a ‘manufactured consensus’ combine to shape the process 
of news selection and production (Greer 2010). From this perspective, what news 
organisations choose to publish as news reflects socially determined notions of who 
and what are important (Greer and Reiner 2012; Graber 1980).  These organisations 
assume the identity of an audience and the terms that would make an event 
comprehensible to that audience (Hall 1993). From this structuralist understanding, 
news organisations necessarily distort because they create their own reality.   
Building on work by Lang and Lang (1955), Halloran et al. (1970) describe the 
news production process as being governed by ‘inferential structures’ or frameworks 
that have been predefined on the basis of values and definitions already legitimated in 
the public mind (see also Greer 2010).  According to Hall (1993) these inferential 
structures are ‘maps of meaning’ that give plausibility, order, and coherence to 
discrete events by tapping into broadly shared beliefs and a ‘common stock of 
knowledge’ (see also Greer and Reiner 2012).  While the development of an 
inferential structure involves neither intentional bias nor ‘simple selection by 
expectation’, it does involve ‘a process of simplification and interpretation, which 
structures the meaning given to the story around its original news value’ (Cohen 
1972/2002: 33; Halloran et al. 1970: 215-16).  For Chibnall (1977/2013: 30), this 
simplification and interpretation involves the ‘pruning down’ and ‘moulding’ of reality 
to fit pre-existing forms of news.  Thus, reality is forced to accommodate the news – 
the news need not concern itself with reality.  And, to facilitate immediate 
comprehension, social situations, where possible, are forced into binary oppositions 
that are familiar (Chibnall 1977/2013: 30).  In their media analysis of London’s 1968 
anti-Vietnam war demonstrations, Halloran et al. (1970) show how in the weeks 
preceding the demonstrations the media predefined the event as one that would or 
could involve violent confrontations between the binary forces of ‘law and order’ (as 
represented by the police) on the one hand and ‘anarchy’ (as represented by the 
demonstrators) on the other (Halloran et al. 1970: 90; see also Greer and Reiner 2012: 
264). On the day of the demonstrations, although there were very few incidents of 
violence, reporters nevertheless emphasised in their news reports those violent 
incidents.  It was the issue of violence that became news.  The news coverage distorted 
the relatively peaceful event to fit with a predefined inferential structure – a 
‘framework of violence’.    
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Over time these inferential structures have become incorporated into 
journalism’s ‘stock of knowledge’ and in employing them journalists simultaneously 
normalise value-laden definitions and images and obviate fresh thinking about new 
phenomena (Hall 1993; Hall et al. 1978; Chibnall 1977/2013). Rather than helping the 
audience to understand old realities in new ways, in using inferential structures 
journalists encourage the audience to understand new realities in old ways (Chibnall 
1977/2013: 35).  As one crime reporter in Chibnall’s research admitted, news stories 
are ‘simple clichés set to music – you select the right cliché and you write it up to suit 
the particular circumstances’ (see Chibnall 1977/2013: 35).   Moreover, occupational 
pressures encourage reliance on these predefined structures.  Retrieving a ‘framework’ 
is convenient, facilitates deadlines and the time schedules of news production, ensures 
that stories will not offend and provides a story with instant credibility.  When 
journalists construct a story around a predefined structure, their reporting is more 
likely to be respected and seen as ‘responsible’ (see Chibnall 1977/2013).  According 
to Hall (1993: 87), such normative structures ‘contain strong prescriptions to ‘see’ 
events in certain ways: they tend to ‘rule in’ and ‘rule out’ certain kinds of additional 
inferences’.  As such, journalism’s inferential structures inform and reflect a 
hegemonic ideology – an ideology that rarely changes once established (see for 
example Lang and Lang 1955).   
However, Hall et al. (1978) are quick to emphasise that news organisations do 
not autonomously create these structures or transmit the resulting ideology in a 
conspiratorial manner. Rather, news organisations play a secondary role.  News 
organisations reproduce the dominant ideology.  Hall et al. (1978) locate this activity 
in the journalistic imperatives of ‘impartiality’, ‘balance’, and ‘objectivity’. These 
professional rules require a clear distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ privileging 
stories that are firmly grounded in the authority of ‘experts’ in the fields covered by 
the stories (Hall et al. 1978; Chibnall 1977).  The more powerful the position of the 
‘expert’ informing the story – the more information members of the public perceive 
the expert to possess – the more ‘factual’ and ‘objective’ members of the public will 
believe the story to be. Becker (1967) explains this as society’s ‘hierarchy of 
credibility’: 
[i]n any system of ranked groups, participants take it as given that 
members of the highest group have the right to define the way things 
really are...those at the top have access to a more complete picture of 
what is going on than anybody else.  Members of lower groups will 
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have incomplete information and their view of reality will be partial 
and distorted in consequence. (see Chibnall 1977: 38-39) 
  
For crime reporters, this means the most coveted sources of statements and 
information are those perceived to have all the ‘facts’ pertaining to crime: the police, 
Members of Parliament responsible for public safety and other high-ranking 
government officials. By necessity crime reporters develop a symbiotic relationship 
with these sources, as access to official statements and information is critical to the 
crime reporter’s livelihood (Greer and Reiner 2012).  Ultimately, crime reporters 
become the mouthpiece of the police and the criminal justice system inevitably relying 
on and reproducing their respective institutional views. Hall et al. (1978: 58) note: 
Ironically, the very rules which aim to preserve the impartiality of the 
media and which grew out of desires for greater professional 
neutrality, also serve powerfully to orientate the media in the 
‘definitions of social reality’ which their ‘accredited sources’ – the 
institutional spokesmen – provide. 
 
Thus, from a structuralist perspective, the dissonance between newspaper 
representations of crime and official crime data lie in a combination of 
newsworthiness, the newspaper production process and an overreliance on official 
crime data and statements from the police and high-ranking government officials.   
 
The Liberal Pluralist Paradigm 
The second theoretical paradigm that shaped news media in the 20th Century – the 
liberal pluralist paradigm – emphasises the principles of freedom, choice and 
democracy. Operating from this largely American perspective, pluralist researchers 
argue that news selection and production is shaped not by elite interests but by public 
interests and consumer demand and the sovereignty of professional journalistic values 
rather than constraints on journalists’ professional autonomy.  Additionally, pluralist 
researchers argue that news selection and production is shaped by equal competition 
for media access by a diversity of news sources and the collective values of a society 
built around ‘organic consensus’. These approaches are popular among media 
practitioners and those wielding the most cultural, economic and political power 
(Greer 2010; see also Hall 1982).  From this perspective, the role of the news media is 
to accurately inform audiences, protect democracy and serve the interests of the social 
majority. Such an approach inadequately explains why crime articles would 
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overwhelmingly emphasise the opposite of whatever crime trends and patterns emerge 
from official crime data (see Hall 1982). 
 
Caribbean Crime Literature 
Criminological literature on crime in the Caribbean developed in two discernible 
phases (see Harriott 2003; Birkbeck 1999). The first phase saw scholars grappling 
with questions surrounding the appropriate content and direction of the region’s 
theoretical work (Birkbeck 1999).  In calling for a ‘Caribbean criminology’, for 
example, Kenneth Pryce (1976/2007) argued that scholars working in and on the 
Caribbean should adopt critical criminology as the theoretical framework for their 
work while Bennett and Lynch (1996/2007) identified five Caribbean-specific features 
that rendered critical criminology and all other existing theoretical frameworks 
inapplicable to the region.  Maureen Cain (1996/2007) rebuffed the wholesale embrace 
or rejection of existing theories arguing instead that Caribbean criminologists must 
engage with existing theoretical frameworks ‘instrumentally’ as they explore the 
concrete reality of Caribbean experiences.  Similarly, Deosaran and Chadee 
(1997/2007) maintained that any Caribbean criminology eventually taking shape 
would not have at its core a theoretical framework radically different from those 
already existing.  Rather, any Caribbean criminology would reinterpret existing theory 
in a way that made sense for the Caribbean.  According to Birkbeck (1999/2007), at 
this point Caribbean criminology was thought to exist at a pre-theoretical level as most 
scholars had not engaged in the empirical testing of a set of general statements that 
offered an explanation for the region’s experience with crime.  Harriott (2003) 
explains that much of this early criminological work in and on the region involved 
very little empirical work.   
In contrast, the second phase of criminological research has proven to be more 
empirically grounded and methodologically rigorous. This research that Harriott 
(2003) refers to as ‘second-generation literature’ does not rely solely on official crime 
statistics and is more varied in focus and perspective.  For example, scholars have 
focused on, inter alia, female victimisation (see for example Jones 2003; Bernard 
2006), victimisation and ethnicity (see for example Norris and Bergdahl 2007), crime 
and tourism (see for example Alleyne and Boxill 2003; King 2003), policing and 
security (see for example Harriott 2000; Mars 2001/2007; Deosaran 2002, 2007; 
Griffith 2004; Bowling 2005, 2006, 2010), gang violence (see for example Seepersad 
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and Bissessar 2013), crime and governance (see for example Ryan and Ferguson 2003; 
Gray 2001), drugs (see for example King 2000; Klein et al. 2004; Figueira 2004; 
Bartilow 2007; Bowling 2008), gun violence (see for example Agozino et al. 2009), 
fear of crime (see for example Chadee 2001, 2003; Harriott 2003a; Chadee and Ditton 
2007), incarceration (see for example Ramdhanie 2002/2007; Jones 2007), crime 
reporting behaviour by the public (see for example Bennett and Wiegand 1994) and 
crime policy (see for example Surette et al. 2011; Robotham 2003).  Notwithstanding 
the important strides that have been made, however, important gaps remain.  
First, literature that focus on the crime experience of individual Caribbean 
countries tend to focus exclusively on the region’s larger countries such as Jamaica 
(see for example Harriott 2000, 2003, 2008; Headley 2002, 2003; Gunst 2003; Lawton 
2008, Bailey 2008, 2010), Trinidad and Tobago (see for example Hagley-Dickinson 
2011) and Guyana (see for example Mars and Mars 2002; Granger 2011). To date, 
there is very little academic literature dedicated solely to the crime experience of 
Antigua and Barbuda, any of the other countries comprising the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States (the “OECS”) or Barbados. Of those regional studies that 
include these smaller countries, the analysis is often based on incomplete data 
provided by national criminal justice organisations  (see for example de Albuquerque 
and McElroy 1999; Deosoran 2004).   The data to which researchers gain access are 
often incomplete because, as is the case in Antigua and Barbuda, national criminal 
justice organisations in many of these countries do not collect crime data in a 
systematic or uniform manner over time, organisations are sometimes unwilling to 
divulge the data to non-governmental individuals, and the data collected are often not 
stored in a database that is conducive to easy extraction or manipulation (Bennett and 
Lynch 1996/2007).  
Second, very little work has been done with respect to the social construction 
of crime in the Caribbean.   That is, Caribbean criminological research is mainly 
conducted from an ‘objectivist’ perspective that is concerned with the sources, 
dimensions and possible remedies of crime rather than the process by which crime has 
come to be viewed as a problem.  Much of this work is centred on ‘practical’ questions 
including who or what causes crime in the Caribbean, who is harmed by that crime, 
what is the harm suffered, and what are the prescribed measures that can ameliorate 
the situation. The unquestioned assumption is that crime is a problem in the region.  
Rarely asked is whether crime deserves the type of attention it receives – whether 
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there is any relationship between the questions that dominate the crime literature and 
the ways in which Caribbean people have understood their criminological realities. 
Finally, there is a dearth of academic research on the development of 
Caribbean crime policy.  This deficiency has resulted in what Harriott (2003: xvii) 
calls an ‘emerging intellectual dependence on external assistance and consultancies’.  
Indeed, much of the regional crime literature that includes Antigua and Barbuda has 
been conducted by consultants and published by regional or international organisations 
(see for example Maertens and Anstey 2007; Barnes et al. 2008; UNDP 2012).  As 
Harriott (2003: xvii) explains: 
These consultants bring with them the experience of their countries, 
and in some instances a wider experience, but they have no 
knowledge of the local situation and no time to learn about it.  They 
may also bring considerable ideological luggage with them, as 
expressed in fads associated with the rotation of political 
administrations in their home countries, which are not interrogated 
from the viewpoint of the concrete realties of [the Caribbean]. 
As a study focused exclusively on crime and crime policy in Antigua and Barbuda, 
this research makes a modest attempt to begin filling some of these gaps in Caribbean 
crime literature.  More broadly, this research responds to Harriott’s (2003) call for the 
type of empirical research that will facilitate a better understanding of the Caribbean 
crime phenomenon and allow for evidence-based judgements and policy. 
 
II 
 
Social Constructionism 
As a result of their seminal 1966 text, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 
in the Sociology of Knowledge, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann are widely 
heralded as the intellectual forefathers of the modern social constructionist movement 
(Gubrium and Holstein 2008; Best 2008).  Informed by Durkheim (1961, 1964), 
Berger and Luckmann rendered problematic the taken-for-granted ‘facts’ of 
experience that had been treated as matters to be discovered, recorded and analysed 
(Best 2008). In their text, Berger and Luckmann (1966) encouraged empirical attention 
to the social processes that shape knowledge and established a framework for 
understanding the ways in which meanings are created through social interaction.  
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Within sociology, Berger and Luckmann’s ideas were infectious.  By the late 1970s, 
sociologists commonly used constructionist theory to anchor their inquiries of news, 
science, deviance and social problems (see for example Knorr-Cetina 1981; Tuchman 
1978; Douglas 1970; Spector and Kitsuse 1977; see also Best 2008).  Beyond 
sociology, Berger and Luckmann’s approach had far reaching effects. In charting the 
development of the paradigm, Best (2008) explains that Berger and Luckmann’s 
insights were published at a fortuitous time, when the academy was characterised by 
an increasing demand for innovative ideas rigid enough to guide emerging scholarship 
but malleable enough to be applied to many different experiences in many different 
disciplines.  As such, social constructionism quickly flourished as a frame for 
understanding a range of disparate experiences including, child abuse (Gelles 1975), 
social problems (Spector and Kitsuse 1977), gender (Lorber and Farrell 1991), 
sexuality (Kitzinger 1987), race (Haney Lopez 1994), wife abuse (Loseke 1992) and 
pregnancy (Gardener 1994), across a range of disparate disciplines such as 
anthropology (Faubian and Marcus 2008), communications (Foster and Bochner 
2008), education (Wortham and Jackson 2008), psychology (Gergen 1985; Gergen and 
Gergen 2008), public policy (Schneider and Ingram 2008) and political science 
(Edelman 1988; Schneider and Ingram 1993).   
For scholars interested in drawing attention to troubling social conditions and 
the plight of vulnerable communities or for those interested in the disjunction between 
the objective indicators of a social condition and the way in which that social 
condition is experienced or treated, the appeal of social constructionism was clear.  In 
contrast to the objectivist perspective, social constructionism allowed these scholars to 
look beyond the causes, dimensions or possible remedies of the conditions they 
investigated and to question the processes through which knowledge of these 
conditions were created.  Additionally, social constructionism allowed scholars to 
examine how impacted communities experienced theses social conditions.  W.I. 
Thomas famously wrote, ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences’ (Goffman 1974/1986: 1).  Social constructionism allowed scholars to 
better understand these consequences.   
At the heart of social constructionism are the shared meanings held by 
members of society – what Surette (2015) calls the ideas, interpretations and 
knowledge that groups of people agree to hold in common.  According to this 
perspective, what we understand to be real is not independent of human processes or 
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grounded in discrete events but is created through active social relationships and a tacit 
agreement to see the world in a specific way.  As Surette (2015: 31) explains: 
...in social constructionism, the degree to which a given constructed 
reality prevails is not directly dependent on its objective empirical 
validity but is instead strongly influenced by shifting cultural trends 
and social forces.  The world may be in one state, but people can 
believe it is in another state and act accordingly.  
According to Best (2008: 57): 
People constantly make choices based on how they understand their 
alternatives...and those choices...then constrain what they will do next.  
Many of these choices are soon lost from sight, and an edifice of taken-
for-granted assumptions about the world emerges and evolves.  Adopting 
a constructionist stance makes it easier for analysts to penetrate those 
assumptions and to recognize and study these processes. 
This is the insight that informed Stanley Cohen’s (1972/2002) seminal work on ‘moral 
panics’, Craig Reinarman’s (1994) work on ‘drug scares’, Stuart Hall et al.’s (1978) 
work on mugging, Joel Best’s (1991) work on freeway violence and a host of other 
constructionist studies looking at how particulars issue come to public attention (Best 
1999). Indeed, social problems research offers the clearest examples.   Social 
constructionism provided to social problem scholars a well-developed framework for 
investigating the contested claims made by ‘claims makers’ – the promoters, activists 
professional experts and spokespersons involved in articulating specific claims about a 
social condition – in the creation of new social problem categories (Cohen 1972/2002; 
Surette 2015).  Put differently,  ‘[c]onditions might exist, people might be hurt by 
them, but conditions are not social problems until humans categorize them as 
troublesome and in need of repair’ (Loseke 2003: 14). Social constructionism provided 
a framework for understanding the categorisation process. 
But, social constructionism has flourished in spite of its critics not without 
them.  Beyond the general critique that constructionist research questions often 
seemed trivial or secondary as compared to objective concerns about the condition 
itself (Loseke 2003), scholars such as Hacking (1999) argued that constructionists 
were too concerned with the extent to which claims were accepted as truthful and not 
concerned enough with the actual truthfulness of the claims themselves.  Hacking 
(1999: 4) famously suggested,  
The next stage in the notorious series of holocaust denials might be a 
book entitled The Social Construction of the Holocaust, a work urging 
that the Nazi extermination camps are exaggerated and the gas 
chambers fictions. 
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For these critics, constructionist language offered a cloak of legitimacy that could 
allow spurious, arbitrary or self-serving claims to flourish (Best 2008).  Other critics 
argued that social constructionist scholars engaged in the same detrimental practices 
that they condemned.  That is, social constructionists routinely privileged their own 
assumptions by failing to simultaneously apply the same sort of constructionist 
critiques to their own ideas and assumptions (Best 2008).  Woolgar and Pawluch 
(1985) called this failure ‘ontological gerrymandering’.  Constructionist scholars 
ultimately addressed the charge of ontological gerrymandering by splitting into two 
separate factions, the strict constructionists who conceded the charge and sought to 
avoid all objectivist assumptions about reality, and the less radical contextual 
constructionists, who accepted the basic premise of social constructionism but saw 
ontological gerrymandering as a necessary evil, something to be aware of and to be 
handled with caution (Best 2008). This divide among social constructionist researchers 
had profound implications for the type of research that they could produce.   While 
strict constructionism allowed researchers to note claims and counterclaims about 
social conditions, the ontological imperative to avoid all assumptions about the ‘truth’ 
of these conditions enjoined them from assessing their relative merits.  As Best (1993: 
136) explains: 
Calls for sociologists to stay within the analytic boundaries of strict 
constructionism, coupled with admissions that most – if not all – 
constructionist case studies fail to meet those standards, raise the 
question whether a strict constructionist analysis is possible or even 
desirable. 
 
In contrast, contextual constructionism allowed researchers to move past the 
ontological dilemma and study ‘claims-making’ within the context of culture and 
social structure.  Researchers were able to examine the relative veracity of claims and 
assess the societal impact of those claims making very careful assumptions about the 
‘truth’ of the conditions they studied.  According to Best (1993), these studies were 
particularly useful in societies heavily committed to information and comment through 
mass media, governmental organisations and professional agencies.  In short, 
contextual constructionism facilitated increased knowledge of social life by assuming 
that understanding the empirical world is desirable and thus a better understanding of 
the empirical world would result from paying more attention to the manner in which 
social problems emerged (Best 1993). Much of the social construction research 
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pertaining to crime and criminal justice, including this study, is informed by 
contextual constructionist assumptions. 
The Social Construction of Crime and Criminal Justice 
Gamson (1992) and Sasson (1995) argue that in constructing meaning people draw on 
‘popular wisdom’, ‘experiential knowledge’ and ‘media discourse’. Loseke (2003) 
adds to these ideational resources the terms ‘practical experience’, ‘cultural themes 
and feeling rules’, and ‘local culture’, while Surette (2015) includes ‘conversational 
reality’.  Nomenclature aside, constructionist scholars generally agree that people 
acquire social knowledge and construct their own version of reality from a variety of 
sources that are broadly categorised as ‘experienced reality’, ‘symbolic reality’, and 
‘socially constructed reality’ (Surette 2015).  With respect to crime and criminal 
justice, a person’s experienced reality is her or his direct first-hand experience with 
crime or the criminal justice system.  A person’s symbolic reality includes those 
accounts of crime or criminal justice experiences she or he believes that were relayed 
to her or him by friends, acquaintances or other people, social groups, institutions and 
the media.  A person’s socially constructed reality is what she or he perceives as the 
‘real’ world based on the mixture of her or his experienced and symbolic realities.  It 
is this socially constructed reality that largely governs a person’s behaviour because 
people generally behave according to what they believe about the world around them 
and it is this socially constructed reality that ultimately shapes public policy (Surette 
2015). 
 Surette (2015: 33) describes the social construction of crime and criminal 
justice in four stages.  During Stage 1 criminal events occur and are noted by 
individuals and organisations. During Stage 2 there is an attempt to contextualise the 
criminal events.  Here, competing constructions offer differing descriptions of the 
context in which the criminal events occurred.  For example, some may argue that 
crime is out of control while others might argue that society is safe.   Crime statistics 
and stories may be used at this time to support either construction.  Those articulating 
each argument – the ‘claims makers’ – might offer differing explanations of why 
crime is out of control or why society is safe and prescribe a set of corrective or 
maintenance measures.  During Stage 3 the media help to filter competing 
constructions favouring those that are dramatic, sponsored by powerful groups and 
related to pre-established cultural themes.  In this example, the media are more likely 
to support the construction that crime is out of control because gruesome murders, 
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random violence, bizarre crimes and the triumph of evil over innocence are the sort of 
crime drama that the media relish.  By privileging some constructions over others, the 
media effectively determine which version of reality is considered legitimate and thus 
‘real’. During the final stage, Stage 4, the dominant social construction of crime 
emerges. As most people have very little direct experience with crime and the criminal 
justice system, the construction most likely to prevail is the construction favoured by 
the media.   This four-stage process has significant implications because the dominant 
social construction of crime actually directs criminal justice policy. That is, the 
dominant socially constructed crime reality will establish the contours of the crime 
problem – its sources, trends, definitions and policy responses (Surette 2015).  The 
crime reality that people believe to be true will influence legislation and the allocation 
of government resources and will communicate implicit value judgments: which 
members of society are virtuous or dangerous, who deserves attention and protection, 
and which actions should be rewarded or penalised (Sasson 1995). 
 
 
Figure 1: Surette's Four Stages of Social Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from Surette, R. 2015. Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice. Pg. 33. Stamford, CT: 
Cengage Learning 
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Frame Analysis 
Although frame analysis has its roots in cognitive psychology and anthropology 
(Gamson 1988; Goffman 1974/1986), the methodology is widely attributed to the 
sociologist Erving Goffman (1974/1986) and is commonly used in constructionist 
research on crime and criminal justice policy (Sasson 1995; Surette 2015).  As a 
sociologist, Goffman appreciated the complexity inherent in making sense of one’s 
social world and understood that people could not make sense of their social world 
without drawing on their past experiences.  As such, Goffman focused on the 
‘organisation of experience’.  Operating from the question, ‘What is going on here?’ 
Goffman (1974/1986) aimed to fashion a response by isolating the available 
‘frameworks of understanding’ or ‘frames’ that people draw on to make sense of 
events and analysing the peculiarities and vulnerabilities to which these frameworks 
are subject. Frame analysis is thus premised on the constructionist notion that we are 
active assemblers of meaning and in constructing our accounts of reality we draw 
upon the ideational resources at our disposal.  For Goffman and his intellectual 
progeny, this cognitive process is not done consciously.  As Koenig (2004: 2) 
explains, in a ‘Goffmanian’ context,  ‘frames are not consciously manufactured but are 
unconsciously adopted in the course of communicative processes’.  Gitlin (1980: 6-7) 
elaborates: 
[f]rames are principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation 
composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and 
what matters.  In everyday life, as Erving Goffman has amply 
demonstrated, we frame reality in order to negotiate it, manage it, 
comprehend it, and choose appropriate repertories of cognition and 
action. 
But, contemporary frame analysis reflects a break with Goffmanian tradition.  During 
its evolution, theorists reimagined the concept of framing as something done 
consciously.  Second generation frame analysis, traced back to Entman (1993), 
emphasises deliberate frame selection.  According to Entman (1993: 52): 
[f]raming essentially involves selection and salience.  To frame is to 
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient 
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described. 
Reese (2001: 6) goes as far as suggesting that framing is necessarily an active process 
and as such the paramount question ought to be ‘how much ‘framing’ is going on’? 
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Whether the framing process happens consciously or unconsciously, scholars are clear 
that ultimately frames give coherence and meaning to events and phenomena (Beckett 
1994; Gamson et. al 1992).  On a functional level, frames serve to define problems, 
diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies (Entman 1993; Gamson 
1992). That is, frames contain a ‘diagnostic component that identifies a condition as 
intolerable and attributes blame or causality, and a prognostic component that 
prescribes one or more courses of ameliorative action’ (Sasson 1995: 10). Each frame 
often evokes a standard counterclaim or rebuttal argument from those who disagree 
with it. Frames, and their corresponding rebuttals can be conjured through metaphors, 
catch phrases, public figures, and other condensing symbols (Sasson 1995; Gamson 
1988). Frames have significant policy implications because they determine which 
events and phenomena garner public attention, how the public understand them, how 
they are evaluated and how law and policymakers choose to respond. Accordingly, 
what a frame includes is as important as what it omits (Entman 1993).  Edelman 
(1993: 232) underscores the point:   
The character, causes, and consequences of any phenomenon 
becomes radically different as changes are made in what is 
prominently displayed, what is repressed, and especilly in how 
observations are classified. Far from being stable, the social world is 
therefore a chameleon, or, to suggest a better metaphor, a 
kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can be readily evoked 
by altering the ways in which observations are framed and 
categorized.  
In short, frames can be thought of as fully developed social construction templates that 
allow people to easily categorise, label and deal with the events and phenomena they 
invariably encounter as they go about their everyday lives (Surette 2015: 37).  
Framing Crime and Criminal Justice Policy 
Just as media scholars have come to rely increasingly on frame analysis (Tuchman 
1978; Gitlin 1980; Lang and Lang 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson et al. 
1992) so too have those scholars who conduct research on crime and criminal justice 
policy (Gusfield 1984; Reinarman and Levine 1989; Best 1990, 1991, 1994, 1999, 
2004; Sasson 1995, 1995a; Beckett 1994, 1997, 2000; Altheide 2002; Cavender 2004; 
Reinarman 2004; Hayward and Presdee 2010; Boda et al. 2011; Boda and Szabo 
2011).  For these scholars, frame analysis provides a useful intellectual framework for 
mapping shifts in crime policy, examining crime discourse in the media and 
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understanding public perceptions of crime (see for example Sasson 1995; Altheide 
2002; Cavender 2004; Boda et al. 2011).  Like the frames that exist with respect to 
other social problems, crime frames consist of diagnostic and prognostic components.  
Crime frames might articulate broad statements about the causes of crime generally or 
the causes of a specific incident, they may provide explanations for the nature of the 
crime problem or why the specific incident occurred and they may prescribe 
ameliorative policy responses. Beyond the confines of the academy, when attempting 
to make sense of crime and criminal justice events and phenomena, the ability to 
quickly employ a pre-established frame, especially those with built-in policy 
prescriptions, obviates the analysis, deliberation and nuance otherwise required.  
Because various frames have sponsors of varying levels of influence and power, the 
frames end up competing with one another to define the society’s crime reality. Put 
differently, how criminality is understood in the society, which criminal justice 
policies enjoy public support and how new crimes and criminals are perceived, are 
linked inextricably to the frame that is most widely accepted  (Surrette 2015).  
 Crime Talk: How Citizens Construct a Social Problem by Theodore Sasson 
(1994) is one of the few texts to include a working catalogue of culturally available 
frames on street crime. From examining samples of media and popular crime 
discourse, Sasson determined that all the main views on crime and criminal justice 
could be distilled into one of five frames: ‘Faulty System’, ‘Blocked Opportunities’, 
‘Social Breakdown’, ‘Media Violence’ and ‘Racist System’.  Although Sasson’s 
research is focused on the crime discourse in the United States, Boda et al. (2011) 
expands the catalogue beyond this context and contributes the ‘Cruel World’ frame, 
and the ‘Faulty Politics’ frame.  However, these latter two frames are less 
comprehensive than Sasson’s with respect to its prognostic and diagnostic components.  
 The first frame, Faulty System, posits that crime is a result of impunity – 
people commit crimes because they know they can get away with them.  The police 
are ‘handcuffed’ by liberal judges, the overcrowded prisons have ‘revolving doors’ for 
serious offenders and the ‘system’ is riddled with loopholes and technicalities.  The 
only way to ensure public safety is to increase the swiftness, certainty and severity of 
punishment. Adequate funding for police, courts, and prisons must be made available. 
The symbolic representation of the Faulty System frame is recidivism (Sasson 1995: 
13-14).  
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The Blocked Opportunities frame depicts crime as a consequence of inequality 
and discrimination, especially with respect to unemployment, poverty and inadequate 
educational opportunities.  People commit crimes when they discover that the 
legitimate means for attaining material success are blocked.  According to this frame, 
growing desperation promotes violence as well as property crime – ‘if you’re going to 
create a sink-or-swim society, you have to expect people to thrash before they go 
down’. To reduce crime, government must ameliorate the social conditions that cause 
it. The Blocked Opportunities frame is symbolically represented by ‘dead-end’ jobs 
such as ‘flipping burgers at McDonald’s’ (Sasson 1995: 14-15).   
The Social Breakdown frame depicts crime as a consequence of family and 
community disintegration and skyrocketing rates of divorce and out-of-wedlock births. 
Although the frame is typically expressed in a neutral fashion, the conservative 
version of this frame attributes family and community breakdown to ‘permissiveness’, 
the civil rights and feminist protest movements in the 1960s and 1970s respectively, 
and government-sponsored antipoverty initiatives.  The liberal version of this frame 
attributes family and community breakdown to unemployment, racial discrimination, 
and the loss of jobs and income.  According to this frame, the crime problem can be 
solved by collective efforts to reconstitute family and community through moral 
exhortation, neighbourhood associations, crime watches and community policing.  
Social breakdown is symbolically condensed by complaints about the lack of ‘family 
values’ and comparisons to the ‘good ol’ days’ (Sasson 1995: 15-16). 
The Media Violence frame depicts crime as a consequence of violence on 
television, in the movies, in popular music and video games.  Proponents of this frame 
make such arguments as, ‘Television has become a school of violence and a college 
for crime’. Because violence in the mass media undermines respect for life, the way to 
reduce crime is to first reduce it in the mass media. The Media Violence frame is 
symbolically represented by allusions to violent visual media, video games, and 
musical lyrics (Sasson 1995: 16; see also Surette 2015). 
The Racist System frame sees the courts and police as racist agents of 
oppression.  According to the frame, police resources are dedicated to the protection of 
low crime white neighbourhoods rather than high crime minority ghettos.  Black 
offenders are more likely than whites who commit comparable offences to be arrested, 
convicted and sentenced to prison.  Additionally, the death penalty is administered in a 
racist fashion.  Some versions of this frame argue that the fundamental purpose of the 
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criminal justice system is to supress a potentially rebellious underclass.  The racist 
system frame is symbolised by the Trayvon Martin shooting, the beatings of Rodney 
King and the murder trial of O.J. Simpson. (Sasson 2015). 
 The Cruel World frame holds that crime is an inevitable feature of modern 
life. Because modern life is inherently dangerous and unpredictable, crime can strike 
anyone at anytime. The random nature of crime means that irrespective of age, sex and 
social status, everyone has the potential to be a perpetrator or a victim.  In order to 
reduce crime, society must be as cruel with criminals as the criminals were when they 
broke the law.  The Cruel World frame can be symbolically condensed by random, 
senseless violence. Finally, the Faulty Politics frame focuses on ‘bad politics’ and ‘bad 
and corrupt’ politicians.  According to this frame, crime is caused, albeit indirectly, by 
political corruption.  Therefore, in order to curb crime, it is important to eliminate 
corruption. The frame can be condensed by reference to ‘corrupt politicians’ (Boda et 
al. 2011: 6).   
Table 1: Criminal Justice Frames 
Frame Cause Policy Response Symbols 
Faulty System Crime stems from 
criminal justice leniency 
and inefficiency 
The criminal justice system 
needs to 'get tough' 
'Handcuffed police',     
'Revolving door 
justice' 
Blocked Opportunities Crime stems from 
poverty and inequality 
The government must 
address the 'root causes' of 
crime by creating jobs and 
reducing poverty 
Dead-end, low 
paying jobs 
'Flipping burgers' at 
McDonald's  
Social Breakdown Crime stems from family 
and community 
breakdown 
Citizens should band 
together to recreate 
traditional communities 
Urban riots 
Violent Media Crime stems from 
violence in the mass 
media 
The government should 
regulate violent imagery in 
the media 
'Life imitates art' 
Racist System The criminal justice 
system operates in a 
racist fashion 
Black people should band 
together to demand justice 
Trayvon Martin 
shooting   Racial 
Profiling 
Cruel World Crime is an inevitable 
feature of modern life 
Society must be as cruel 
with criminals as the 
criminals were when they 
broke the law 
Random violence 
Faulty Politics Crime stems from 
political corruption 
Eliminate corruption 'Corrupt politicians' 
SOURCE: Adapted from Sasson, T. 1995. Crime Talk. Pgs. 13-17. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter; Surette, R. 2015. 
Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice. Pg. 38. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning; and Boda et al. 2011. ‘Penal Populism and Justice 
Policy Reform in Hungary: Analysing discourses of media and politics’. Pg. 6. 
While not an exhaustive catalogue of all possible crime frames, these frames are a 
comprehensive representation of the most prevalent frames found in public and media 
crime discourse.  As such, it is likely that one or more of these frames are likely to 
garner some portion of public support. The frames are not mutually exclusive, as 
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people commonly support more than one frame simultaneously and identify particular 
frames with particular crimes and criminals. Criminal justice claims makers are 
therefore guaranteed some level of support if they can fit their social construction of 
crime within one of these frames (Surette 2015). 
Summary 
In this chapter, I laid out the competing constructions of Antigua and Barbuda’s crime 
story and I highlighted the literature on the usage of crime statistics and official data as 
well as that on public and media knowledge of crime and the social construction of 
crime.  In this chapter I described frame analysis as a useful intellectual framework for 
examining crime discourse in the media and understanding public perceptions of crime.  
I also made a case for using Antigua and Barbuda’s crime statistics as an empirical 
basis for critically assessing claims made about crime.   In so doing, I have located this 
study in contextual constructionist assumptions.  Having laid this foundation, chapter 
three will describe the mixed methods research design that I implement to address my 
research questions. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
‘There is a world of empirical reality out there.  The way we perceive and understand 
that world is largely up to us, but the world does not tolerate all understandings 
equally.’ 
-- Kirk and Miller (1986: 11) 
 
Introduction 
Much like Theodore Sasson’s (1995) seminal work Crime Talk: How Citizens 
Construct a Social Problem, after conducting my preliminary research I conceived this 
study as one that would be qualitative in nature and firmly rooted in the contextual 
constructionist paradigm.  Employing a very similar methodology to that used by 
Sasson, and borrowing heavily from his work, I did not intend to question the 
‘objective’ nature of the crime problem in Antigua and Barbuda at all.  Rather, my 
goal was to focus exclusively on those activities through which Antiguans and 
Barbudans have come to view crime as a problem in the first place.   By analysing 
transcripts of peer group discussions, focused interviews and newspaper stories, I 
wanted this constructionist study to be one generated solely from the ‘bottom up' 
where multiple views were pulled together and categorised into broader themes. I 
expected that these broader themes would ultimately lead to a unifying theory (see for 
example Creswell and Plano Clark 2011: 41).  I expected this study to build on 
Gamson’s (1992: 4) insights that contrary to the way in which the mass public is often 
characterised, ‘people are not so passive, people are not so dumb, and people negotiate 
with media messages in complicated [and varied] ways...’   
Yet, in creating the research design I was troubled by the significant data gaps 
that I encountered during my initial review of the existing crime data. Just as similar 
constructionist studies were able to present a more robust picture of how crime is 
constructed by comparing claims to historical crime trends and patterns, could I too 
create a similarly robust picture with respect to Antigua and Barbuda? Might basic 
knowledge of the country’s crime trends and patterns over time shed additional light 
on, or help to contextualise, the various perceptions of the Antiguan and Barbudan 
crime problem? While this broader approach was more appealing to me because I felt 
the findings of such a study might have important implications for criminal justice 
policy, the major obstacle to incorporating official crime data was the burden of 
collecting and analysing the data myself.  Because the RPF did not keep computerised 
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records prior to 1994, there is very little academic analysis of the country’s crime 
trends during this time.  Where such analysis does exist, gaps in the data are common 
and Antigua and Barbuda is discussed within the broader context of the English-
speaking Caribbean (see for example de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999; Deosoran 
2004).  As a result, in order to assess subjective perceptions of crime against the 
backdrop of crime trends, the collection and analysis of official crime data would need 
to be included in the design of the study.  And, arguably, altering the research design 
in this way would necessarily shift the underlying epistemology of the study.  This 
epistemological shift is significant because epistemology, or how we gain knowledge 
of what we know, necessarily influences how research questions are asked and 
answered.  Additionally, epistemology is linked inextricably to the relationship 
between the researcher and research as well as the paradigm, or framework of beliefs 
and practices guiding the study (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Morgan 2007).   
Altering the epistemology would mean that the contemplated paradigm could no 
longer be solely constructionist focused on process and meaning, it would have to be 
one that is more pluralistic and incorporate a positivist perspective (see Sale et al. 
2008).   Put differently, the assumptions underlying this study would need to 
acknowledge, as Kirk and Miller (1986: 11) acknowledged in the epigraph of this 
chapter, that while reality may very well be socially constructed and comprised of 
multiple truths, it could also be objective and exist independent of human perceptions.  
The world does not tolerate all understandings equally.  My relationship with my 
research would not only be one of ‘closeness’ and subjectivity, it would also be one of 
some distance.   
Understanding these implications, I decided to change the research design to 
one that is both qualitative and quantitative. I decided to ground my work in a mixed 
methods design, where both quantitative and qualitative data are collected, analysed 
and ‘mixed’ in a single study or series of studies (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011).  At 
the heart of my research design would be Creswell and Plano Clark’s (2011) central 
premise that the combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection can 
provide a better understanding of the research problem than each approach on its own.  
And, the new mixed methods research design would be steeped in a paradigm of 
pragmatism – a paradigm that allows for diverse approaches and values both objective 
and subjective knowledge (see Creswell and Plano Clark 2011: 43).  I still expect to 
build on Gamson’s insights – that the mass public negotiate their realities in nuanced 
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ways – but I also hope, like Fincham et al. (2011), that this mixed methods approach 
will contribute to a more creative, lateral-thinking, problem-oriented body of social 
science research.   
This chapter outlines my mixed methods approach and associated issues, 
including tensions between the various epistemological tenets of the study, data 
selection and collection, methods of analysis and my role as researcher. In section I, I 
will articulate my epistemological assumptions and detail my research design.  
Additionally, I will discuss mixed methods research in the context of social policy.  In 
section II, I will describe the quantitative aspects of the design and discuss collecting 
and analysing official police data.  I will also outline the process of collecting and 
analysing newspaper stories of crime and crime control. Similarly, in this section I will 
describe the qualitative aspects of the design.  Here I will describe the process of 
conducting the peer group discussions and how I analysed the transcripts. Lastly, in 
section III, I will highlight the strengths and limitations of this study and discuss the 
role of my own subjectivity.   
 
 
I 
Paradigm Wars: Qualitative or Quantitative? Or, Quantitative and Quantitative?  
Since the mid-nineteenth century sociologists have debated the merits of qualitative 
and quantitative research.  During the 1950s these debates became more prominent as 
proponents of qualitative research attacked the positivistic nature of mainstream 
sociology (Fincham et al. 2011).  For example, in his attack on what he called 
‘scientism’ and ‘variable analysis’, Herbert Blumer (1956, 1969) argued that because 
sociological notions are typically abstract and lack any fixed or uniform indicators, 
any claim that these notions are measurable is spurious.  For Blumer, social science 
variables are not clear and discrete ‘objects’ with the clearly and precisely defined 
properties inherent to genuine variables.  Rather, they are little more than ‘abbreviated 
terms of reference’ for complex patterns of social organisation (Cuff et al. 1990).  
Framed in terms drawn largely by critics of quantitative research, the ‘paradigm wars’, 
as they came to be called, gave voice to philosophical positions and intellectual 
rationales that qualitative researchers believed had been marginalised theretofore 
(Bryman 2006a).  Although while these paradigm wars were fought largely on the 
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epistemological level, many of those involved began to conflate epistemology and 
method, erroneously treating the two as synonymous (Howe 1988, 1992; Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004; Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005).  Proponents of qualitative 
research argued that social phenomena and their meanings are produced through social 
interaction. Thus, reality is indeterminate and in a constant state of revision. Any 
investigation of this reality would necessarily require research methods that rejected 
the natural scientific model.  According to this view, a good qualitative research 
strategy would rely on words rather than numbers and ‘inductive’ rather than 
‘deductive approaches’.  That is, approaches that generate rather than test hypotheses.  
Those engaged in qualitative research professed the superiority of deep, rich 
observational data that included the interpretations of the social actors themselves.  By 
contrast, proponents of quantitative research argued that social phenomena and their 
meanings have an existence independent of social actors. By this account, reality is 
categorical – it is external and objective.  Investigation of any social phenomena 
would need to embrace the natural scientific model and employ a hypothetico-
deductive approach.  These proponents extol the virtues of hard generalizable survey 
data (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005; Bryman 2012; Fincham et al. 2011; Creswell and 
Plano Clark 2011; Sandelowski 2001).  
Although the paradigm wars are now widely thought to be over (Bryman 
2006a), they gave birth to three distinct perspectives on whether qualitative and 
quantitative research can and should be combined in a single study: the purist 
perspective, the situationalist perspective and the pragmatist perspective   (Rossman 
and Wilson 1985).  Purists tend to focus on the assumed epistemological and 
methodological differences described above and would argue a version of what 
Kenneth Howe (1988: 10) coined the ‘incompatibility thesis’ – the idea that qualitative 
and quantitative research methods are fundamentally incompatible because they are 
rooted in diametrically opposed, and therefore mutually exclusive, ontological and 
epistemological traditions.  Purists tend to be preoccupied by the differences between 
qualitative and quantitative research and rarely acknowledge the myriad similarities 
that exist between the two (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005).  Purists advocate a mono-
method approach believing ‘...one [paradigm] precludes the other just as surely as 
belief in a round world precludes belief in a flat one’ (Howe 1988: 12).   
Unlike the purists, situationalists focus not on ontology or epistemology but on 
research methods.  Situationalists maintain that both quantitative and qualitative 
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methods have value and may be used in a single study, but each method has usefulness 
in a specific situation or phase of the research process (Rossman and Wilson 1985).  
Research methods, according to this view, are not competitive but are complementary. 
Methods most often associated with quantitative research can provide representative 
information, which is given meaning by methods most often associated with 
qualitative research (Vidich and Shapiro 1955:33).  Although this position is less 
extreme than that of the purist, Rossman and Wilson (1985) rightly point out that this 
attempt at rapprochement falls short of meaningful integration.  Like the purist 
perspective, the situationalist perspective still advocates a mono-method approach 
because while situationalists see quantitative and qualitative methods as 
complementary, they still see quantitative and qualitative methods as representing 
distant universes (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005; Rossman and Wilson 1985).   
In contrast to both the purist and the situationalist perspectives, the pragmatist 
perspective is the only one that argues for a truly integrated approach in a single study 
(Rossman and Wilson 1985).  Like situationalists, pragmatists privilege research 
methods over epistemology and argue a version of the ‘common-sense’ position 
frequently cited, ‘epistemological purity doesn’t get research done’ (see for example 
Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005: 377; Onwuegbuzie 2003: 395; Greene et al. 1989: 257; 
Tedlie and Tashakkori 2003: 19; see also Bryman 1984). But, this concern with 
methods notwithstanding, a pragmatist approach places primary importance not on 
methods but on the research question.   As such, pragmatism is a problem-centred 
approach in which the researcher is not afraid to use multiple methods of data 
collection and analysis to investigate the question driving the research. Pragmatist 
researchers collect data according to what works best to address the research question 
(Creswell and Plano Clark 2011).  The pragmatist approach to research is therefore 
pluralistic and oriented towards inquirer flexibility and adaptability (Creswell and 
Plano Clark 2011; Howe 1988; Greene et al. 1989).  Pragmatists believe that the 
dichotomy that exists between quantitative and qualitative approaches is artificial and 
argue that qualitative methods are not inherently constructionist nor are quantitative 
methods inherently positivist (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005). Appreciating that 
quantitative and qualitative approaches have inherent strengths and weaknesses, 
pragmatists believe researchers should exploit the respective strengths of both 
approaches to most efficiently use them in addressing the research question (Rossman 
and Wilson 1985). By this account, examining cultural behaviour with a variety of 
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different approaches can greatly enhance the credibility of research results (Rossman 
and Wilson 1985).  
 
Paradigm Peace: Quantitative and Quantitative!  
As more and more scholars began to demonstrate that they had mixed qualitative and 
quantitative research, the incompatibility thesis became less tenable (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori 2003).  Increasingly, textbooks began calling attention to the fact that 
distinctions between quantitative and qualitative research are neither absolute nor 
clear-cut (Bryman 1984, 1988, 2004).  Many argued that excessive focus on the 
differences underlying the incompatibility thesis obfuscated the myriad similarities 
between quantitative and qualitative research.  For example, Onwuegbuzie and Leech 
(2005) argued that both quantitative and qualitative methods describe the data, 
construct explanatory arguments from the data, and speculate about why the outcomes 
they observed happened as they did.  Moreover, both quantitative and qualitative 
researchers are concerned with verifying their data and incorporate safeguards in the 
research design that minimise confirmation bias and other sources of invalidity.  
According to Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005; 381), perhaps the most important 
similarity between qualitative and quantitative research, however, is the fact that all 
data can be viewed as qualitative or quantitative.  That is, all data can be ‘binarised’, 
dichotomously expressing a variable in binary form just as all data represent an 
attempt to capture a raw experience. Qualitative designs can incorporate inferential 
statistics that can be created by treating words or observations as sample units of 
representative data just as experimental, quasi-experimental and correlational designs 
can incorporate the collection of observational and interview data (Onwuegbuzie and 
Leech 2005). 
Because the incompatibility thesis has now been largely ‘discredited’  (Tedlie 
and Tashakkori 2003: 19), the epistemological concerns at the crux of the paradigm 
wars have been blunted (Bryman 2006a, 2007).  As such, the legitimacy of the purist 
perspective has been severely compromised.  While some researchers continue to 
subscribe to some version of the purist perspective, irrespective of whether they 
combine methods themselves, most researchers today accept that quantitative and 
qualitative research can and should be meaningfully combined. Social science research 
is now increasingly oriented towards a pragmatic viewpoint that prioritises using any 
approach that allows research questions to be answered regardless of its supposed 
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philosophical presuppositions (Bryman 2006a).   Indeed, an examination of recent 
social and behavioural science research reveals that qualitative and quantitative 
methods are being mixed extensively to solve practical research problems (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori 2003).  Accordingly, in this time of ‘paradigm peace’, we have embarked 
on what Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003: ix) have called the ‘third methodological 
movement’ – the use of mixed methodology in social problems research. 
This orientation towards pragmatic research is important to my work because 
my approach is informed by pragmatism. Rejecting purist and situationalist arguments, 
I mix qualitative and quantitative methods taking the view that these methods are more 
alike than they are different (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005). Like Morgan (2007: 60), 
I reject the artificial choice between a pair of extremes where research results are 
either completely specific to a particular context or an instance of some more 
generalised set of principles; where the results are either so unique that they have no 
implications for other actors in other settings or so generalised that they apply in every 
historical and cultural setting.  Underpinning my approach is Greene’s (2007: 20) 
understanding that there are multiple ways of seeing and hearing, multiple ways of 
making sense of the social world, and multiple standpoints on what is important and to 
be valued.  Thus, my work assumes that Antigua and Barbuda’s crime problem is 
extraordinarily complex, that there are multiple legitimate approaches to investigating 
it and that any given approach would inevitably be partial (Greene 2007).    
Still, I faced practical challenges in contemplating my research design. Bryman  
(2007) aptly sums up my difficulty by asking: how do you put it all together?  How 
can I bring together an objectivist account of crime with the more subjective accounts 
of how people construct crime? While I am interested in people’s accounts, from a 
socially constructionist discursive perspective, which is agnostic about whether there 
is a real crime problem, I recognise that there may be official crime data that suggest a 
crime problem actually exists.   Here, my values as a researcher are paramount.  While 
I approach this research from a perspective of pragmatism, I cannot deny that my main 
emphasis is the social construction of crime. Like other researchers sympathetic to 
social constructionism, I openly acknowledge that the goal of my research is to rely as 
much as possible on the participants’ views of the situation and to focus on the socio-
historical context that inevitably shaped those views (Creswell 2003).  Thus, while this 
research is steeped in pragmatism, the primary qualitative aspects of the research are 
based on contextual constructionist epistemological assumptions. In this study I mix 
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qualitative and quantitative methods in order to achieve completeness.  In so doing, 
my intent is to create a more comprehensive understanding of the crime problem in 
Antigua and Barbuda given that such a comprehensive account has not been written to 
date. 
Because there are no established templates or specific rules for forging such a 
negotiated account I would need to make decisions regarding how and when data 
would be collected, how and when this data would be mixed and how to ensure the 
quality of the research.   In the following section I will outline my research design. 
Mixed Methods Research Design  
The primary purpose of this study is to develop a more comprehensive understanding 
of Antigua and Barbuda’s crime situation by investigating the ‘social construction’ of 
crime and the crime ‘frames’ that the news media and members of the public draw on 
to make sense of the phenomena. Accordingly, the research is designed to answer the 
primary and secondary research questions: 
Primary Research Question:  
 
How do the news media and members of the public in Antigua and Barbuda 
describe  and explain crime in terms of its causes and remedies?   
 
Secondary Research Question:  
 
What are the basic crime trends and patterns in Antigua and Barbuda from 
1970 to 2010?
 
I chose to use a concurrent ‘embedded’, or ‘nested’, mixed methods research design 
symbolically represented as QUAL (+quan) (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011: 71). In 
this design, the researcher implements a secondary quantitative strand within the larger 
qualitative case study.  A strand refers to the component of the study that encompasses 
the basic process of conducting research – from posing the initial question to 
interpreting results generated from the data collected to answer that question (Creswell 
and Plano Clark 2011).  Unlike a sequential research design, in a concurrent design the 
qualitative and quantitative strands are implemented at the same time and in a single 
phase.  In this case, the supplementary quantitative strand is added to enhance the 
overall design (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Hanson et al. 2005).    
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In my research design, although both sets of data were collected and analysed 
concurrently and in a single phase, the qualitative data collection was an iterative 
process.  As Figure 2 suggests, I began collecting qualitative data – reading speeches 
by partisan politicians, government speeches and publications, reading newspaper 
articles and recording observations – and then used that information to make minor 
revisions to the instrument that would be used to conduct peer group discussions.  The 
process of reviewing regularly the data generated and fine-tuning the peer group 
discussion instrument was important because I wanted to be sure I was capturing all of 
the crime themes that were present in popular discourse.  At the same time, I began 
collecting official police data.  I created a spreadsheet of all ‘major crimes’ or ‘serious 
crimes’ known or reported to the police in each year from 1970 to 2010 with the 
intention of conducting a crime trend analysis.  Additionally, I began sampling 
newspaper articles and commentary so as to conduct a newspaper analysis. 
 At first glance, my research design may appear closer to Creswell and Plano 
Clark’s (2011: 71) sequential exploratory design where data collection occurs in two 
distinct phases with the researcher creating an instrument to test or generalise the 
findings based on the results of the initial qualitative phase.  With such a design, data 
strands are mixed during data collection whereby the researcher connects the results of 
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  collection	   QUAL Data	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   Procedure Official	  Police	  Data Newspaper	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  analysis 
Integration	  of	  findings	  from	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Figure 2: Concurrent Embedded Mixed Methods Design 
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one strand to the data collection of the other (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011).  My 
concurrent design differs in that the mixing of the qualitative and quantitative data 
occurs during interpretation, the final step of the research process.  Accordingly, I 
collected qualitative and quantitative data simultaneously, analysed each data strand 
independently and interpreted the qualitative results in light of what was learned from 
the quantitative research.  
There are several advantages of using a concurrent embedded mixed methods 
research design.  For example, because one data type is given less priority than the 
other and both data can be collected and analysed simultaneously, this design can be 
used when the researcher does not have sufficient time or resources to commit to 
extensive quantitative and qualitative data collection.  Additionally, by adding the 
supplemental data the researcher is able to improve the larger design by exploiting the 
strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods (Creswell and Plano Clark 
2011; Cresswell et al. 2008).  Moreover, concurrent embedded designs allow the 
researcher to gain and report multiple perspectives on the topic at hand within the 
same study (Hanson et al. 2005; Creswell et al. 2008). 
I chose to use an embedded mixed methods design because a single data set 
was not sufficient to answer both research questions.  As discussed in chapter two, 
official crime data and newspaper articles would not tell me much about popular 
conceptions of crime in Antigua and Barbuda just as individual accounts of crime 
could not give me an accurate account of crime trends and patterns.   Moreover, the 
fundamental nature of each research question differed and each type of question 
required different types of data (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). My goal with this 
research was to investigate ‘multiple constructed realities’ through the shared 
investigation of meanings and explanations.  I wanted to know how people living in 
Antigua and Barbuda think and talk about crime, how their ideas are shaped, generated 
or moderated through conversation with others (Ritchie and Lewis 2003).  I wanted to 
understand how the newspapers cover crime in the media.  But, I also wondered what 
crime looked like from the perspective of crime statistics over a long period of time – 
without the missing years that are all too common.  I wondered what sorts of trends 
and patterns served as the backdrop to the country’s crime talk. Did referenced ‘crime 
waves’ correspond with actual increases in reported crime? Was there really 
significantly less reported crime during the 1970s and early 1980s? I wanted to 
understand crime from the most empirical perspective available to me (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 2008). Given my rationale, the individual nature of doctoral research and the 
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time and funding constraints associated with this type of research, the embedded 
mixed methods design is an ideal way of creating this sort of comprehensive account 
of crime in Antigua and Barbuda.   
Mixed Methods Reliability and Validity 
Despite the unique opportunity to exploit the combination of complementary strengths 
and nonoverlapping weaknesses, mixed methods research is still plagued by the 
problems of reliability and validity3 (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson 2006). That is, mixed 
methods research remains subject to potential issues that might compromise the 
merging or connecting of the quantitative and qualitative strands of the study and the 
conclusions drawn (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). Because different mixed methods 
research designs are subject to different threats to reliability and validity, I sought to 
minimise the threats most often associated with the concurrent embedded mixed 
methods design. These potential threats, according to Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2011), are most prevalent in the data analysis and interpretation stages of the research.  
For example, during the data analysis stage the potential exists for the researcher to 
use inadequate approaches in combining the data.  I sought to minimise this threat by 
quantifying my peer group discussion data and creating graphs to depict the results of 
both the peer group discussions and the newspaper analysis. In doing so, I was better 
able to compare the frequency of frames in the newspaper discourse and the public 
discourse.  Additionally, there exists the potential for the researcher to use inadequate 
approaches in transforming the data.  To minimise this threat I kept data 
transformation straightforward.  As previously discussed, I quantified my qualitative 
data using NVivo software.  With NVivo I coded the data and created themes.  I then 
used the software to count the frequency of the codes and themes, which allowed me 
to recognise patterns and idiosyncrasies, document analytic moves and verify 
interpretations.  Using NVivo made the coding and retrieval process more efficient 
and enhanced the transparency of my analysis.  
 In interpreting their findings, researchers using concurrent embedded mixed 
methods designs are at risk of not addressing the mixed methods research questions 
and giving more weight to one form of data than the other without adequate 
                                                
3 The literature calls for using new terminology with respect reliability and validation in mixed methods research.  Onwuegbuzie 
and Johnson (2006) discuss reliability and validity in terms of representation, legitimation and integration.  However, like 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), I believe that reliability and validity remain the best terms to use because they represent 
common language understandable to many researchers and because they are accepted by both quantitative and qualitative 
researchers. 
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explanation (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011).  I avoided these validity and reliability 
threats by following advice set forth by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011). I was careful 
to address each of my research questions.  Moreover, in addition to using Microsoft 
Excel to create charts and graphs that present both sets of results in an equal way, I 
was explicit in my intention to place greater weight on the qualitative data.  As 
previously discussed, I clearly explained that I was most concerned with how 
members of the public in Antigua and Barbuda think and talk about crime control.   
 
Limitations of the Concurrent Embedded Mixed Methods Research Design  
Despite the strengths of using the concurrent embedded mixed methods design, like 
most research designs, there are limitations.  First there can be difficulty in integrating 
the results because data might first need to be transformed in some way (consistent 
units of analysis for example).  Additionally, integration may be difficult because the 
two methods are used to answer different research questions.  Next, the researcher 
needs to have expertise in both quantitative and qualitative methods. Finally, because 
of the sheer volume of data generated, the possibility exists that much of the data 
generated may not be fully used, thus wasting the researcher’s time, research resources 
and the participants’ time (Creswell 2003; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Bryman 
2006).   
I took care to mitigate these limitations by attending intense QSR International 
NVivo training conferences in order to learn how to use NVivo software.  By 
quantifying my qualitative data, integrating the results of the two data sets was much 
easier.  Additionally, by articulating clearly that the official police data was secondary 
and meant only to contextualise the various perceptions of crime, neither integrating 
the results nor conducting the analysis posed much of a challenge.  Lastly, I tried as 
much as possible to keep my interviewees focused on the topic and I spent significant 
time developing the instrument used for the peer group discussions and honing my 
data collection strategy. Both my instrument and data collection strategies were 
reviewed by and discussed with experienced qualitative researchers.   
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II 
In section II, I will describe the various aspects of the design.  Here I will describe the 
research setting, quantitative aspects of the design, including the collection and 
analysis of official police data and newspaper stories relating to crime. Similarly, in 
this section I will describe the process of conducting the peer group discussions and 
how I analysed the transcripts. I will also discuss conducting in-depth interviews with 
relevant political stakeholders.  
 
The Research Setting 
Although Antigua and Barbuda is a twin island nation, financial and time constraints 
did not allow for research to take place in Barbuda.  Accordingly, all of the research 
was conducted on the island of Antigua over the course of ten months during 2010.  
With nearly 87,000 people, Antigua is 108 square miles and is comprised of six 
parishes: St. John, St. George, St. Peter, St. Philip, St. Mary and St. Paul.  According 
to official police data, of the six parishes St. John sees the vast majority the country’s 
crime, as it is the parish in which the capital city, St. John’s, is located. The vast 
majority of the research was conducted in St. John’s, the country’s urban centre, and 
its surrounding area. 
Quantitative Research 
My general approach to the quantitative research in this study was informed by 
objectivism.  As an ontological position, objectivism builds on the postivist idea that 
social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social 
actors (Bryman 2012). Notwithstanding the critiques of police recorded crime figures 
discussed in chapter two, I approached this data intending it to provide some empirical 
basis for assessing claims made about crime.  Although it is an imperfect measure, the 
official crime data shaped much of my interpretation of the qualitative data.  As such, 
this quantitative portion of my research is concerned with the nature of the crime 
problem in Antigua and Barbuda.  This portion of the research is primarily concerned 
with an unbiased description of crime patterns, crime trends and media 
representations. My relationship with this portion of my research was necessarily one 
of some distance.   
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In analysing the quantitative data, I conducted a basic crime trend analysis 
(Osborne and Wernicke 2003) using police recorded crime figures for the 40-year 
period between 1970 and 2010.  My goal at this point was to create an empirical 
account of historical crime trends and patterns, which had not previously existed. With 
this trend analysis I simply sought to establish what Maguire (2007: 255) calls the 
‘basic contours’ of crime in Antigua and Barbuda – the overall scale of crime and the 
relative incidence of different types of offences, trends in those offences over time, 
and their geographical distribution. Additionally, I conducted a newspaper analysis 
using quantitative content analysis.  The newspaper analysis focused on newspaper 
articles discussing crime from 1994 to 2009.  My goal for the newspaper analysis was 
to better understand the country’s media discourse surrounding these issues. 
Trend Analysis 
Obtaining police statistics for the 40-year period between 1970 and 2010 was very 
difficult because there is no database designed to capture incidence of crime reported 
to and recorded by the police. Prior to 1994 the police force did not keep computerised 
records at all and even after the records were computerised there was still no easy way 
to extract or manipulate the records because the crimes are recorded in a basic word 
processing file with very limited functionality.  As such, at the national archives I 
searched old colonial police records, namely annual reports that have since been 
discontinued entitled Annual Report on the Organisation and Administration of the 
Royal Police Force and Fire Service of Antigua and Barbuda.  From these reports I 
obtained the official crime statistics from 1970 to 1989.  I then verified the 
authenticity of these reports with senior police officers who were familiar with them.  
These senior members also verified that the way in which the statistics were calculated 
for these reports is consistent with the way in which they are now captured 
notwithstanding the fact that the reports are no longer published. To obtain crime 
statistics for the years 1990 to 1993 I sat with one of the same senior members of the 
police force and we went through old notebooks in which the crimes had been 
recorded and recreated the statistics for those years.  I obtained the crime statistics 
from 1994 to 2010 from the police officer attached to the Criminal Investigation 
Department who is responsible for entering the statistics into a computerised file that 
is stored electronically.  Despite my best efforts, there are still three years for which I 
was unable to locate statistics: 1975, 1981 and 1983.  Although I am disappointed by 
these gaps, I am heartened by the fact that this trend analysis is the most 
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comprehensive longitudinal account of crime in Antigua and Barbuda to date.   
 Upon verifying the accuracy of the statistics, I entered them into a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet.  I then consulted secondary legal material as well as senior 
members of the police force to gain clarification with respect to the changing 
definition of crimes over time.  So as to ensure I was making fair and reliable 
comparisons, where there was any ambiguity with respect to crime definitions and 
police interpretations thereof, or recording practices, I created a combined category.  
For example, there seemed to be confusion amongst members of the police force 
surrounding the precise definitions of unlawful carnal knowledge and unlawful sexual 
intercourse.  As such, I combined these two categories and discussed them as one.  
Similarly, until 2004 rape was recorded with indecent assault.   To remain consistent, 
from 2004 to 2010 I combined the statistics for rape and indecent assault although they 
were initially recorded separately by the police.  With respect to theft crimes, from 
1970 to 1993 the classifications used by the police were simply ‘Thefts and Other 
Stealings’ and ‘Burglary, Housebreaking, Storebreaking’ while corresponding 
categories used between 1994 and 2010 were ‘Larceny,’ ‘Breaking and Larceny’ and 
‘Praedial Larceny’.   To maintain consistency, I subsumed the 1994-2010 
classifications as well as ‘Burglary, Housebreaking, Storebreaking’ under the single 
1970-1993 classification ‘Theft and Other Stealings’. Once I compiled the official 
statistics in a new spreadsheet with newly created categories, I used census 
information to calculate the rate of each crime per 100,000 inhabitants for each year.  
In the case of sexual violence, I acknowledged the fact that women are 
disproportionately at risk of experiencing this type of crime by calculating the rate per 
100,000 women.  Additionally, adhering to traditional criminological classifications 
(see for example Harriott 2000), I classified murder, wounding, assault, robbery and 
shooting as violent crimes while classifying theft and other stealings, arson, malicious 
damage, embezzlement and fraud as property crime.  These classifications allowed me 
to determine by year what percentage of total recorded crime was comprised of violent 
crime and property crime, and, they allowed me to compare the amount of violent 
crime to the amount of property crime recorded each year.  I was also able to discern 
the most prevalent violent crimes and property crimes over time. Moreover, I was also 
able to determine the geographic distribution of crimes during this time period.   
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Newspaper Analysis 
I derived the sample for my newspaper analysis from newspaper articles and 
commentary published in the Daily Observer from 1994 to 2009.  I chose the Daily 
Observer because it was the newspaper with the largest circulation during the period 
under review and because the second most widely circulated newspaper, the Antigua 
Sun, ceased circulation as I was conducting my field.  As such the Daily Observer was 
the country’s sole daily newspaper in circulation.  I selected this particular 15-year 
period for several reasons.  First, the official crime data suggested a noticeable change 
in recorded offending patterns during this time. Next, government speeches and other 
documents suggested that politicians and senior government officials began 
referencing the country’s crime ‘problem’ in the mid 1990s.  Lastly, the first edition of 
the Daily Observer was published on 27 January 1994.  Thus, my newspaper analysis 
would essentially cover the life of the publication.   
 Having chosen the newspaper and the time period, I had to consider how I 
would sample the newspaper articles and commentary. I initially expected to select the 
articles and commentary based on probability sampling methods.  Specifically I 
intended to use systematic sampling techniques.  However, as I became familiar with 
the available catalogue of newspapers in the national archives I learned that the 
newspapers were not digitised, a significant number of issues were missing – 
including entire months, the newspapers varied greatly with respect to the number of 
articles and commentary included in each and there were many issues that did not 
discuss crime at all.  In using traditional systematic sampling, I feared that the sample 
might be underinclusive given the incompleteness of the catalogue. As such, I chose to 
focus on the month of February since it was the month with the fewest number of 
missing issues and the only month that was represented each year.  I then went through 
each issue looking for all articles and commentary that discussed crime and crime 
control in Antigua and Barbuda.  In total, there were 1092 items that fit this criteria 
spanning all sections of the newspaper: Editorial, Observations, Letters, Court News, 
Press Releases, Regional, Sports and International.  I subsequently winnowed the 
sample to include only items that expressed at least one of the crime frames either for 
the purpose of advocacy or rebuttal. 
 Employing Sasson’s (1995) methodology, I used the individual article or 
commentary as the unit of analysis and I tracked the frequency of frames in the media 
discourse. I coded an item as expressing a positive version of a frame if it expressed at 
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least one of the frame’s components when characterising Antigua and Barbuda’s 
current crime situation or as a suggested remedy for the country’s crime situation.  I 
coded an item as expressing a rebuttal to a frame if it expressed an emphatic rejection 
of at least one of the frame’s components.  Where an item expressed elements of 
multiple frames, I coded it as displaying multiple frames.  
 It is important to understand that the findings of my newspaper analysis should 
not be generalised to all forms of media in Antigua and Barbuda or to those 
newspapers that are no longer in circulation.  My findings are representative only of 
the type of crime discourse published in the most widely circulated newspaper and the 
type of media discourse that looms in the background as people go about their lives 
and formulate their opinions about crime and criminal justice. 
Qualitative Research 
Frame Analysis 
The specific methodology I employed during this constructionist stage of the study is 
frame analysis.  As discussed in chapter two, frame analysis is a methodology, widely 
attributed to Goffman (1974), which is commonly used to conduct research in the 
constructionist paradigm (Sasson 1995).  The methodology is premised on the idea 
that we are active assemblers of meaning and in constructing accounts of public issues 
we draw upon the resources at our disposal, including popular wisdom, our personal 
experiences, and bits of media discourse. In using these resources to create coherent 
and meaningful accounts of public issues, we select from a range of interpretive 
frameworks available in the culture in order to create meaning (Sasson 1995).  These 
interpretive frameworks, or frames, are the ‘schemata of interpretation’ and typically 
include a diagnostic component that identifies a condition as intolerable and attributes 
blame or causality, and a prognostic component that prescribes a course of 
ameliorative action (Goffman 1974/1986: 21; Borah 2011; Sasson 1995).  
Additionally, frame analysis presupposes that meaning created through the use of 
frames occurs in various contexts including mass media and everyday conversation.  
 As such, my goal in this part of the study was to determine what the prevalent 
crime frames were, which frames dominated the public, media and political 
discourses, and why some frames were more successful than others.  To achieve my 
goals, I collected and analysed newspaper articles, political manifestos, government 
speeches, speeches by opposing politicians and political parties, parliamentary 
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debates, criminal law judicial opinions and annual crime reports. Understanding as 
Atkinson and Coffey (2011), that documents are not firm evidence of what they report 
but construct particular kinds of representations, I used these documents to establish a 
catalogue of culturally available frames on crime in Antigua and Barbuda (Sasson 
1995). I then conducted nine focused interviews (Kvale 2009) with key stakeholders in 
order to get a better sense of existing criminal justice policy, the newspaper production 
process and to discuss their own perceptions of crime.  I conducted these interviews 
with the Minister of National Security, the Police Commissioner, the Prison 
Superintendent, a criminologist and a senior officer in the Criminal Investigation 
Department of the RPF, the Director of the Office of National Drug and Control 
Policy, the former publisher of The Daily Observer, the Director of Youth Affairs and 
the Director of the Bureau of Gender Affairs.  Finally, finding value in the ‘...explicit 
use of...group interaction to produce data and insights that would be less accessible 
without the interaction of the group’ (Morgan 1988: 12), I conducted ten peer group 
discussions comprised of 52 members of the public in the hopes of eliciting 
perceptions of crime and reaction to the pre-established crime frames.  The group 
discussions held were not traditional focus groups but were more akin to Gamson’s 
(1992) peer group conversations, which are smaller than traditional focus groups, held 
in the participants’ own environment, conducted with participants who are already 
familiar acquaintances and conducted with little interference or intervention by the 
facilitator.  
 The documentary analysis, focused interviews and peer group discussions were 
all intended to provide an in-depth understanding of crime in Antigua and Barbuda 
through the eyes of the public, the media and politicians.   Although discreet portions 
of the data analysis took place during the data collection process, the bulk of the 
analysis occurred after the data collection was already completed.  In the discussion 
below, I outline my procedures with respect to each of these areas. 
Documentary Analysis 
The purpose of my documentary analysis was threefold.  First, I wanted to create a 
catalogue of culturally available crime frames, second, I wanted to examine how 
government officials and opposing politicians discussed crime in public discourse and 
third, I wanted to understand Antigua and Barbuda’s socio-political context – the 
crime story that the official crime data could not possibly capture.  To achieve these 
three objectives, I spent significant time in the country’s national archives reviewing 
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all available material on crime and crime control from 1970 to 2009.  Specifically, I 
reviewed 76 documents: available party manifestos and individual candidate 
manifestos from 1994 to 2010, government throne and budget speeches from 1994 to 
2010, selected parliamentary debates on crime legislation and annual crime reports 
from 1970 to 1989.  Most documents preceding 1994 made no explicit reference to 
crime excluding the annual crime reports, which dated back to 1970.   
In order to create a catalogue of culturally available frames, I scoured a wide 
range of newspapers for articles related to crime.  Initially, my search was unfocused. 
At this point, I was familiarising myself with the archival resources that I would have 
at my disposal as well as noting the various themes invoked in the relevant articles.   
From this experience I learned that none of the newspapers were available in digital 
form, many newspapers were missing a number of issues, and many newspapers 
ceased publication after only a few years.  This information would have significant 
implications for my formal newspaper analysis.  It was also helpful to see the diversity 
of crime frames across various newspapers from as early as 1970.  From only one 
newspaper, the country’s sole daily newspaper currently in circulation, I selected one 
year – 1996 – and collect every single crime related article.  I chose 1996 because the 
country saw a significant number of murders in 1994 and to a lesser extent in 1995 and 
I thought crime might be a well-debated topic at this time.  Additionally, 1996 saw one 
of the biggest murder trials in the country’s history.  I expected that the details of the 
murder trial coupled with the potential frustration with the sheer number of murders in 
1994 and 1995 might generate a lot of newspaper coverage of crime as a social 
problem.   
 Because I wanted to create a catalogue of culturally available crime frames 
rather than a catalogue of media crime frames, I also examined other documents likely 
to contain crime frames.  Persuaded by Sasson’s (1995: 13) thinking that frame 
sponsors ‘tend to express their views in an ideologically coherent manner, thus 
presenting relatively ‘pure’ or unadulterated frames’, I mined political manifestos, 
government speeches, parliamentary debates with respect to two crime bills and 
annual crime reports for ‘crime talk’ and created a working catalogue of frames.  I 
then conducted two exploratory interviews, one with a renowned cultural critic, 
playwright, author and songwriter, the other with a popular musician and songwriter.  
Based on these interviews I further revised my working catalogue and then compared 
my catalogue with Boda et al. (2011) and Sasson’s (1994) to determine what, if any, 
overlap existed.  Given the precision and economy of these frame descriptions, my 
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thinking at this point was that I could build on those descriptions striving for similar 
precision and economy in other emerging themes.  I then ‘tested’ my adjusted 
catalogue using a sub-sample of the media discourse I intended to analyse. That is, I 
looked to see whether the frames were comprehensive enough to capture all of the 
claims in the discourse and whether there were claims that required brand new frames.  
My rationale in testing the catalogue was to ensure accurate reflection of the important 
crime themes that emerged. From this exercise I created a new frame that I titled Poor 
Immigration Control. Ultimately, my catalogue of culturally available frames included 
Sasson’s (1995) Faulty System, Blocked Opportunities, and Social Breakdown and my 
newly created Poor Immigration Control.  Given Antigua and Barbuda’s relatively 
homogenous population – 91 per cent of the population is Black – the Racist System 
frame was unsurprisingly absent from the discourse. Also absent from the discourse 
was Violent Media. Similarly, Boda et al.’s (2011) Cruel World frame did not appear 
in Antigua and Barbuda’s crime discourse although there were elements of Faulty 
Politics. 
Focused Interviews 
According to Kvale (2009), focused interviews are neither strictly structured with 
standard questions, nor entirely nondirective.  Focused interviews enable the interview 
subject to shape the interview raising issues she finds important to the topic, while 
allowing the interviewer to lead the interview subject towards certain themes without 
expressing any specific opinions about these themes. As previously mentioned I 
conducted focused interviews with nine relevant stakeholders: eight government 
officials and the publisher of the daily newspaper that I used in my newspaper analysis.   
I chose to interview senior government officials – the Minister of National 
Security, the Police Commissioner, the Prison Superintendent, a criminologist and a 
senior officer in the Criminal Investigation Department of the RPF, the Director of the 
Office of National Drug and Control Policy, the Director of Youth Affairs, and the 
Director of the Bureau of Gender Affairs – in order to get a better sense of existing 
criminal justice policy and to capture government reactions to the final catalogue of 
frames.  I was interested to hear how these officials would describe the country’s 
crime problem. I selected these government officials based on their position in the 
current government.  From the Minister of National Security, the Police Commissioner 
and the Prison Superintendent I was particularly interested in whether they were 
operating according to an articulated criminal justice policy and how criminal justice 
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policy was constructed.  From the directors of Youth Affairs and the Bureau of Gender 
Affairs I was particularly interested obtaining any additional information they could 
provide with respect to youth and gender violence. I was interested in verifying 
newspaper reports of ‘youth gangs’ and school violence and ‘gang violence’.   I chose 
to interview the publisher of the newspaper not only to hear his views on crime and get 
his reaction to my catalogue of frames but also to have a sense of how the newspaper 
is produced.   
Peer Group Discussions 
Focus groups are group interviews that rely on interaction with the group, based on 
topics that are supplied by the researcher who takes the role of moderator (Morgan 
1997).  According to Morgan (1997: 2), the ‘hallmark of focus groups is their explicit 
use of group interaction to produce data and insights that would be less accessible 
without the interaction found in a group’.  Historically, focus groups were used most 
widely with respect to market research. The increasingly prevalence of focus groups in 
social science research is a result of social scientists’ ability to borrow from and adapt 
the practices used by market researchers (Morgan 1997; Gamson 1992).  The main 
advantages of focus groups are twofold: they can produce concentrated amounts of 
data on the precise topic of interest informed by the opinions of more people than 
might otherwise have been possible and they can provide invaluable insight into 
complex behaviours and motivations by not only uncovering what participants think 
but, more importantly, why participants think what they think.  In this regard focus 
groups are well suited to discovering group norms (Morgan 1997; Gamson 1992).   
 However, focus groups also have two significant weaknesses that cannot be 
overlooked.  First, there is always some uncertainty about the accuracy of what the 
participants say because the fact that the researcher creates and directs the groups, 
often in an unfamiliar environment, makes focus groups less naturalistic than other 
qualitative methods.  Second, the reliance on interaction in the group to produce the 
data can be problematic because there may be a tendency toward both conformity – 
participants withholding things that they might say in private – and polarisation, 
participants expressing more extreme views in the group than those they may express 
in private (Morgan 1997).  To exploit the strengths of focus groups while mitigating 
the weaknesses, I chose to conduct peer group discussions akin to Gamson’s (1992) 
peer group conversations. By definition peer group discussions are somewhat smaller 
than traditional focus groups, downplay the facilitator’s role in keeping the 
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conversation going and are held among familiar acquaintances in their own 
environment (Gamson 1992).  Thus I conducted ten peer group discussions with small 
groups of at least three participants who were already familiar with each other.  
Because I wanted them to meet in a familiar space where they might have 
spontaneously engaged in a conversation about crime had I not been present, I met the 
participants in locales as disparate as the beach, a restaurant, participants’ homes, and 
participants’ workplaces. 
 To minimise researcher effect and build rapport I typically arrived at the 
specified location thirty minutes prior to the scheduled time of the discussion in order 
to meet with the group organiser, test my recording device and take care of any 
preliminary matters.  I asked participants to complete a short demographic 
questionnaire that included questions detailing race, gender, age, experience with 
crime, occupation, place of residence and nationality.  Ideally I would have liked to 
include questions about income and educational background but culturally, those 
questions are thought to be intrusive and I tried to keep the participants as relaxed as 
possible.   I transcribed the recordings myself so that I would have greater familiarity 
with the data.  After transcribing each discussion, I replayed each recording in order to 
check the transcript for accuracy.  
I recruited participants for the peer group discussions using such convenience 
sampling techniques as email and word of mouth. I initially began recruiting 
participants by contacting the head of a community program conducted through the 
Bureau of Gender Affairs and engaging members of the public who visited the 
National Archives.  I employed these recruitment techniques because I was cognisant 
of the fact that I was not asking participants to merely complete a survey or to 
participate in a peer group discussion at a neutral location, but rather to allow me into 
their intimate social spaces, including their homes (Gamson 1992). Understanding 
Caribbean culture, I suspected I would be met with suspicion and hesitation if I 
approached people cold in a shopping centre or unfamiliar public space.  Sacrificing 
random selection, I instead strove for heterogeneity with respect to key demographics 
such as race, age and ethnicity.  From my initial contacts from the National Archives 
and the community program at the Bureau of Gender Affairs, I sought referrals for 
additional candidates.  I then selected the cadre candidates I would include in the study 
based on criteria derived from the 2001 census.  Each selected candidate was 
designated a group coordinator and asked to form a group of at least three people, 
including themselves.  I asked each group coordinator to arrange a meeting that I 
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would join and facilitate. My instructions were threefold: the group should consist of 
people who are already familiar with one another and who would otherwise socialise, 
the group members should be comfortable discussing sensitive issues with each other 
and should have discussed such issues at least once in the past, and in choosing the 
venue for the meeting the group leader should select a venue familiar to the group in 
which a spontaneous conversation about crime and other controversial issues might 
conceivably occur irrespective of my involvement. 
An obvious limitation to my approach is the resulting fact that I do not have a 
probability sample but a type of  quota sample.  A quota sample is a sample that 
reflects a population in terms of the relative proportions of people in different 
categories such as gender, age, ethnicity and regions of residence. Unlike a stratified 
sample, the sampling of individuals is not carried out randomly since the final 
selection of people is left to the interviewer. Compared to other sampling techniques, 
quota sampling is rarely employed in academic social research although it is used 
extensively in market research and political opinion polling (Bryman 2012).  Because 
quota samples are not random, they are rightly criticised as not being representative of 
the population as a whole.  That is, the findings emanating from a quota sample cannot 
be generalised to, or held to be equally true of, the population from which the sample 
is drawn (Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Bryman 2012).   However, this limitation does not 
detract from the quality of my findings because random sampling is typically not ideal 
for traditional focus groups or the type of peer group discussions that I conducted 
(Morgan 1997).  As Morgan (1997: 35) explains, the small number of participants 
involved in these types of projects makes it extremely unlikely that a sample size of 
less than 50 will be adequate to represent a larger population, regardless of random 
selection.  Furthermore, as group members are unlikely to hold a shared perspective on 
the research topic, a randomly sampled group may not be able to generate meaningful 
discussions.   
While the peer group discussions cannot be generalised to, or held to be 
equally true of, all residents in Antigua and Barbuda, because the discussions created 
by the group were created collectively, it reflects the common sense of the culture 
from which the participants are drawn (Sasson 1995). Thus, what my peer group 
discussions provide is an intersubjective understanding – an understanding of the 
taken-for-granted assumptions shared by the group  (Gamson 1992; Sasson 1995).   As 
such, the potential danger of marginal ideas and individuals with idiosyncratic views 
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were minimised in this research in ways that they may not have been in more 
conventional interview research (Sasson 1995). 
In total, 52 Antiguan residents participated in 10 peer group discussions.  
Because Barbuda is often marginalised in the nation’s policy discourse, I hoped to 
conduct a discussion group on that island.  However, limited time and resources 
precluded travel to Barbuda and thus that island, which represents two per cent of 
Antigua and Barbuda’s entire population, is underrepresented in the sample. But, 
Barbuda’s underrepresentation notwithstanding, the sample population is as 
geographically diverse as the population at large, according to the 2011 census.  Based 
on a demographic questionnaire that participants completed at the end of each 
discussion, 58 per cent of the sample lives in the parish of St. John as compared to 59 
per cent of the larger population. The parishes of St. Mary and St. George are slightly 
overrepresented as 12 per cent of participants reported living in St. Mary (as compared 
to nine per cent of the larger population) and 17 per cent in St. George (as compared to 
nine per cent of the larger population).  The parishes of St. Peter, St. Phillip and St. 
Paul are slightly underrepresented with two per cent of the sample living in each of St. 
Peter and St. Phillip and six per cent living in St. Paul (as compared to the larger 
population in which seven per cent of the population lives in St. Peter, five per cent in 
St. Phillip and six per cent in St. Paul).   
92 per cent of the sample is currently employed in the paid labour market while 
six per cent is retired and two per cent report being a student.  Of those currently 
employed, 27 per cent work for the government in some capacity, which accurately 
reflects the 25 per cent of residents in Antigua and Barbuda who are employed by the 
government.  Additionally, 33 per cent of the sample work in service oriented jobs, 
eight per cent work in clerical or administrative jobs, and six per cent worked in lower 
wage jobs such as domestic work or security.   
With respect to the major racial groups, the sample reflects the diversity of the 
larger population with 85 per cent of respondents identifying as Black (as compared to 
91 per cent of the larger population) although White participants are overrepresented 
(10 per cent as compared to two per cent) as well as those identifying as Syrian or 
Lebanese (4 per cent as compared to .6 per cent).  The sample is more female than the 
larger population (71 per cent as compared to 53 per cent) and is comprised of more 
Antiguan nationals (85 per cent) than the larger population (70 per cent). With respect 
to age, the sample accurately reflects the proportion of those over 60 (17 per cent 
versus 16 per cent) although it significantly overrepresents those between the ages of
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30 and 59 (63 per cent versus 38 per cent) and may slightly underrepresent younger 
residents between the ages of 18 and 29 (19 per cent as compared to 24 per cent4).  
Additionally, the proportion of interviewees who reported being a victim of crime 
between 2009 and 2010 was in line with the UNDP crime survey (13 per cent 
compared with 11 per cent respectively). 
Each peer group discussion took place in a venue of the group coordinator’s 
choosing and lasted between forty and 90 minutes.  Most discussions took place in 
either a participant’s home or a more institutional space in which the participants were 
accustomed to meet and discuss personal matters.  Other venues selected by group 
leaders included the beach and a popular restaurant.  In keeping with ethical research 
standards (Kvale 2009), at the beginning of each discussion I informed participants of 
the purpose of the study and explained to them that as part of the study I would likely 
publish the transcripts of the discussion in whole or in part.  I reminded the 
participants that their participation was completely voluntary and they could withdraw 
their participation at any time without penalty. I assured the participants that their 
identities would remain confidential and that I would use pseudonyms in order to 
preserve their anonymity but that time constraints may force me to use a transcription 
service to assist me with transcription so there may be at least one other person who 
has access to the raw data.  Lastly, I asked the participants for their permission to 
record the discussion with a digital recording device.  In order to analyse the data, I 
personally transcribed each peer group discussion, which resulted in 88,000 words of 
data. 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis involves coding the data, dividing the text into small units, 
assigning a label to each unit and then grouping the codes into themes (Creswell and 
Plano Clark 2011). I analysed the qualitative corpus of this study – all of the collected 
qualitative data – with two goals in mind: to track the frequency of selected crime 
frames and to capture frames that spontaneously emerged in the documents I examined 
as well as the interviews and peer group discussions that I conducted. This method 
allowed me to analyse the data both deductively and inductively in two separate stages.   
 I first read and reread the corpus in order to gain intimate familiarity with its 
contents. As Saldaña (2011) explains, by reading and rereading the corpus, you gain 
                                                
4 This category is difficult to compare because the census statistics report 24 per cent of the population being between the ages of 
15 and 29 while I asked people whether they were between the ages of 18 and 29. 
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intimate familiarity with its contents and begin to notice significant details as well as 
developing new insights about their meanings.  Patterns, categories and 
interrelationships become more evident the more you know the subtleties of the 
database.  I then conducted the initial data analysis using a deductive approach.  With 
respect to the documents and focused interviews, I coded the text as displaying a 
positive version of a particular frame if it expressed at least one component of that 
frame to characterise Antigua and Barbuda’s crime situation or as a solution (Sasson 
1995). Because each discussion rather than individual is the unit of analysis, in 
analysing transcripts of peer group discussions, where participants expressed 
unanimous support for a frame, I coded that frame’s performance as ‘strong’. Where 
participants disagreed with one another over a frame’s merits, I coded that frame’s 
performance as ‘mixed’ and where participants were unanimous in their rejection of a 
frame, I coded that performance as ‘weak’. 
 During the second phase of this data analysis, I used a more inductive approach.  
I allowed additional crime frames to emerge organically.  While I used descriptive 
codes (Miles and Huberman 1994) during this stage of analysis in order to help 
categorise and index the data corpus’ basic contents (Saldaña 2011), I also employed 
values coding (Saldaña 2009) to identify the participants’ values, attitudes, and beliefs.  
Values coding infers the ‘heart and mind’ of an individual or group’s worldview as to 
what is important, perceived as true, maintained as opinion and felt strongly (Saldaña 
2011: 105). During this phase of the analysis, two new frames emerged from the data: 
Criminal Culture and Foreign Cultural Influences.  
 While I first coded the data manually, I later used NVivo software in order to 
exploit the benefits of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (“CAQDAS”).  I 
chose to use NVivo because it made the coding and retrieval process faster and more 
efficient, it allowed me to relate coded text to demographic information and I thought 
it would enhance the transparency of my analysis (Bryman 2012; Bazeley 2009).  
Additionally, using NVivo allowed me to quantify my data corpus and count the 
frequency of themes and codes thus helping me to recognise patterns and 
idiosyncrasies, document analytic moves, and verify interpretations (Sandelowski et al. 
2009: 3).    
As a result of this data analysis I found that six crime frames comprised 
Antigua and Barbuda’s catalogue of crime frames:  
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Faulty System: Crime stems from the failure of the criminal justice 
system to apprehend and punish offenders.  It’s no wonder there’s so 
much crime, criminals know they can do whatever they want to do 
and get away with it.  If we’re serious about fighting crime then the 
police need to get ‘tough’. Only when more criminals are made to do 
hard time will the message get out that ‘crime doesn’t pay’. 
Blocked Opportunities: Crime stems from poverty, unemployment, 
poor education, bad housing and class discrimination.  Kids come 
from places like Gray’s Farm and Point turn to crime when they don’t 
see any opportunities for legitimate work.  If we’re serious about 
fighting crime, we need to create more opportunities for 
disadvantaged kids.  We’ll only make progress in the fight against 
crime when we begin to seriously address these ‘root causes’. 
Social Breakdown: Crime stems from a breakdown of the traditional 
family and traditional community.  In the past there was less crime 
because neighbours looked out for one another and parents supervised 
and disciplined their children.  The best way to fight crime is for 
neighbours, in partnership with the police, to band together to restore 
order to their communities.  
Poor Immigration Control: Crime stems from poor immigration 
control.  Most of the crime that occurs is committed by ‘non-
nationals’.  If we’re serious about fighting crime, we need to 
crackdown on the number of non-nationals that come into this country 
– especially those from Jamaica and Guyana. 
Criminal Culture: Crime stems from excessive contact with systems 
and authorities that send pro-crime messages.  It’s no wonder there is 
so much crime, when there is widespread corruption among 
government officials, prominent business people and in government 
institutions, and when the justice system treats people differently 
based on who they are and who they know, people feel justified in 
cutting corners and breaking the law themselves.  If we are serious 
about fighting crime, we need to stamp out corruption, in all of its 
forms, wherever it occurs and maintain a transparent justice system 
that treats everyone equally irrespective of wealth or status. 
Foreign Cultural Influences: Crime stems from foreign cultural 
influences.  Most of the crime that occurs reflects patterns of 
criminality that are not indigenous to Antigua and Barbuda.  If we are 
serious about fighting crime we need to protect our culture from 
outside influences that have crept into our society through the Trojan 
Horse of criminal deportees returned from the United States, Canada 
and the United Kingdom, as well as the Internet, American cable 
television, music and Caribbean immigrants. 
I then grouped these frames into larger themes for the purposes of discussion.  As such, 
chapters five, six and seven of this study are built around the themes of 
‘Socioeconomic Factors’, which includes Blocked Opportunities and Social 
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Breakdown; ‘Alien Influences’, which includes Foreign Cultural Influences and Poor 
Immigration Control; and ‘Governance, Crime, Culture and Control’, which includes 
Criminal Culture and Faulty System. 
Trustworthiness and Authenticity 
Some qualitative researchers have employed the terms reliability and validity in ways 
very similar to quantitative researchers.  That is, they have used reliability to indicate 
the degree to which a measure of a concept is consistent and validity to refer to the 
integrity of the research – whether the research actually accomplishes what the 
researcher intends it to accomplish (Bryman 2012). However, with respect to assessing 
the quality of qualitative research, the central focus has increasingly become 
‘trustworthiness’ and ‘authenticity’ (Bryman 2012).   
I took several steps to enhance the trustworthiness and authenticity of my 
research.  First, on obtaining permission from my participants, I recorded each 
interview and peer group discussion fully transcribing each session. Where there was 
ambiguity in meaning or sense, I contacted the relevant participant to seek clarification.  
This clarification strengthened the overall credibility of my interview and peer group 
discussion data.  Second, I enlisted two academics to review my instrument and data 
collection strategies.  Lastly, I documented my procedure with an aim towards 
transparency.  The use of more than one method – the documentary analysis, focused 
interviews and peer discussion groups – allowed for triangulation, whereby multiple 
methods of investigation and sources of data are used in order to bolster the research’s 
credibility.  In reporting my findings I sought to create ‘thick description’ (Geertz 
1973), or rich accounts of the details of the culture such that readers have a database 
for making judgments about the possible transferability of my findings to other 
contexts (Bryman 2012).  Put differently, I sought to create an account of the Antiguan 
and Barbudan crime situation that ‘goes beyond mere fact and surface appearances’ 
and ‘presents detail context, emotion, and the webs of social relationships that join 
persons to one another’ (Denzin 1989: 83). 
While my research is an important contribution to the body of crime literature 
focused on the social construction of crime generally and Antigua and Barbuda 
specifically, I recognise that it does have limitations.  In section III I will discuss those 
limitations. 
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III 
 
Limitations of the My Research 
Because of constraints with respect to time, funding and other resources, in conducting 
this research I have had to make difficult decisions and less than ideal compromises.  
Specifically, in an ideal world I would have liked to travel to Barbuda to conduct 
research on that island as well.  Barbuda is often marginalised in the country’s national 
discourse and while it does not represent a significant percentage of the population, 
Barbudans share different cultural realities, sensitivities and lived experiences.  My 
research would have benefitted from including Barbudan perspectives.  
 A second limitation of my research pertains to the sample of media discourse 
used for the newspaper analysis.  Because there were missing issues, albeit fewer than 
might have been missing using other sampling techniques, it is possible that my 
analysis does not include every relevant article or commentary expressing a crime 
frame.  Additionally, if I had a team of researchers and more time I would have 
expanded the newspaper sample to include other months as well as other types of 
media discourse.  For example, Antigua and Barbuda has a vibrant radio culture.  
Indeed, many people receive their news and information from popular radio shows.  It 
would have been interesting to include radio in the media discourse for analysis. 
 Additionally, my research raises a question concerning the extent to which the 
interview sample represents the population of Antigua and Barbuda. Because the 
interview sample is somewhat skewed towards a more diverse middle-aged female 
population one might argue that the concerns expressed in the study better reflect 
white or Syrian middle-aged female angst rather than the concerns of the typical 
Antiguan. After all, scholars such as Jackson (2009) have found that women report 
higher levels of ‘worry’ or ‘fear’ with respect to victimisation and middle-aged people 
‘worry’ about crime more than the elderly.  But, although there are groups that are 
overrepresented in the interview sample, I am confident in the findings of this research 
as they do not differ significantly from the findings of the 2012 UNDP crime study 
that relate specifically to Antigua and Barbuda.  Moreover, a 2002 crime study of 
Barbados, a Caribbean country very similar to Antigua and Barbuda culturally and 
geographically, found that views and beliefs with respect to the country’s crime 
situation are quite homogenous.  Nuttall et al. (2003) explain that given the limited 
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number of media outlets and the size of the island this homogeneity ought not be 
surprising. In Barbados, there was very little difference in views based on age, gender, 
education, income level or race (Nuttall et al. 2003). 
Role of My Subjectivity 
Good qualitative research is typified by reflexivity, or the researcher’s systematic 
reflection on her role in the research and her sensitivity to how her personal biography 
shapes the study (Creswell 2009).  This, according to Creswell (2009), represents 
honesty and openness, acknowledging that all research is value-laden.  As a means of 
clarifying their role in the research, researchers commonly position themselves as 
either ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ to their research domain.  Insiders are those who study a 
group or context to which they belong while outsiders are those who study a group or 
context to which they do not belong (Breen 2007).  Like Breen (2007), I find this 
insider-outsider dichotomy simplistic and reject it on the basis that it fails to recognise 
that we all have multiple identities, which often interact and operate on multiple levels 
simultaneously (see for example Crenshaw 1991).   I am a Black female citizen of 
Antigua and Barbuda with strong ancestral ties to the country.  I was raised in the 
United States, educated at ‘elite’ universities, and in addition to Antigua and Barbuda, 
I have lived elsewhere in the Caribbean, Africa, the United Kingdom and the South 
Pacific.  I have travelled to 70 countries across all seven continents.  The insider-
outsider dichotomy does not capture my complex and multi-faceted experiences.  
While I self-identify as an Antiguan, I am neither a total insider nor a total outsider 
with respect to the subject of my research. And, throughout my field research I 
emphasised different aspects of my multiple identities according to context and 
audience.  My shifting identities were even more apparent to me when peer group and 
interview participants in one breath would include me when using language like ‘we’ 
or ‘us’ or speak to me in local dialect or assume shared cultural references but then in 
the next breath reference my Harvard education or my exposure to North American 
culture. In certain instances peer group discussion and interview participants 
referenced their own time spent living or studying in North America to highlight what 
they saw as issues in Antigua and Barbuda and they would assume I understood their 
reference.  For example, these participants drew comparisons with respect to the 
education and training levels of police officers, penalties for official corruption, and 
lack of professional opportunities for Antiguan and Barbudan athletes. Thus, I believe 
my role of researcher is better conceptualised along a continuum – in terms of degrees 
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of remoteness from diametrical poles representing familiarity with my research 
domain and unfamiliarity with my research subject (Hodkinson 2005).  
As an Antiguan I was able to exploit the advantages of my familiarity with 
Antiguans and Barbudans and the country’s sociocultural realities.  For example, I 
used my familiarity with the culture to gain access to senior government officials and 
key civil servants, I was able to interact naturally with my peer group discussion and 
interview participants, and I was able establish trust and achieve greater relational 
intimacy (Breen 2007). For example, I called on family and friends to make initial 
contact with senior government officials and because I understood the social capital 
my educational institutions would carry in Antigua and Barbuda, I emphasised my 
institutional connections.  Additionally, during interviews and peer group discussions I 
often used Antiguan colloquialisms, words specific to Antiguan and Barbudan dialect, 
and I made broad cultural references.  However, I was able to avoid some of the 
pitfalls traditionally associated with such familiarity since in many ways there were 
barriers to my complete familiarity.  I recognise that there may be observations I may 
have overlooked or assumptions about social behaviour that I took for granted but I 
was careful not to make assumptions based on my prior knowledge and experience 
and I never lost sight of my primary role as a researcher.  Similarly, as an Antiguan 
who was raised outside of Antigua and exposed to myriad foreign cultures, I benefited 
from the assumption that I was independent (especially with respect to political 
affiliation), unbiased and objective.  Additionally, like Breen (2007), a degree of 
unfamiliarity allowed me to better identify key players, power differentials and 
dynamics that may have been overlooked by a researcher with a much greater degree 
of familiarity than me.   
In acknowledging my role as researcher, I believe my work makes an even 
stronger contribution to literature on Antigua and Barbuda because I have a greater 
degree of familiarity with the country and the culture than those who have conducted 
much of the existing research.  Some researchers are described as parachuting into 
people’s lives and then simply vanishing.  Caribbean academics warn of the ‘tourist 
criminologist’ who comes into the region, gathers data and then leaves the region to 
analyse and document findings that lead to policy recommendations that could lead to 
adverse conditions for Caribbean countries (see for example Jones 1999).  My 
sensitivity to, and on-going relationship with, the Antiguan and Barbudan context 
mitigates this problem. 
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Summary 
In this chapter I have outlined my mixed methods approach and associated issues, 
including tensions between the various epistemological tenets of the study, data 
selection and collection and my methods of analysis. I have also discussed the 
strengths and limitations of both my research design and my actual research.  Lastly, 
in acknowledging my role as researcher and the role of my own subjectivity I have 
lent to my work clarity, coherence, significance and validation.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ‘REAL’ CRIME SCENE 
 
 
Introduction 
Because historical police data is largely inaccessible there is very little analysis of 
crimes recorded by the Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda (the “RPF”) prior 
to 1994.  Where such analysis does exist, gaps in the data are common and Antigua 
and Barbuda is discussed within the broader context of the English speaking 
Caribbean (see for example de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999; Deosaran 2004; 
Maertens and Anstey 2007).   Moreover, there is not much discussion of crimes 
recorded by the police during the years of associated statehood, leading up to Antigua 
and Barbuda’s full independence from Great Britain in 1981.  As such, this chapter 
attempts to fill some of these gaps.  This chapter aims to provide an account of crime 
in the twin-island nation that is more comprehensive than anything that has been 
written to date and to this end it will provide empirical data where none existed 
previously.  This chapter will also unearth patterns of violent crime. Here, crime in 
Antigua and Barbuda will be discussed within the context of socio-political realities 
that the official crime data cannot possibly capture. This chapter is intended to ignite 
meaningful dialogue that has at its heart a premise steeped in some form of empirical 
data rather than one steeped in romanticised notions of a utopian era that the data 
suggests never really existed – that time when ‘...Antigua was a much different place. 
[When] a murder a year...was sensational news’.5   Most importantly, this chapter is 
meant to serve as a basis of comparison between what we think we ‘know’ empirically 
about crime in Antigua and Barbuda and what the media, ordinary citizens and local 
politicians regularly say.   
Using recorded police data for the 40-year period between 1970 and 2010, as 
well as secondary research, this chapter is intended to establish – as best we can – for 
Antigua and Barbuda what Maguire (2007: 255) calls the ‘basic contours of crime’.  
That is, the overall scale of crime and the relative incidence of different types of 
offences, trends in crime over time, and its geographical distribution.  First, a 
description of the socio-political environment in which these crimes occur is set out 
                                                
5 Quotation taken from peer group discussion Darkwood Beach Lime, June 6. 
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followed by a discussion of the actual crime data and associated methodological 
issues.  Finally, information from semi-structured interviews with key civil servants, 
as well as data from government and non-governmental agencies, is used to discuss 
hidden patterns of crime and supplement the empirical findings. 
II 
David Garland (1996; 2000; 2001) has argued that high rates of property crime and 
violent crime have become a standard feature of the late modern social experience. 
Although crime typically has an uneven social distribution and high-risk victimisation 
is a concentrated phenomenon, high crime rates and the threat of crime have so seeped 
into the modern consciousness that they have become a ‘taken for granted element’ of 
late modernity (Garland 1996). While Antigua and Barbuda may not be what Garland 
envisioned as a late modern society, the features that it shares with such societies 
(globalisation for example) means that it is not excepted from this development.  In 
Antigua and Barbuda increased rates of property crime and violent crime are no longer 
an anomaly and crime is viewed as the ‘most serious challenge facing the country’ 
(Maertens and Anstey 2007: 1).  The UNDP (2012: 19) crime survey found that 54 per 
cent of respondents feel insecure because of crime and security. But, in deconstructing 
Antigua and Barbuda’s actual crime rates and understanding how crime has changed 
over time, it is important to first understand the social, economic, political and cultural 
context in which these crimes occurred.  As Reiner (2000: 80) argues, the cultural and 
socio-economic context facilitates a broader understanding of the circumstances in 
which offenders have acted and their experience of these circumstances as pressures 
and temptations to commit crimes.  Moreover, the cultural and socio-economic context 
can shed light on shifts in the availability of means and opportunities to commit crimes 
and associated social controls. The discussion below aims to describe Antigua and 
Barbuda’s social, economic, political and cultural context in order to facilitate a 
broader understanding of the police recorded crime figures. 
Cultural and Socio-Political Context  
By the late 1960s sugar, Antigua and Barbuda’s cash crop, could no longer sustain the 
economy.  Unlike other Caribbean countries, Antigua and Barbuda did not rebuild its 
agriculture sector around a second cash crop.  Instead, the country focused on 
developing small farmers and small-scale food production for the local market.  As a 
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supplement to this restructured agriculture sector, the country looked to tourism, 
related construction, and light manufacturing as a way to diversify its economy 
(Knight 1989; de Albuquerque and McElroy 1995; Caribbean Development Bank6 
2007a).  Most of this diversification occurred during the 1980s when the total number 
visitors to the island, as well as hotel rooms doubled. Also during this time, electricity 
production tripled as did the number of telephones and vehicles, the value of 
construction permits rose seven times and the average annual gross domestic product 
(“GDP”) grew approximately seven per cent. Per capita real GDP more than doubled 
and the country’s strategic location enabled Antigua and Barbuda to become a major 
hub for regional and international travel.  By extension, the international airport 
became a service point for aircraft serving the region thus creating employment and 
income growth in the transportation sector.  Indeed, by 1993 agriculture’s share of the 
country’s GDP had fallen to 3.7 per cent while tourism simultaneously grew to 
account, directly and indirectly, for 50 per cent  (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1995; 
CDB 2007a).  Tourism dwarfed agriculture and manufacturing and emerged as the 
backbone of the economy.  Antigua and Barbuda enjoyed income levels that made it 
one of the better-off countries in the Caribbean and the developing world (CDB 
2007a). 
  As much of the tourism boom of the 1980s was facilitated largely by foreign 
debt, the turn of the decade ushered in new economic realities for Antigua and 
Barbuda as well.  During the 1990s, growth declined to less than half of the 1980s 
growth rate and the country was forced to struggle with high debt and growing arrears.  
Economic difficulties were further exacerbated by five major hurricanes, a volcanic 
eruption in neighbouring Montserrat and a ruling by the World Trade Organization 
(the “WTO”) that threatened the banana industry in Dominica, a country whose 
economy is inextricably linked to that of Antigua and Barbuda.  In fact, the WTO’s 
ruling on the banana trading practices affected the very stability of the Eastern 
Caribbean Dollar – Antigua and Barbuda’s currency.  Fiscal imbalance, or the 
imbalance between revenue generation and expenditures, widened and declining credit 
worthiness prevented access to regular financing. The practical implications of these 
new economic realities included the postponement of necessary public investment, 
labour market distortions that made government the single largest employer in the 
country and overreliance on tourism as the mainstay of the economy (de Albuquerque 
                                                
6 Referred to hereinafter as “CDB”. 
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and McElroy 1995; The Daily Observer 1995; Robinson and Cashin 2006; WTO 
2005).   
These new economic realities also served to restructure the nature of poverty in 
the country as a growing number of women and new immigrants became dependent 
for employment on seasonal low skilled and low paying jobs in the hotel and 
restaurant sectors.  These low paying jobs were hypersensitive to such exogenous 
events as natural disasters and fluctuations in European and North American 
economies.  For example, after hurricane Luis in 1995, between 4000 and 7,000 hotel 
and tourism jobs – approximately 15 to 25 per cent of the workforce – were lost 
(Griffith 2004).  Similarly, men flocked to low paying low skilled work in the 
construction industry, which was often tied to the tourism industry. Because 
government became a significant employer for the poorest segment of the population, 
once public sector cuts began, it was the poorest segment of the population that was 
disproportionately affected  (CDB 2007a).  As in other parts of the region (see for 
example Harriott 2000), the face of poverty in Antigua and Barbuda was rapidly 
becoming that of a low skilled worker with full-time employment in the formal labour 
market.  
Consequently, rather than turn to the IMF for assistance, the government 
developed and implemented its own voluntary ‘homegrown’ structural adjustment 
programme in consultation with the Caribbean Development Bank, the Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (see for 
example Government of Antigua 1995). This homegrown programme was designed to 
diversify the economy, rein in spending, cut public sector employment, and raise 
revenues through indirect taxation (Government of Antigua 1995; Government of 
Antigua 1996).  However, according to reports and assessments, this structural 
adjustment programme never fully achieved intended results (see for example CDB 
2007a).  Public sector employment was not cut as much as it should have been and 
attempts to diversify the economy through financial services and the creation of a 
gaming industry were largely thwarted by the United States.  Tourism remained the 
lifeblood of the economy.  As such, economic woes were further exacerbated by the 
2001 terrorist attack on the United States.  The attack led to an immediate decline in 
tourist arrivals as North American air travel decreased by as much as 20 per cent even 
after North American air space reopened following its immediate closure for several 
days after the attack (see Bhadra and Texter 2004).   This decrease severely impacted 
Antigua and Barbuda’s macro and micro economies.    
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Raising revenue through indirect taxation, a key component to the 
government’s structural adjustment program, also proved problematic.  The 
government had long held that direct taxation would rob citizens of disposable income 
that, when spent, could stimulate the economy.  As such, the focus was instead on 
raising revenue through customs duties and other indirect taxes (see for example 
Antigua Labour Party Manifesto 1999).  While there may have been some merit to this 
approach in theory, in reality relying on indirect taxes had the effect of further 
entrenching inequality – the gap between the middle class and the poor – which 
persisted into the 2000s (CDB 2007a). It is unclear that a 2004 change in government 
made any immediate difference in this respect. As compared to other Caribbean 
countries, Antigua and Barbuda continues to have a relatively high level of inequality.  
With respect to consumption expenditure, in 2007 the poorest quintile, consumed less 
than five per cent of total expenditures while the wealthiest quintile consumed 56.3 per 
cent of expenditure – more than 10 times that of the poorest quintile.   Similarly, it is 
unclear that the 2004 change in government and new macroeconomic policies aimed at 
fiscal debt reduction, direct taxation and reducing the public sector wage bill through a 
voluntary severance and early retirement scheme (see for example IMF 2006), had any 
appreciable effect on the patterns of poverty that emerged with the labour market 
distortions of the 1990s.  By 2007 28.3 per cent of Antiguans and Barbudans were 
estimated to be vulnerable (10 per cent), poor (14.6 per cent) or indigent (3.7 per cent) 
and the vast majority of this population was employed in the formal economy (CDB 
2007a).   
 Though inequality and poverty were hardly foreign to Antigua and Barbuda as 
a former British colony, the way in which people dealt with them evolved with the 
country’s growth and development.   These coping strategies affected the availability 
of means and opportunities to offend.  Some of the same conditions that facilitated 
economic prosperity in the 1980s (i.e. use of the country as a regional and 
international travel hub and a thriving tourism sector) simultaneously facilitated the 
flourishing of a nascent underground economy built around drug running, prostitution 
and human trafficking.  Through its international connections, this underground 
economy eventually became attractive and rewarding enough to serve as a 
counterpoint to participation in the formal economy (see Bowling 2010).  Moreover, 
evidence suggests that there is no longer a social stigma associated with participation 
in this underground economy and a growing number of people – especially 
marginalized young people – move fluidly between it and the formal economy.   Not 
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only have young people admitted to running drugs to survive, a 2001 survey 
discovered that 20 per cent of secondary school students would engage in the sale of 
drugs if given the opportunity (CDB 2007a).  
 A flailing formal economy and the pervasiveness and institutionalisation of 
Antigua and Barbuda’s underground economy have had a profound effect on the 
structure of crime. Beyond the fact that drugs and prostitution are themselves illegal, 
the infrastructure required to support them is criminogenic and antithetical to the 
safety and security of residents of Antigua and Barbuda.   For example, while drug 
running necessarily required established spaces that could facilitate drug activity, these 
spaces also provided convergent opportunities in which predatory crimes could occur 
thus compromising the safety and security of the communities in which they were 
located (Crotts 2003).  Drug running also required a ready supply of firearms and 
ammunition to protect the drugs and drug operatives (Agozino et al. 2009; see also 
Klein 2008 for discussion of the link between drugs and development).  Such 
‘protection’ often included robbery and narcoterrorism, the intimidation of clients and 
attempts to deter disloyalty by fellow operators through the use of violence (Griffith 
1997).  Indeed, a 2007 study found that Antigua and Barbuda had become a country 
with indications of increased use and availability of small arms (Maertens and Anstey 
2007). Similarly, because official police and other government data from the Bureau 
of Gender Affairs suggest that the vast majority of recorded cases of prostitution 
involve immigrant female prostitutes, as prostitution became a more prominent fixture 
of the underground economy, it required greater cooperation by immigration and 
senior officials who were often bribed to allow into the country, or extend the stay of, 
foreign women who were brought to Antigua and Barbuda to ensure a steady stream of 
employees for various houses of prostitution.  According to records from the Bureau 
of Gender affairs, prostitution quickly led to the trafficking of women.   
 Between 1995 and 2000 the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom 
each adopted a stricter stance towards foreign-born criminal offenders and enacted 
legislation lowering the threshold of criminal activity that would trigger deportation.  
From 1998 to 2006 all three of these countries combined deported to Antigua and 
Barbuda 283 criminal offenders. Of the 283, approximately 40.6 per cent were 
repatriated for drug related offences, 15.7 per cent for robbery, burglary or larceny, 6.0 
per cent for illegal firearms and 3.6 per cent for murder or manslaughter (Barnes et al. 
2008). Although the absolute number of deportations may not seem significant, per 
100,000 inhabitants, Antigua and Barbuda had a rate of deportation higher than 
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Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana.  While the data does not support theories that 
deported criminal offenders are primarily responsible for most of the country’s 
increase in serious crime, a 2008 CARICOM7 study on criminal deportation in the 
Caribbean found that even small numbers of deported criminal offenders might result 
in a disproportionately negative effect on the society to which they returned (Barnes et 
al. 2008). Interviews with senior members in the RPF confirm the data.  According to 
officers in the RPF, it is not that criminal deportees are responsible for surges in crime 
that occur, but to the extent they do reoffend in Antigua and Barbuda, they introduce 
ways of offending never before seen in the country.  This is allegedly true with regards 
to ‘hi-tech’ fraud crimes. Furthermore, members of the RPF believe that exposure to 
this level of criminal sophistication, whether through media reports or otherwise, have 
served to increase the sophistication of Antigua and Barbuda’s homegrown criminal 
offenders as well.  
 Growth and development, tourism, inequality, poverty, and criminal 
deportation all interacted to play a significant role in driving Antigua and Barbuda’s 
crime trends and patterns. In the following section these crime trends and patterns are 
discussed more fully, along with associated methodological limitations. 
 
III 
Limitations of the Police Data 
According to Deosaran (2004: 114), the existing databases and methods of collecting 
crime data in commonwealth Caribbean countries are deficient and even archaic.  
Consistent with this observation, Antigua and Barbuda does not have a database 
designed to capture incidents of crime reported to and recorded by the police. 
Incidents of crime are recorded by hand and entered into a word processing document.  
Indeed, prior to 1994 incidents of crimes recorded by the police were not computerised 
at all.  During this time, crime reports were handwritten in notebooks by police 
officers at various stations across the country and the content of those reports were 
collated at the main police station in St. John’s.  At the St. John’s police station all of 
the reports from the various stations, coupled with reports made to the St. John’s 
station, were recorded in yet another notebook, and eventually filed away.  For most of 
the 1970s and 1980s the compiled crime data was published annually in a series, 
                                                
7 CARICOM is an abbreviation for Caribbean Community and Common Market, which is a collection of fifteen mostly English-
speaking Caribbean countries and territories.   
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which has since been discontinued, entitled the Annual Report on the Organisation 
and Administration of the Royal Police Force and Fire Service of Antigua and 
Barbuda.    
Although police records were increasingly computerised after 1994, the 
fundamental process employed by police officers of collecting and compiling crime 
data remains largely unchanged.  However, when all of the crime reports are recorded 
at the St. John’s police station, an officer attached to the Criminal Investigation 
Department (“CID”) now enters the compiled data into computerised frequency charts, 
which are stored electronically.  Despite this technological development, there is still 
no easy way to extract or manipulate this crime data because the data is not entered 
into a database but in a basic word processing document with very limited 
functionality.   
Despite the anachronistic manner in which the RPF compiles national crime 
data, resulting flaws are not inherently different from those associated with crime data 
collected in jurisdictions where data is collected by more sophisticated means.  While 
the RPF’s method of compiling national crime data may allow for more leakage than 
jurisdictions with fully computerised databases and automated tracking, widely 
accepted perils of using police data to talk about the overall scale of crime and 
associated crime trends persist.  As such, there is likely a disconnect between the 
amount of crime that has been reported to and recorded by the RPF and that which 
actually occurs in Antigua and Barbuda.  
Nevertheless, the discussion below outlines what we believe we ‘know’ about 
crime in Antigua and Barbuda. 
Reported Crime Trends 
Unlike other parts of the Caribbean, trends in the crimes reported to the RPF are not 
easily discernable (cf. Maertens and Anstey 2007; Harriott 2000).  Given Antigua’s 
small population of between 60,680 and 90,80 for the period of review, 1970-2010, 
crime trends often appear erratic since a relatively small number of incidents in any 
particular year can lead to dramatic increases in corresponding rates.  Nevertheless, it 
is clear that as a percentage of total reported crime, the vast majority of reports have 
always related to property.  The data also suggest that the nature of violent crime – 
murder, rape, shooting, wounding and robbery – appears to be changing and that there 
is a relatively high amount of sexual violence in the country. As of 2010, however, the 
rates of both property and violent crime appeared to be on a downward trend. 
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Reports of property crime outstrip those of violent crime.  From 1970 to 1995 
the rate of property crime increased from 677 to 4,525 per 100,000 people, before 
decreasing to 1,829 per 100,000 [Figure 3].  As a percentage of total crime, property 
crime increased from 56.6 per cent to 77.7 per cent of total crime reports. During this 
time, the ratio of reported property crime to violent crime fluctuated between 2:1 and 
8:1.  Since 1982, Antigua and Barbuda’s first year of full independence from Great 
Britain, property crime has comprised at least 70 per cent of all crime reports, peaking 
at 84.3 per cent in 2005.  That the vast majority of reported crime has been property 
related is not surprising and is consistent with crime patterns emerging from official 
police data in most developing countries (Buendia 1989: 415), England and Wales 
(Maguire 2007: 255) and other countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Harriott 
2000: 9-10; UNDP 2012: 20). What is perhaps more surprising, however, is that from 
1970 to 2010 the ratio of property crime relative to violent crime has generally 
increased rather than decreased.  This apparent trend defies the trajectory of reported 
crimes elsewhere in the Commonwealth Caribbean where the ratio of property crime 
relative to violent crime has decreased (see Harriott 2000: 9-10; UNDP 2012: 20).  
This trend also defies much of the public discourse surrounding crime in Antigua and 
Barbuda and seems to cast doubt on the characterisation of Antigua and Barbuda’s 
crime as mostly violent.  One possible explanation for this counterintuitive trend is 
that over time the reporting behaviour of the public changed with respect to property 
crime. Over the first 25 years of the period, for example, as property insurance may 
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have become a more prominent feature of society, there would have been a greater 
incentive to report property crimes to the police in order to support insurance claims.  
As such, the growing proportion of property crime reports during this time might 
actually represent a decline in the overall number of property crime reports that were 
never brought to the attention of the police.  The discussion below further explores 
Antigua and Barbuda’s crime trends with respect to reported property crime.  
Property Crime 
For much of the 1970s and the 1980s Antiguans and Barbudans left their belongings 
unsecured (see for example see for example Antigua and Barbuda 1979, 1982, 1984, 
1987, 1989).  It was not uncommon for people to leave running cars unattended, 
homes unlocked or businesses improperly secured.  These routine activities created 
opportunities for crime such that reports of larceny, which also includes RPF 
categories of ‘breaking’, ‘breaking and larceny’, ‘burglary’, ‘housebreaking’, ‘store-
breaking’, ‘thefts and other stealing’, collectively accounted for almost 90 per cent of 
all property crime reports and as such tracked very closely the patterns of overall 
property crime reports [Figure 4]. 
  
 
 
Additionally, the literature suggests that the increases that occurred in reports of 
larceny during the latter part of the 1980s into the 1990s were driven, in part, by 
increased drug abuse, which is generally associated with increased property crime (see 
for example de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999; Maertens and Anstey 2007), and five 
major hurricanes in 1995.  Between 1982 and 1995 official police records suggest that 
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much of the theft reported to the police was committed by individuals who sought to 
support their drug habit or intended to ship stolen goods – often electronic equipment 
– overseas in exchange for drugs.  During this time, use of crack and cocaine increased 
and marijuana cultivation was prevalent (see for example Antigua and Barbuda 1982, 
1984, 1987, 1989).  That government formally acknowledged increased drug use, 
formed a national drug council and publicly pledged to strengthen drug education in 
schools, underscores the extent to which drug abuse was perceived as a problem 
during this time (Antigua and Barbuda 1995).   
 Furthermore, five major hurricanes exacerbated rates of property crime in 
1995. Evacuated or damaged houses and retail establishments as well as damaged or 
abandoned vehicles provided increased opportunities for property crime. Police 
records claim that notwithstanding military patrols and a declared curfew in parts of 
St. John’s, after Hurricane Luis extended power outages invited increased larceny, 
especially in the tourist areas of downtown St. John’s.  In addition, reported incidents 
of fraud increased 50 per cent in 1995 as reports of false insurance claims and other 
insurance related fraud became more prevalent. 
  Between 1995 and 2010, however, reports of larceny and overall rates of 
reported property crime declined by 42 per cent.  This decline is likely due to a 
complicated mixture of several disparate factors.  First, the perception of increased 
crime and greater awareness may have led many to take greater precautions in 
securing their belongings.  Official police records document education and outreach to 
members of the public with respect to securing their belongings.  These initiatives also 
included visiting business establishments to discuss more effective security devices.  
Second, it is not likely that the reports of larceny and property crime directly 
associated with the hurricanes in 1995 would have persisted past that year.  Levels of 
looting would have likely decreased as would the opportunities that evacuated homes 
and abandoned property would have provided.  
Third, beginning in 1996, the Minister of Finance increased budgetary spend to 
support measures aimed at both supply and demand reduction of illicit drugs.  
Government introduced new legislation targeting drug offenders and created a new 
Drug Enforcement Unit, which had responsibility for creating a national drug reform 
programme.  The Prime Minister appointed a “Drug Czar” as well as a Cabinet sub-
committee to deal with drug issues (Antigua and Barbuda 1997).  In 1998, musician 
Eric Clapton established a state of the art drug treatment facility, which is the 
country’s sole rehabilitation centre.  Given that these measures coincided with 
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increased drug seizures and arrests, it is plausible that these measures had an effect on 
drug activity known to the police.  That is, it is plausible that property crime reports 
decreased because these efforts ensured that there were fewer individuals who sought 
to support their drug habit or barter property for drugs.  Additionally, seizures of 
nearly all drugs in 1996 were up on the previous year and from 1995 to 2003 seizures 
of cannabis plants increased dramatically thereby affecting the local marijuana supply 
[Table 2]. If drug activity did in fact decrease after 1996 it is likely that associated 
property crime would have also decreased. A study published by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research explains that although marijuana consumption, as compared to 
other illicit drugs, does not typically produce compulsive patterns of criminal behavior 
among users and is not as expensive as other illicit drugs, marijuana involvement is 
significantly correlated with higher rates of offending for acquisitive or income-
producing property crimes (Pacula and Kilmer 2003).  According to Pacula and 
Kilmer (2003), frequent marijuana use was found to have a larger effect on 
participation in property crime than frequent alcohol use or any other illicit drug use.  
Similarly, in his study of youth crime, Baker (1998) finds that frequent marijuana 
users were almost five times more likely to report participation in acquisitive property 
crime than non-users, even after controlling for individual characteristics, family 
background, and other substance use. 
Table 2: Drug Seizures and Arrests 1995-2003 
Substances Seized 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Cannabis (kg) 204 1485 628 105 75.25 66.70 756 1257 359.38 
Cannabis Plants 294 2464 3556 2107 23384 8416 69498 4540 7203 
Hashish (kg) 2 32 0 0 1000 0 0 0 0 
Cocaine (kg) 88 6 126 1 21.5 24.36 6 59.8 62.27 
Crack Cocaine 
(pieces and ounces)  
132 
 8oz 
290 149 
.74oz  
81 0 0 0 0 0 
Persons Arrested                   
Males 63 66 185 185 122 201 150 101 107 
Females 19 13 37 22 25 20 15 27 30 
Juvenile Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 
Juvenile Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 82 79 222 207 147 221 166 131 137 
SOURCE: RPF Criminal Records Office 
 89 
Fourth and perhaps most interesting, there is evidence that as reports of 
property crime were decreasing the informal or ‘underground’ economy was growing.  
Harriott (2000) suggests that in some cases it may be possible to attribute declining 
reports of property crime to a decrease in reports of larceny, which might in turn be the 
result of would-be offenders turning to the underground economy.  Harriott (2000) 
contends that in Jamaica increased fraud and decreased larceny points to a qualitative 
shift in the illegal modes of adaptation to societal conditions.  New income-generating 
activities in the underground economy now offered higher income and status and 
lower risks than traditional forms of property crime. It may well be that this same 
phenomenon has played out in Antigua and Barbuda.  Although it is very difficult to 
measure with any precision, there is some evidence that over time the underground 
economy has grown becoming an increasingly institutionalised and socially accepted 
part of Antiguan and Barbudan society (see for example CDB 2007a).  Furthermore, 
limited resources for policing have reduced the risks of operating in this sphere. A 
2007 poverty assessment of Antigua and Barbuda provides evidence of the role of the 
underground economy as well as underground economic activities in the lives of poor 
people in Antigua and Barbuda.  According to the assessment, participants in the study 
admitted to ‘surviving “by any means necessary” saying that men may resort to 
“hustling” and to “drug trafficking”, and women to “prostitution”’  (CDB 2007a: 84).   
Additionally, similar to the Jamaica case, in Antigua and Barbuda both blue-collar and 
white-collar fraud increased.  For example, between 1995 and 2001 the rate of blue-
collar fraud reports increased 25 per cent and in the private sector, insider trading and 
overbilling on state contracts were pervasive.  One example of white-collar fraud is the 
Medical Benefits Scheme scandal in the late 1990s in which a number of persons and 
businesses (including a government minister) were charged with defrauding the 
government of millions of dollars using forged cheques, using inside information for 
personal gain and deliberately overbilling the government for goods and services 
rendered.  A commission of inquiry was subsequently formed and criminal charges 
were filed in 2004.   
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Violent Crime 
Over the past 40 years, the underlying rate of violent crime reports has remained 
relatively stable despite marked fluctuations over short periods [Figure 5]. In 1970 
there were 448 violent crimes recorded per 100,000 people and 403 in 2010.  There 
are, however, some curious trends in the structure of violent crime reports. Homicide 
rates is one of the best indicators of violent crime rates because it is the least affected 
by the recording and reporting limitations that affect most other crimes. In Antigua 
and Barbuda, homicide rates have fluctuated but have trended mostly upward.  Since 
the early 1980s, but more consistently since the mid-1990s, robbery has become a 
larger proportion of all violent crime reports.  In 1990 the rate of reported robberies 
was 30 per 100,000 and this comprised roughly 6 per cent of violent crime reports.  
However, by 2010 rates of reported robbery increased 340 per cent to 132 per 100,000 
people accounting for 33 per cent of violent crime. In 2009 robbery reports accounted 
for nearly half of the country’s reported violent crime.   As gun crime has become 
significantly more prevalent throughout the region, since 2004 reports of shootings 
have featured more prominently among all violent crime recorded by the police (see 
Agozino et al. 2009 for discussion of the ‘pistolization’ of the region).  It is plausible 
that the alleged increase in gun violence has facilitated increased homicide rates and 
declining rates of wounding. Figure 6 below juxtaposes the increasing rates of 
homicide reports and the decreasing rates of wounding reports.  It is possible that the 
increased use of guns has had deadlier outcomes in situations where wounding or 
grievous harm would have otherwise resulted.   
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Figure 6: Rates of Reported Homicide as Compared to Rates of Reported Wounding 
 
 
SOURCE: RPF Criminal Records Office 
Table 3 below shows the annual incidence of homicide, sexual violence, shooting, 
wounding and robbery reported to the RPF. While per capita rates are useful in 
describing crime trends because they provide a basis of comparison across disparate 
jurisdictions and time periods, raw numbers can be helpful in understanding how 
people understand and experience the levels of violence in their communities, 
especially as media reports tend to focus on individual occurrences. 
 
Table 3: Incidence of Violent Crime  
Year Violent Crime Homicide Sexual Violence Shooting Wounding Robbery 
1970 272 2 10 0 252 8 
1971 376 3 22 0 348 3 
1972 383 1 17 0 357 8 
1973 339 6 10 0 313 10 
1974 397 4 16 0 356 21 
1975 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1976 393 6 13 0 360 14 
1977 396 1 22 0 355 18 
1978 345 2 19 0 309 15 
1979 348 2 16 0 323 7 
1980 351 6 26 0 308 11 
1981 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1982 422 9 31 0 352 30 
1983 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1984 294 1 32 0 235 26 
1985 301 5 33 0 238 25 
1986 301 4 36 0 242 19 
1987 304 2 30 0 244 28 
1988 376 5 49 0 286 36 
1989 388 2 44 0 315 27 
1990 345 3 46 0 277 19 
1991 344 4 36 0 278 26 
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Year Violent Crime Homicide Sexual Violence Shooting Wounding Robbery 
1992 406 3 53 0 311 39 
1993 461 5 49 0 358 49 
1994 480 9 51 0 356 64 
1995 511 4 51 0 382 74 
1996 415 3 54 0 306 52 
1997 427 11 46 0 302 68 
1998 389 3 51 0 260 75 
1999 305 5 36 0 245 19 
2000 473 4 96 0 315 58 
2001 423 7 73 0 303 40 
2002 413 9 54 0 289 61 
2003 450 6 55 0 296 93 
2004 430 7 41 15 289 78 
2005 405 6 38 10 278 73 
2006 474 14 43 13 256 148 
2007 605 19 44 35 309 198 
2008 426 14 58 33 168 153 
2009 375 16 40 11 140 164 
2010 366 7 20 22 186 120 
SOURCE: RPF Criminal Records Office 
 
Robbery and Homicide 
In 2007 the rate of reported robbery peaked at 230.5 per 100,000, up from 13.2 in 
1970 [Figure 7]. As already noted, some of this increase has been associated with the 
rapid rise in drug use in the 1980s and 1990s as some addicts used robbery to support 
their addiction (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999).  Much of the increase, however, 
can be directly attributed to the growth of the underground economy.  Associated with 
this growing informal sector is the proliferation of arms and ammunition as gangs seek 
to protect their turf and goods, maintain their dominance and manage rivalry 
(Montoute and Anyanwu 2009). For example, in 2007 the Office of National Drug 
Control and Money Laundering Policy (“ONDCP”) disrupted the illegal drug trade by 
successfully executing six major operations that resulted in seizures of 6,824 pounds 
of cannabis and five kilograms of cocaine worth EC $22,950,200 (US $8,442,583) 
(ONDCP 2008).  The decrease in supply set off a drug war, which led to a record 
number of robberies and at least eight drug-related murders (ONDCP 2008).  
Similarly, robberies increased slightly in the mid-1990s when local authorities 
increased supply reduction efforts.  According to Montoute and Anyanwu (2009) it is 
important to understand that Antigua and Barbuda has a lucrative marijuana trade that 
is under-researched.  In explaining the significance of this trade, these scholars quote a 
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regional expert who says, ‘a pound of high potency organic [marijuana] fetches more 
than a pound of cocaine’ (Montoute and Anyanwu 2009: 75).  
Police reports suggest that of those robberies known to the police, increasingly 
they have been committed in bold fashion during the day, by masked assailants and 
with the assistance of firearms (Montoute and Anyanwu 2009; de Albuquerque and 
McElroy 1999).  Because of this change in the manner in which robberies are 
committed, most notably the increasing use of firearms, it is not surprising that 
empirically, reports of robbery appear to be positively correlated with reports of 
homicide [Figure 7].  Since the 1990s and more consistently since 2004, a growing 
number of homicides were committed during the commission of a robbery.  For 
example, in 2004 close to 30 per cent of the homicides reported to the police took 
place in the commission of a robbery.  Two incidents garnering widespread national 
and international attention exemplify the point.  In 1995, a gunman, in broad daylight, 
shot in the chest and killed a Canadian woman picnicking on a quiet beach as she 
resisted the gunman’s attempt to steal her handbag. Similarly, in 2008 British 
newlyweds on their honeymoon were murdered in their hotel room in what the RPF 
has ruled a robbery gone awry. The female victim was shot in the head and died 
instantly while her husband was shot in the neck and died a week later.  In 2010 
homicides that occurred in the context of robberies represented 57.1 per cent of all 
homicides and have contributed to the erratic nature of Antigua and Barbuda’s 
homicide rate, which has ranged from a low of 3.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1989 to 
a high of 22.1 in 2007 – the year of the alleged drug war.    
Figure 7: Rates of Robbery as Compared to Rates of Homicide 
 
SOURCE: RPF Criminal Records Office 
Rape and Indecent Assault 
Recorded rates of sexual violence against women are high across the Caribbean, with 
all commonwealth Caribbean countries showing higher per capita rates than the global 
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average.  More particularly, there exists a culture of coerced sex in the region such that 
almost 50 per cent of the region’s adolescent girls’ first sexual experiences were 
forced (Sealy-Burke 2009).  Indeed, for much of Antigua and Barbuda’s history, the 
reported incidence of rape, indecent assault and unlawful sexual intercourse has 
remained high. From 1970 to 2010 the rate of reported sexual violence fluctuated 
between 16.5 and 132.8 per 100,000 inhabitants.  Rape and indecent assault have 
accounted for as much as 20 per cent of the country’s violent crime.   
Figure 8: Rate of Rape per 100,000 Females 2004-2010 
 
SOURCE: RPF Criminal Records Office 
 It is generally accepted that reports of sexual offences are lower than the actual rate of 
occurrence due to non-reporting.    A task force on sexual violence and sexual assault 
in Antigua and Barbuda found that the perceived lack of privacy and confidentiality 
within the health sector was one of the most significant barriers to reporting such 
offences.  Additionally, the perceived inefficacy of the police is thought to contribute 
to underreporting.   Against this backdrop, Antigua and Barbuda’s high levels of 
reported sexual violence are even more disturbing as it is likely that there are even 
more incidents that actually occur that are never reported to the police.  
However, data on rates and incidence obscure important changes in the manner 
in which rape is committed. Historically, the perpetrator was someone known to the 
victim.  But, now, according to records at the Bureau of Gender Affairs, rape is said to 
be increasingly committed by strangers (see also de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999).  
An extreme example of this new trend is the spate of rapes that occurred in late 2007 
continuing into early 2009, which were linked to an alleged masked ‘serial rapist’ who 
was said to break into the homes of women and rape them at gunpoint.  This spate of 
rapes was the driver of the 2008 rape rate of 99 per 100,000 females [Figure 8].  While 
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this alleged ‘serial rapist’ was never formally caught or charged for these rapes, in 
concealing his identity and using a firearm he helped to further entrench the 
increasingly anonymous nature of rape in Antigua and Barbuda. The Executive 
Director of the Directorate of Gender Affairs explains that as early as 2000 in a small 
section of St. John’s women were being raped by a masked person or persons at 
gunpoint but these rapes went largely unnoticed and unsolved.  The alleged masked 
‘serial rapist’ is therefore thought to be the personification of a trend that was slowly 
creeping into Antiguan and Barbudan society. Indeed, professional profilers hired by 
the government have long suspected the rapes were likely committed by more than 
one person and not a single ‘serial rapist’ as commonly reported in the media and 
discussed in the public domain.  Although sexual violence has always been prevalent 
in Antigua and Barbuda, the rates of rape during this time led to heightened rates of 
anxiety. Even after the rapes subsided in 2009, women are still fearful of being raped 
and many have changed their daily patterns and behaviour as a result.  Indeed, the 
UNDP crime survey suggests that 19 per cent of both women and men feared being 
sexually assaulted in some fashion.  This percentage is nearly twice that in any other 
Caribbean country (UNDP 2012).    Much of the reason for this fear is the seemingly 
random nature of the attacks.  While further entrenching the anonymous nature of rape 
in Antigua and Barbuda, the masked serial rapist had a profound effect on the national 
consciousness with respect to crime and security. 
The Geographical Distribution of Crime in Antigua and Barbuda 
While the vast majority of crime and violence in Antigua and Barbuda occurs in the 
capital city of St. John’s and its surrounding areas, it is not distributed evenly across 
this area.  As the former Assistant Commissioner of Police explained in an interview 
for this study, much of Antigua’s property crime occurs on the three streets in 
downtown St. John’s where tourists most frequently travel.   This is consistent with 
research pointing to a link between property crime and tourism.  Scholars such as de 
Albuquerque and McElroy (1999) and Ryan (1993) have long argued that visitors 
represent attractive targets and are often less guarded.  
In contrast, a disproportionate amount of recorded violent crime occurs in the 
Gray’s Farm area of St. John’s [Figure 9].  Approximately four square miles, this area 
is one of the most economically depressed areas of the country.  Much of the Gray’s 
Farm area is characterised by poor housing, small dwellings in need of repair and 
overcrowding (CDB 2007a).  Although there is access to electricity and water, these 
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utilities are prohibitively expensive for some households and as such some houses do 
not have indoor toilet facilities.  In the Gray’s Farm area, both the youth 
unemployment and overall unemployment rates are high and there is a stigma attached 
to the community, partly because there is a general perception that crime and violence 
are prevalent there. For example, the overall unemployment rate for Gray’s Farm 
proper is 18.6 per cent and for three of its surrounding areas – Nut Grove, Greenbay 
and Cooks Hill –  the unemployment rate is 19 per cent, 21 per cent and 21 per cent 
respectively. These rates are high as compared to the overall unemployment rate of 
wealthier areas such as Marble Hill (3.9 per cent), Coolidge (2.53 per cent) and 
Paradise View (6.67 per cent).  The unemployment rate as of 2007 was estimated at 
approximately 4 per cent (CDBa 2007a).  Moreover, visible drug dealers, domestic 
violence, prostitution and teenage pregnancy have all been associated with this area 
(see for example CDB 2007b).   
Figure 9: Gray's Farm, Antigua and Barbuda 
SOURCE: Google Maps	  	  
	  	  
According to RPF statistics for the period between 2008 and 2010, 25 per cent of all 
homicides occurred in the Gray’s Farm area.  Additionally, with the exception of the 
rest of the parish of St. John’s, which covers a much larger area, Gray’s Farm and its 
surrounding area is the site of most rapes and robberies. 
Summary 
In this chapter I used recorded police data for the 40 year period between 1970 and 
2010 as well as secondary research in an attempt to establish some empirical account 
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of crime in Antigua and Barbuda. Although recorded police data is more a reflection 
of the crimes reported to the police than a precise measure of the crime that actually 
occurs in the country, such data is the best information available to provide a basic 
sense of what we think we know about the overall scale of crime, the relative 
incidence of different types of offences, trends in crime over time, and its geographical 
distribution. From this analysis it appears that unlike other parts of the Caribbean, 
property crime reports still comprise the vast majority of crimes recorded by the police 
and both violent crime and property crime reports were declining as of 2010.  
Additionally, despite assertions to the contrary, the overall rate of violent crime reports 
in Antigua and Barbuda has remained relatively stable from 1970 to 2010. However, 
although the overall rate of violent crime has remained stable, the nature of violent 
crime has changed.  That is, homicide and robbery seem to be trending upward as 
wounding trends downward.  Moreover, from all accounts violent crime is more 
frequently occurring in public spaces now involving tourists and firearms. In this 
chapter I also provided a description of Antigua and Barbuda’s socio-political 
environment in order to contextualise the crime data.  Finally, I supplemented the 
empirical findings with information from semi-structured interviews with key civil 
servants, as well as data from government agencies.  This chapter serves as the 
empirical basis on which the claims made by members of the public and the news 
media will be assessed.  The following chapter is the first of three chapters that report 
the public and news media perceptions of Antigua and Barbuda’s crime situation.   
  
 98 
CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
‘I totally disagree...the reason I don’t agree right, is because of this, Antigua is a very 
small society. We’re not big enough in terms of land space and numbers to have an 
underclass that is marginalized. Education is free to everybody in Antigua. It’s free to 
everybody in Antigua. And regardless to where you originated, you can move. Antigua 
is one of the few Caribbean societies in which our Prime Minister comes from Gray’s 
Farm and lives in Gray’s Farm. If that is not the power of education then what is it?’  
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  
 ‘...up until the maybe mid 80s the um, rural areas in particular were more settled and 
people tended to know one another and people used to look out for their neighbours 
and so you basically could have left your doors open and go and ask your neighbour 
to look out. But there has been a transformation um, in these communities because of 
the influx of non- nationals and these non-nationals are not just coming in and settling 
permanently in the communities they, well should I say they’re transient – they’re 
mobile when they come in. So they move, they may come to Jennings and they go 
elsewhere. And so people are much more um, people tend not to know each other that 
well or relate to each other as a sense of community which we had in the 60s, 70s and 
early 80s and so it presents, I believe, more opportunities for crime’. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of three chapters that reveals how the news media and 
members of the public describe and discuss crime and criminal justice policy. More 
specifically, this chapter explores how newspaper articles and participants in the peer 
group discussions articulate the connection between social conditions and crime. The 
data show that while neither the newspaper articles nor the peer group participants 
fully embrace the notion that crime stems from such structural impediments as 
poverty, unemployment and class discrimination, they are more likely to assert that 
crime stems from a breakdown of the traditional family and traditional community. 
 Informed by a Mertonian understanding of anomie and strain theory as well as 
The Chicago School’s disorganisation theory and Hirschi’s theory of social control, 
this chapter is divided into two sections organised around two distinct frames – section 
I focuses on Blocked Opportunities and section II focuses on Social Breakdown. In 
section I I will articulate the various components of the Blocked Opportunities frame, 
discuss their theoretical underpinnings and report the frequency with which these 
components were found in newspaper articles.  Additionally, I will describe the 
reactions to the Blocked Opportunities frame by participants in the peer group 
discussions by describing the supportive and rebuttal arguments.   Similarly, in section 
II I will focus on the Social Breakdown frame articulating the various components of 
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the frame along with their theoretical underpinnings.  Additionally, I will report the 
frequency with which the components of the frame were found in newspaper articles 
as well as peer group discussion participant reactions to the frame. Lastly, in section 
III I will summarise the findings of the two frames and discuss their implications.  
I 
Blocked Opportunities 
Although Émile Durkheim is credited with the birth of anomie theory, it is Robert K. 
Merton’s reformulation of anomie that is most applicable to the crime discourse in 
Antigua and Barbuda.  In his 1938 essay ‘Social Structure and Anomie’ and 1957 
classic Social Theory and Social Structure, Merton redefines anomie as a structural 
disjunction between culturally prescribed goals and socially prescribed means of 
attaining those goals.  The thrust of Merton’s argument is that anomie ensues when 
wealth and material gain are communicated to all members of society as cultural 
symbols of success yet legitimate opportunities to achieve these goals are not available 
to everyone.  Put differently,  
the cultural demands made on persons…are incompatible. On the one 
hand, they are asked to orient their conduct towards the prospect of 
accumulating wealth, and on the other, they are largely denied 
effective opportunities to do so institutionally (Merton 1938: 679).   
The consequence of this structural disjunction, according to Merton (1938), is a 
‘definite pressure,’ or what he (1968) and subsequent theorists would later characterise 
as ‘strain’, exerted upon persons in the society (see for example Agnew 1992).   To 
adjust to this pressure or strain, persons employ one of five possible ‘modes of 
adjustment’ (Merton 1938: 676).  These modes of adjustment include conformity, 
which occurs when individuals both embrace conventional social goals and have the 
means to attain them, ritualism, which occurs when individuals have acquired the tools 
to accumulate wealth but reject established cultural goals, rebellion, which occurs 
when individuals substitute an alternative set of goals and means for conventional 
ones, innovation and retreatism. Only the latter two modes of adjustment – innovation 
and retreatism – however, are closely associated with criminal behaviour and thus 
germane to the crime discourse in Antigua and Barbuda. 
 Innovation occurs when an individual has subscribed to the virtues of 
achieving wealth and material gain without equally internalising the institutional 
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norms governing the means for their attainment.  As such, in a society that places a 
high premium on these goals and social ascent, when legitimate channels of vertical 
mobility are closed or narrowed, the individual logically responds by employing 
illegitimate or illegal means to achieve them. American gangster Al Capone is 
Merton’s quintessential innovator as Capone ‘represents the triumph of amoral 
intelligence over morally prescribed “failure…”’ as (1938: 679).  Retreatism on the 
other hand is an escape mechanism that allows individuals to be ‘in the society but not 
of it’.  Retreatists reject both the culturally defined markers of success and the means 
for their attainment.   Unable to succeed through socially approved institutional norms 
and unwilling or unable to employ one of the other five modes of adjustment, the 
retreatist simply ‘drops out’ of society.  Those who employ this mode of adjustment 
typically include ‘psychotics, psychoneurotics, chronic autists, pariahs, outcasts, 
vagrants, vagabonds, tramps, chronic drunkards and drug addicts’ (Merton 1938: 677). 
It is the drug addiction that is most closely associate with criminal behaviour. 
  Building on Merton’s work, Robert Agnew’s general strain theory offers a 
more general explanation of criminal activity (Siegel 2011).  For example, Agnew 
(1992) argues that strain may result not only from the failure to achieve positively 
valued goals but also from the failure to achieve legitimate expectations and the failure 
to achieve an equitable outcome.   According to Agnew, the frustration and 
disappointment that an individual may feel when he or she is somehow blocked from 
achieving the goals of wealth and material gain may be the same or even greater if that 
individual’s past experience or knowledge of similarly situated persons suggests that 
he or she should have achieved those goals.  Similarly, the frustration and 
disappointment may be the same or greater if an individual fails to achieve wealth and 
material gain and also feels that his or her failure is unfair or unjust. Additionally, 
Agnew more precisely specifies the relationship between strain and delinquency by 
pointing out that strain is likely to have a cumulative effect on delinquency after a 
certain threshold level is reached (Agnew 1992) 
 Although Merton developed his theories with particular regard to the United 
States and did not assume that they automatically applied elsewhere, general strain 
theory and anomie are critical to understanding the message of the Blocked 
Opportunities frame that is identified in Antigua and Barbuda’s news media and public 
crime discourse because the frame posits that crime stems from such strains as 
poverty, unemployment, poor education, bad housing and class discrimination.  And, 
like Merton’s quintessential innovator, youth from economically depressed areas such 
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as Gray’s Farm and Point turn to crime when they are constrained in their 
opportunities for legitimate work.  In keeping with this line of thinking, the solution 
lies in creating more opportunities for disadvantaged young people.  Of all six crime 
frames, Blocked Opportunities is the most heavily contested although the public 
discourse reflects more nuanced understandings and is more supportive than the 
newspaper discourse.  The remainder of this section will discuss these findings in 
greater depth.  
Blocked Opportunities in the News 
Components of the Blocked Opportunities frame appear in only 7.4 per cent of the 68 
newspaper articles included in this study.  Where the Blocked Opportunities frame is 
evident none of the articles explicitly argue that crime stems from poverty 
unemployment, poor education, bad housing or class discrimination.  Rather, these 
articles draw on the frame in order to reject its fundamental premise. For example, in a 
1995 court news report entitled ‘Commentary on Crimes of Violence’ the writer 
laments: 
We are advised and are alarmed that even in the nation’s best schools, 
pupils from privileged backgrounds are turning up armed with 
handguns, knives and ice picks at the ready, to do serious injury to 
their schoolmates and the wider public at the slightest provocation 
and sometimes without any provocation at all (The Daily Observer 
2/23/1995: 7) 
Similarly, in a 2000 editorial entitled ‘Courts Should Impose Appropriate Sanctions’ a 
judge adjudicating a case is quoted as telling a young first-time offender, ‘[y]ou come 
from a good home, a good background.  You are supposed to set a good example…’ 
(The Daily Observer 2/28/2000: 2)  And, in a 2006 front page article entitled ‘Gang 
Members Tell Tales,’ reporter Nasheta Richards quotes an anonymous female gang 
member pondering the involvement of certain other female gang members in an illegal 
prostitution ring saying, ‘some of [the girls] from private schools don’t even need the 
money, cause their parents have plenty’ (The Daily Observer 2/13/2006: 1).  Although 
the surprise that is articulated in each of these examples suggests an underlying 
assumption that criminal behaviour is the domain of those who do not have access to 
the best schools, are not from privileged backgrounds and are not from ‘good homes’, 
it is an assumption that is directly being challenged. 
 Components of the Blocked Opportunities frame are explicitly refuted in only 
one article.  A 1998 editorial entitled ‘Stemming the Rising Tide’ suggests that crime 
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is divorced from poverty and other social conditions because ‘in bygone days...without 
affluence, nay, even amid excruciating poverty and oppression, children were raised to 
become decent and law-abiding citizens of the land’ (The Daily Observer 2/10/1998: 
2).  Here, the editorial writer appears to argue that there is not a causal relationship 
between poverty, oppression and crime. This is a common retort that Merton (1938) 
himself addresses in his argument that poverty and limited opportunities alone are not 
sufficient to induce high rates of criminal behaviour. Similarly, in discussing the 
validity of strain theory, scholars such as Reiner (2012) and Braithwaite (1979) 
acknowledge that the relationship between economic deprivation and crime is complex 
and cannot be reduced to a simple causal formulation.  This rebuttal argument, which 
is prevalent throughout the peer group discussions, highlights the need for a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between crime and poverty. In the analysis 
below, before I address the rebuttal argument, I will consider the overall performance 
of Blocked Opportunities in the peer group discussions and then focus on the few 
supportive arguments that emerged in discussing the frame.  
Blocked Opportunities in Peer Group Discussions 
In all ten peer group discussions, the overall performance of the Blocked 
Opportunities frame is relatively weak.  In half of the peer group discussions there is a 
‘mixed’ reaction to the Blocked Opportunities frame, meaning that in these 
discussions, at least one group member articulates a cogent position contrary to the 
other group members when discussing the merits of the frame.  In the remaining half, 
there is a ‘weak’ reaction to the Blocked Opportunities frame.  In these discussions 
there is unanimous rejection of the frame.  None of the peer group discussions gave 
‘strong’, or unanimous, support for the idea that crime stems from poverty, 
unemployment, poor education, bad housing and class discrimination or that young 
people from places like Gray’s Farm and Point turn to crime when they do not see any 
opportunity for legitimate work. 
Supportive Arguments 
In the peer group discussions where at least one participant articulates a cogent 
position in favour of the Blocked Opportunities frame, they do so by making one of 
three arguments: crime is born of necessity, stressful life events have a cumulative 
effect on a person pushing him or her towards deviance or accumulation of wealth and 
material gain are so important that they must be attained by any means necessary 
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irrespective of whether the means is legal.  In the analysis below each of these 
arguments are discussed in turn. 
Supportive Argument 1: Crime is Born of Necessity 
The implicit association between crime and socioeconomic conditions appears in four 
out of five peer group discussions in which at least one participant supports the 
Blocked Opportunities frame.  For example, when asked who they thought were 
committing the crimes, members of one peer group conveniently called the ‘Redcliffe 
Street’ discussion group for purposes of this analysis, constructed the offender in clear 
Mertonian terms:  
Group: Redcliffe Street  
Participants:  
Lavern, a Black Guyanese programme officer in her 40s  
Peaches, a Black Antiguan clerical assistant in her 30s 
Tia, a Black Antiguan social development practitioner in her 20s 
Judy, a Black Antiguan security officer in her 30s 
Janet, a Black Dominican janitor in her 20s 
 
Tia: I think um, we have we have a growing community of people 
who are I don’t know if they’re desperate I don’t know if 
they’re drug users or –  
Judy: They’re desperate, unemployed 
Peaches: Mainly unemployed people 
Tia:  Some sort of mental illness 
Judy: They’re frustrated and they don’t know what to do 
Tia: Some – all kind of combination – yeah – so there’s this kind 
of frustrated group 
Judy: They really want – some people really want to play their part 
in the community and to really work but jobs are really hard 
to find because of the economic problems. So people are 
frustrated and they want to survive so then some people just 
break your house just to get something to eat. And, you know 
before times people have not been doing these things. If you 
really find people doing these things it’s like the drug abusers 
and stuff like that. But, these days, you know people are so 
desperate to get something to eat they’ll break your house 
just to get something to eat. 
In response to the same question during a peer group discussion that will be referred to 
herein as the ‘Darkwood Beach’ discussion group, Ronald, a Black Antiguan educator 
in his 50s, said, ‘I think [it is] the jobless youth...it’s unemployed young people’.   
Illustrating this point further is Regine, the only participant in what is referred 
to herein as the ‘Cedar Valley’ discussion to agree with the Blocked Opportunities 
frame. Regine makes the case for the connection between deprivation and crime: 
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Group: Cedar Valley  
Participants:  
Regine, a Black Antiguan banker in her 40s  
Precious, a Black Antiguan retiree in her 60s 
Oliveen, a Black Antiguan senior legal secretary in her 30s 
Toya, a Black Antiguan attorney-at-law in her 50s  
 
Regine: I agree [with the prompt for the Blocked Opportunities 
frame].  
Precious:   That’s kind of hard. 
Facilitator: You don’t agree? 
Oliveen:  Some kids from Gray’s Farm and Point – some want to 
come out of there and make a better life for themselves 
and a lot of them do. 
Toya: And many do. 
Regine: But again, because of their impoverished environment 
they just don’t have a choice.  Sometimes they’re coming 
back to maybe the at home prostitution, their parents – 
their mother – whatever it is gone away since last night, 
don’t return home. So, there is no every day 
encouragement, you have to go to school or whatever it is 
– looking about the children properly to go to school.  So 
they’re kind of just left on their own and then they form 
their own habits. 
 
Similarly, Wayne, a Black Antiguan police officer in his 30s who participated in what 
will be called the ‘Longford’ discussion group argued:  
...Wherever there is poverty, there is always an increase in crime. And 
where there is underprivileged persons, because once you’re 
marginalized and you feel that everything is against you, you always 
tend to find some way to be seen and if that’s how you will be seen, 
turn to crime. Now we have, we’re human beings and we have certain 
survival instincts. If they can’t survive poverty they’ll turn to crime. 
In each of these examples, the offender is said to turn to crime as a survival 
mechanism – to eat, to provide for him or herself and/or his or her family.  As Sasson 
(1995) found, the easiest way to understand this construction of offending is that 
sometimes crime is simply born of necessity.  It is worth noting, however, that this 
construction of offending is contradicted by most studies conducted in the United 
States on offender decision-making.  For example, Cromwell (2006) has found that 
crime is not used to meet subsistence needs, instead it is used to fund ‘partying’. 
Supportive Argument 2: Stressful Life Events Have a Cumulative Impact on a 
Person 
As previously discussed, Agnew (1992) expands the parameters of Merton’s theory in 
part by pointing out that strain is likely to have a cumulative effect on delinquency 
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after a certain threshold level is reached.  Quoting Linsky and Strauss (1986: 17), 
Agnew (1992: 62-63) argues, ‘“it is not so much the unique quality of any single event 
but the cumulation of several stressful events within a relatively short time span” that 
is consequential’.  Alluding to the recent difficulties in the Antiguan and Barbudan 
economy and alleged exploitation of undocumented immigrants, Jennifer speaks in 
language reminiscent of Agnew’s general strain theory in the excerpt below:  
Group: Lower Nevis Street  
Participants:  
Timothy, a White British missionary in his 50s  
Malcolm, a Black Antiguan pastor and police officer in his 40s 
Sam, a Black Antiguan executive director in his 60s 
Cynthia, a Black Antiguan Nurse in her 50s  
Renee, a Black Guyanese Nursing Assistant in her 20s 
Jennifer, a Black Antiguan cashier in her 40s 
Freida, a Black Dominican domestic in her 50s  
Shana, a Black Antiguan vendor in her 40s 
 
Jennifer:  There are many reasons why people do what they do.  
And, a lot of us, we tend to look at the criminal and the act 
that they have committed. We forget those who are behind 
the scenes who cause these people to commit these 
criminal acts. 
Facilitator: Such as who? 
Jennifer: Such as when a man goes out to work ok, and he works 
for you months – 3 weeks, 3 months – and 6 months and 
you don’t pay that man, what are you doing to that 
person?  Right? I know of cases, lots of cases, a lot of 
cases where these things happens. As a matter of fact, one 
time I was at work and two guys came in and they were 
going to shoot up this man, so I asked, why are you going 
to shoot up the man? Have you stopped to think that when 
you shoot him you’re going to sit down behind the prison 
bars for a period of time? And we were able – another guy 
and I – we were able to calm them down and they went 
and we told them how they can go and deal with the man, 
right.  But now, if you work for a person and they don’t 
pay you, there are legal avenues but if you don’t pay a 
person, how are they going to pay lawyers or whoever to 
fight a case for them. So, I think this is one of our biggest 
concerns. When somebody work for you, you pay them if 
you can’t afford to pay them let them go get job other 
way. Don’t have people working for you and they have 
families to feed they have to earn somehow and this is 
how they take it back and honestly, I have come across a 
lot of people who are, I mean, really – 
Facilitator: Are these government workers? 
Jennifer: Government workers, a lot of the security here in Antigua, 
I mean these families are going through a lot of crisis 
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because of the fact they are working and they’re not being 
paid. Government workers, private firm workers, security 
workers – especially security workers and government. A 
lot of these people because they are not from here, they 
come you take them to work and you work them, you lay 
them off and you take on some more. I mean, all this is not 
right. And, say one say two, a lot of us are angry but we 
have to be angry with who? With ourselves and the 
systems...too, right? 
 
Jennifer constructs the offender as an otherwise law-abiding person who works and 
works without receiving compensation, cannot support his or her family and finally 
reaches a breaking point. 
Supportive Argument 3: The Ends Justify the Means 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Merton (1938) redefines anomie as a structural 
disjunction between culturally prescribed goals and socially prescribed means of 
attaining those goals. When there is a higher premium on success than there is on the 
way in which it is attained, some members of society are likely to resort to achieving 
success by any means necessary.  Put simply the ends will always justify the means.  
In the Darkwood Beach discussion Terrance, a Black Antiguan dental surgeon in his 
50s, translates Merton’s anomie theory in a real-life way: 
Many of the youth are looking in society and realizing that their 
parents and even some of them who are in their 30s and their 20s went 
to school with people who were far less able with them in the 
education system but yet still they walked into an establish business 
and their people are just riding high on the hog...the other thing too is 
that these people are living in a different lifestyle altogether seeming 
to make quarter of the effort of what the average person is doing. And 
I guess what I’m hinting at here is that we have a very corrupt society.  
Right, and, a lot of the business men are involved in fraudulent 
transactions and the drug trade whether it’s drugs, whether it’s arms, 
whether it’s defrauding the government of its revenue right, and 
therefore you end up with a class in society that projects serious 
wealth that really don’t patronize the education system and the youth 
are looking like and saying hey why do I need to go to school when 
the man up on the hill that has the big house.  He didn’t knock up his 
head with no education, he just cut corners. So it’s a message that we 
as a society sending out to the youth, they not looking at the doctor 
who struggled and did his do and now can come back and buy his 
vehicle and build his house what have you. They’re looking at the 
classmate of theirs who didn’t go anywhere and he’s making money 
hand over fist and he’s not even in the league of the doctor he’s way 
ahead of the doctor. So why I need to emulate him? I need to emulate 
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that big man and that big man is one of the biggest crime lords in the 
island. 
Of those peer group discussions that show support for Blocked Opportunities, three 
out five are infused with talk of anomie, emphasising the premium placed on the 
cultural symbols of success or the inability to achieve success through socially 
prescribed means.  For example, when asked whether young people from 
economically depressed areas turn to crime when they do not see any opportunities for 
legitimate work, Pericles, a Black Antiguan consultant in his 40s, who participated in 
what will be referred to as the ‘Cassada Gardens’ discussion group, focuses on the 
symbols of success: 
...to some extent yes but there is emerging a group of young people 
who are not, could not really fit that description...I think the pressures 
of society in terms of the way they want to live, they don’t see [how] 
holding a 9-5 job is going to give them the sports car that they want or 
build them whatever.    
Similarly, Terrance from the Darkwood Beach discussion group says: 
The thing is, our youngsters – our youth, our young women and young 
men – are products of the electronic media too, of an instantaneous 
gratification mind set...and so you know, it is also partly due to the 
mind-set that there’s not a lot of pleasure and happiness and fulfilment 
in doing the task as opposed to the end product of the task.  Right? So, 
they’re focused totally on the reward aspect of it. That instant 
gratification... 
With regard to the socially prescribed means of attaining success, participants make one 
of three points: (i) that the educational system has failed to serve as an effective vehicle 
for success, (ii) opportunities do exist but because they are inaccessible or culturally 
stigmatised they are effectively non-existent or (iii) there is a cultural bias as to what 
types of opportunities are created.   The excerpts below provide examples of each of 
these three points taken in turn.  In the first excerpt Terrance makes the point that the 
national educational system has failed Antiguan youth. 
Group: Darkwood Beach  
Participants:  
Ronald, a Black Antiguan educator in his 50s  
Toji, a White Antiguan online gaming operator in his 30s 
Terrance, a Black Antiguan dental surgeon in his 50s 
Franklin, a Black Antiguan heavy equipment operator in his 20s 
Arnelle, a Black Antiguan banker in her 50s 
 
Terrance: I think one of the things too, that has happened, is that more 
and more we’re producing young people through a much 
weaker educational system and therefore they get to a 
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certain age and they don’t have any tools whatsoever and 
then total frustration sets in and anything can happen there. 
Arnelle: And poor parenting too. 
Terrance: ...poor parenting too, but I venture to say that in the 1980s, 
the late 80s – middle, late 80s – and definitely the 90s, a 
significant number of our teachers were Guyanese and 
Jamaicans who were just looking for a job.  As a result, they 
failed our educational system and they failed our youth.  
Echoing this sentiment are Heather and Doreen who participated in the Crosbies 
discussion group: 
Group: Crosbies  
Participants:  
Patrick, a Syrian/Lebanese Antiguan retiree in his 60s  
Indigo, a White Antiguan archivist in her 50s 
Heather, an Antiguan student in her 20s who racially identifies as 
‘other’ 
Doreen, a Syrian/Lebanese cake decorator in her 20s 
 
Heather: You have the education then suffering because you don’t 
have proper schoolteachers. You can’t pay the 
schoolteachers. Children are not going to school... 
Doreen: I’m sure as the crime went up, was around the same time 
when education in Antigua began to decrease so rapidly... I 
think that if there was a chart, as measured by CXC results, 
‘cause I remember Antigua Girls High School, Christ the 
King, St. Joseph’s Academy and Grammar School always 
used to get recognition from the CXC council board or 
whatever. And I think if you were to have it on a chart like 
when crime started to increase, and when education started 
to go down, it would probably meet around the same time.  
 
An exchange between Jennifer and Malcolm in the ‘Lower Nevis Street’ discussion 
group exemplifies the second point, that opportunities do exist but because they are 
inaccessible or culturally stigmatised they are effectively non-existent:  
Group: Lower Nevis Street  
 
Jennifer: ...we have a lot of outlets where help can be sought.  
Unfortunately, those who need the help most will not 
achieve it simply because the way in which it is offered...the 
person may be interested but does not accept the help 
because the level is not at the pace to assist that person. 
Malcolm: I love when you say in terms of the whole aspect of they 
may not want to readily access it because at times it is put 
over for those who are dunce.  ‘They teach you to read’. So 
right away if I have any reading impediment that I would 
want to develop, I would not want to attend that class 
because the notion would be that I am illiterate, right, so 
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um, the few [opportunities] that are there, that is really what 
is portrayed. 
 
It is important to understand how this argument differs from a similar argument that we 
will encounter, which is proffered to challenge the Blocked Opportunities frame. Here, 
Jennifer and Malcom agree that more opportunities for disadvantaged youth must be 
created because notwithstanding the fact that certain limited opportunities do exist, 
these opportunities are effectively non-existent because they are stigmatised and 
properly presented.  This argument differs in its emphasis and orientation from the 
argument that we will soon see discussion group participants make when they claim 
opportunities are abundant, but because there may be a cultural stigma attached, people 
choose not take advantage of them to their detriment.  These participants locate the 
problem within individuals rather than society as they refute the Blocked Opportunities 
frame by arguing that more opportunities do not need to be created, they just need to be 
used irrespective of stigma.  Before we get to the rebuttal arguments, however, Ronald, 
from the Darkwood Beach discussion group, makes the final point, that existing 
opportunities are distributed unequally.  Ronald says, ‘...I believe that if we’re living in 
a just society where people have equal opportunities I think crime would be 
diminished’.   Ronald explains: 
...I think given, in any circumstance, I think if you have a youngster 
and I know a lot of people say youngsters don’t like to work, but 
philosophically, I mean I have a problem with that. I think there is not 
equal opportunity in our society and any time you have an unequal 
system, that lends itself to circumstances where crime [occurs]. 
For Ronald, certain opportunities simply do not exist and are not created. Malcolm 
makes this point in the Lower Nevis Street discussion group, as does Franklin in the 
Darkwood Beach discussion group.  Malcolm argues,  
[i]f you look at our communities, there is no avenue for [young 
people] to do...not so much the theoretical but the craft – trade and that 
sort of think like a polytechnic, we don’t have that. And a lot of times, 
somebody many not be so good in terms of reading but they are skilled 
with their hands.  
Similarly, Franklin argues that some young people who turn to violence and crime do 
so because: 
...the government, they not assisting them in different ways because 
some of them don’t want an office job.  They want to ride horse, they 
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want to run, they want to swim.  But they don’t encourage them 
because you would swim but you don’t get no money for it. But in 
other Caribbean countries and in the United States, if you swim and 
you’re a good swimmer, you get a lot of money for it ‘cause like in St. 
Kitts horse racing is a big money making thing. In Antigua horse 
racing, you don’t make nothing, it’s out of your pocket. So it’s the 
government need to help and assist people with different sports and 
the youths and come together as one. 
Malcolm and Franklin acknowledge a cultural bias towards white-collar employment 
and opportunities for those who are more inclined toward traditional academic 
subjects.   These participants call for not only more opportunities but for more diverse 
opportunities. This cultural bias is explored further in the analysis of rebuttal 
arguments below. In many of the peer group discussions where the frame was rejected, 
participants claim that opportunities abound, people simply choose not to take 
advantage of them. 
Rebuttal Arguments 
Of all the frames, Blocked Opportunities is the most heavily contested.  Participants in 
half of the peer group discussions unanimously reject the frame and even where the 
reaction is mixed, the vast majority of participants reject the frame’s constituent 
claims.  The remainder of this section is dedicated to the arguments that participants 
proffer in rebuttal, whether they were in a group that unanimously rejected the frame 
or a group that had a mixed reaction to it.  The first argument discussed is the most 
prevalent. More than half of all participants argue that there are plenty of opportunities 
for those less fortunate, including opportunities for them to create their own 
opportunities.  However, participants who make this argument do so in two slightly 
different ways.  The first version of the argument is specific to ‘native-born’ 
Antiguans.  Some participants argue that many ‘native-born’ Antiguans engage in a 
type of ‘selective employment’ whereby they eschew opportunities that involve 
manual labour.  The second version of the argument applies more generally. 
Participants making this version of the argument say that some young people – 
‘native-born’ Antiguans as well as immigrants – do not wish to work at all.  Even if 
these young people are able to get a good job, participants claim that they simply will 
not take it. The remaining arguments made against the Blocked Opportunities frame 
focus on the frame’s explicit connection between crime and poverty.  Participants 
argue, in the same vein as at least one newspaper article, that it is not inevitable that 
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poverty and deprivation will lead to crime nor is it only young people from 
economically depressed areas who engage in criminal behaviour.   
Rebuttal Argument 1: If You Look For Opportunities They’re There – They Are 
There  
Version I 
In Social Structure and Anomie, Merton (1938) contends that cultural stigmatisation of 
manual labour coupled with the prestige of white-collar work can create a strain 
towards criminality.  According to Merton (1938: 67), the low income associated with 
manual labour cannot compete ‘in terms of conventional standards of achievement’ 
with the high income associated with white-collar work.  For slightly different reasons, 
one-third all peer group participants in three of the ten peer group discussions 
proffered an argument similar to Merton’s.  According to these participants, the 
cultural stigmatisation of manual labour coupled with the prestige of white-collar work 
forces some ‘native-born’ Antiguans to eschew potentially lucrative opportunities 
involving manual labour.  Unable to gain access to more prestigious jobs, some are 
said to turn to crime in order to support themselves.  For example, in the ‘Blue Waters’ 
peer group discussion Lynn describes what she terms ‘selective employment’ and 
ultimately explains that selective employment and the stigma associated with manual 
labour creates a strain towards criminality because those who forego these 
opportunities, ‘still have the same needs as their peers who are earning well and living 
well – they’ve gone to school with them’.  Here Lynn is expressing similar sentiments 
consistent with notions of relative deprivation, discussed by such scholars as Reiner 
(2012).    The excerpt below provides additional insight: 
Group: Blue Waters  
Participants:  
N’Jaedr, a Black Haitian telecommunications engineer in her 40s  
Elbee, a Black Antiguan civil engineer in his 60s 
Lynn, a Black Antiguan public servant in her 60s 
Mimi, a Black Antiguan retiree in her 60s 
Bolivar, a Black Antiguan engineer in his 60s 
 
Lynn:   There is an issue that I have had for years. It has to do 
with selective employment. In lots of places, when you 
don’t have a job you take a job that’s available until 
you get what you want. In this country, that is not the 
case particularly for nationals – for native-born 
Antiguans. They are not taking certain jobs but other 
people have come into the country they taken those 
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jobs and they have progressed beyond the native 
persons who can’t be bothered to take a job. I saw this 
played out in the gas station business.  When I came 
back from university, by and large gas station 
attendants were Antiguans.  By the time I got back 
from Barbuda, 4 years later, nearly every person who 
was selling gas had an accent. It was no longer what 
Antiguans do. 
Facilitator: So there is a sentiment that Antiguans just don’t pump gas? 
Lynn:  You wouldn’t find – and I’m going into some really 
strange occupations.  You wouldn’t find Antiguans 
particularly in the garbage collection business. You 
won’t find them as grave diggers. Nearly all those 
people – I’m deliberately going to those places – nearly 
all those people are non-Antiguans who have come, 
have taken those jobs, and have moved on, progressed 
very rapidly as a consequence of their seeing 
opportunities which they can avail themselves of.  
Facilitator:  So you’re saying that there are opportunities but people 
aren’t taking advantage of them? 
Bolivar: It seems to be more a class thing than an economic 
thing. Let me give you 2 examples. I have a friend 
whose son wanted to buy some equipment to car wash. 
I thought it was great because the youngster was a little 
bit troubled and I thought it was a great idea and his 
father just couldn’t stand the idea. On the other hand, I 
want you to look at the Santo Domingans8 in particular 
who cut grass. You can’t tell me they’re not getting 
rich.  
Lynn:   They are – they are! 
Bolivar: Grass cutting is a lucrative profession, especially when 
2 drops of rain come 
Mimi: And they have their equipment 
Lynn: Several years ago, I said to my brother who lives 
abroad, come home and do this, come and make 
yourself wealthy at home because I saw – remember 
when Nathaniel came here – helping out? And I 
realized that I was paying Nathaniel and then we got 
somebody else and then all of a sudden, the rate just 
went sky high. And I said to myself, but you know, this 
thing has money in it. And you think you can tell some 
parents this is a business you can easily help your son 
to get into.  
Mimi: How about garbage collection? 
Bolivar: Yeah, I must admit, the guy I admired was um, once 
when [the Prime Minister] had started this thing about 
young people, and a senior politican’s son went to him 
and said I want a garbage truck and [the Prime 
Minister] was flabbergasted. What is wrong? It’s a 
                                                
8 ‘Santo Domingans’ is the designation that Antiguans and Barbudans ascribe to anyone from the Dominican Republic (‘DR’) 
irrespective of whether the person is actually from DR’s capital city, Santo Domingo, or elsewhere in the country. 
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business! You see we’re not looking at things as 
business. We’re looking at the stigma. 
Lynn: Remember George and how people laughed with 
George because he had come home with Solid Waste? 
Bolivar: Listen, car washing thing, you see all the amount of 
people gone into it? Power wash? 
Lynn:  I have a cousin who used to tell me, ‘by the time I’ve 
bathed and cleaned my fingernails, and dressed I’m like 
everybody else’. So, you know, it’s not a big deal. But 
it’s getting that in the psyche of our young people 
Lynn’s theory of selective employment is shared and expounded upon by younger 
participants in what will be called the ‘Russell’s’ peer group discussion comprised of 
members mostly between the ages of 18-29. For example, Ashley, a White Antiguan 
landscape designer in her 20s says: 
Look at me for instance.  I own a landscaping company, which could 
easily employ young very physical Antiguan men by they don’t want 
to do the work.  They do not want to do the work so I have a company 
that has 45 employees, which maybe 38 of them are Jamaican, a 
couple Dominicans and two Guyanese. 
The excerpt below continues to unpack this notion of selective employment.  
It is interesting to note that despite the stark age difference, participants in the 
Russell’s discussion group articulated similar sentiments to those hold by the 
Blue Waters discussion group. 
Group: Russell’s  
Participants:  
Brock, a Black Antiguan human resources manager in his 30s  
Betty, a Black Antiguan accountant in her 20s 
Ashley, a White Antiguan landscape designer in her 20s 
Mary, a White Antiguan environment officer in her 20s 
Eryn, a Black Antiguan market officer in her 20s 
Eryn: They don’t want to work period 
Mary: It’s the manual stuff I find 
Ashley: No, Antiguans are too good to do the work. Any Antiguan I 
have hired, ok, think about it my starting salary for an 
employee who cannot read or write or anything, none of that 
factors into it is $2300 EC a month. 
Mary:  That’s just as good as a secretarial job within the government. 
Ashley: They get paid $2300 EC a month. Starting salary with me and 
they have no reading or writing skills whatsoever you know, 
they don’t even have to... I pay for their work permit for them 
you know I give them – half of them get free tickets to go 
back to Jamaica once a year or whatever – I treat my staff 
really well, too well as [Brock] always tell me but at the same 
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time, those are the people who want to work. The Jamaicans 
come here and I agree, Jamaicans in Jamaica don’t work. But 
Jamaicans in Antigua do work.  
Brock: It’s a different class. You can’t go to a nice part of Jamaica 
and expect them to want to do any kind of physical work. 
Betty: Clearly not, it’s like my parents always say too, Antiguans 
may not work here but they go abroad and then work... 
Eryn: Maybe it’s just like a everybody thing...can’t work at home. 
Brock:  Suppose I was out in the field working and then you know 
Mary and Eryn passing by. Every 2 seconds I’m ducking, you 
know. 
Betty: You under the corn tree… 
Version II 
Arguing from a slightly different perspective, nine participants in three discussion 
groups hold the view espoused by John, a participant in the ‘Cassada Gardens’ peer 
group discussion who is a Black Antiguan personal/administrative assistant in his 20s.  
John believes that, ‘a lot of [young people], they just don’t want no work to do – plain 
and simple. If you approach them and offer them a job, they don’t want work to do’.  
John argues this point fervently as he explains that: 
[y]ouths in the country today even if you were to give them jobs, they 
don’t want no jobs.  They just want to sit down – especially [in one 
rural village] there. You have some guys, between there all they want 
[to do is] smoke...and you offer them a job, they don’t want no job. 
They prefer to ask for money from you than to work.  Even if you can 
get them a good job, they don’t want no job.   
In this discussion group, John and Pericles continue to illustrate the point.  
Group: Cassada Gardens  
Participants:  
Pericles, a Black Antiguan consultant in his 40s  
Senaa, a Black Antiguan executive secretary in her 50s 
Dawn, a Black Antiguan district officer in her 30s 
John, a Black Antiguan personal/administrative assistant in his 20s 
Facilitator: So, just so that I’m clear on the point that you are making, 
you are saying that you don’t think that crime comes from 
the poverty and the unemployment, you think that there 
are people who could be employed who are not employed. 
Or don’t want to be to be? 
John:  Well I know first hand of people that, you know you get 
them a job – like you get them a construction job today 
and [they] get pay Friday, they don’t go back to work next 
week. Serious. They go and squander their money and the 
other week they don’t show up. So sometimes you 
yourself you don’t really want to look jobs for people cuz 
imagine you recommend a person to someone you know 
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for a job. They go for one week, two week, get pay then 
for the other week they don’t show up. It makes you look 
bad. 
Pericles:  There is a fellow I can remember in Gray’s Farm and he 
came to our church and gave a very eloquent testimony of 
what God has done for him. A fellow, they call him 
Gargamel...and at one point he was working with public 
works but he’s so prone and he’s such a kleptomaniac that 
he finds himself in prison and it’s not because he can’t 
find a job but he still need to fuel you know – because I 
remember that same Saturday he came to church he got 
monies from several people in the church but by the same 
weekend he had stole something from a member of his 
family and he ended up in jail.   And I see him all the 
time, he’s always begging money and so it’s not 
sometimes because – but it’s a thing that people as I was 
indicating earlier want to live beyond their means. I don’t 
know if you’d really want to call that poverty but you 
know I would want to believe that even though some 
people are in poverty and they have a job they still engage 
in criminal activities because you know the expectations 
of society um are so much and if you want to keep up for 
example with the young fellas who want to impress the 
girls and they want to drive a flashy car but they don’t 
have the money. So how else do you come to it. And so 
that is why I waver in terms of that statement... 
Similarly, Mary argues that there are many opportunities: 
Group: Russell’s 
 
Mary: There’s a lot of opportunities...prime example is English Harbour. 
When it’s in season you go down there to a bar or restaurant and 
probably 60 per cent of the workers there are illegal. They’re all white 
people off the boats who come and get a job for a few months and then 
dip out and go again. And for me, I hate that because any Antiguan 
could do that job and our unemployment rates are high.  There are 
opportunities for I find people without degrees, without formal 
education...you know you don’t need a masters in education to do... 
Ashley: But then it also comes down to like you have to take your life 
into your own hands. I only have a high school degree and I 
own my own company 
Eryn: I guess we’re just grafters 
Mary: But it’s true. If you take opportunities you can take them to 
the next level 
Ashley: You have to create them for yourselves. Like you have to 
create. I believe that everyone has an opportunity to do 
whatever they want. I mean half of the billionaires in the 
world came from nothing. Half of them don’t have high 
school degrees half of these millionaires out there.  You 
know. But, they did it. It’s just laziness. Laziness on this 
island is a huge problem 
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Brock: Indisciplined no motivation 
India: They need to bring back the bull bud9 
Mary: I find another problem is the... I find a lot of Antiguans have 
an expectation. An expectation that they should have because 
they are Antiguan 
Brock: Like they should be given stuff. Because they were spoiled 
from the ALP [Antigua Labour Party] 
In short, Deege, a Black Antiguan participant in the ‘Golden Grove’ discussion group 
who appears in the epigraph of this chapter, sums up this version of the rebuttal 
argument as she insists there are other reasons for the crime situation but not lack of 
opportunity.  Deege says, ‘...as an employer I know what I’m talking about employing 
young people who want a salary and not a job. It’s not because they can’t get a job. 
They got the job. But it’s not the job they want it’s the money’. 
Rebuttal Argument 2: Poverty And Deprivation Do Not Inevitably Lead To Crime 
In the Lower Nevis Street peer group discussion Timothy argues, ‘...it’s not inevitable 
that people who live in poor areas or have to [attend] poor schools or [have] no work 
will turn to crime...’ This is the argument that eight participants proffered against the 
Blocked Opportunities frame. Although this argument was not widely used, the 
suggestion that crime stems from poverty and deprivation aroused strong feelings.  
Contextually, this reaction is unsurprising.  Given Antigua and Barbuda’s history as an 
agrarian slave colony and the country’s recent transition to a service economy, much 
of the growth of the Antiguan and Barbudan middle class has occurred within the past 
35 years (see for example de Albuquerque and McElroy 1995).  As such, many 
Antiguans are not that far removed from the experience of living on very little.  For 
example, Sam in the ‘Lower Nevis Street’ peer group discussion makes the argument 
based on his own personal experience: 
I’ve always said this, that we had a community of widespread poverty 
when I was growing up and yet crime was not prevalent in the 
community…there was no such thing as criminals in a poor area – I 
grew up poor.  Without food to eat people running around with their 
shoes, short pants torn up and so on. We didn’t have any crime. 
And, although Deege’s views were cross-coded as Social Breakdown because of the 
shift in cultural attitude that she describes, it is clear that she too decries the 
                                                
9 Bull bud is an Antiguan and Barbudan colloquialism for a whip.  The term refers to the stretched sun-dried penis of a cow that is 
used to hit someone or something. 
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connection between poverty and crime calling the connection ‘yet another excuse’.  
Using herself as an example, Deege argues in part that: 
Most of us here but by and large most of us come out of the same 
cramped small circumstances because most of us come from villages. 
Right? We are one generation away from the village.  And the villages 
– the houses – were small and cramped and your fence was abutting 
your neighbour’s fence and people were small and whatever…I find 
that we have given people again another set of excuses.  I listen 
sometimes to the music that comes out of Jamaica and they talk about 
the down pressed and the sufferer and the people in the – almost as if 
well, because you born poor.  Big deal.  Plenty people born poor, 
right. It doesn’t mean that you have to stay poor.  And you can be poor 
in pocket but not poor in spirit and I think that the spirit that took most 
of us up and out is what is lacking now…Poverty is a state of mind, 
yes. It’s not the amount of dollars you have in your pocket.  I know 
there are times when if anybody attack me they would beat me for 
wasting their time to mug me because I never had enough. But, I was 
never poor in spirit, never. 
Although empirical data casts doubt on Sam’s claim that crime was not prevalent in 
Antigua and Barbuda in the past, what he and Deege are employing is the theme of 
what scholars call relative deprivation – it is not poverty per se that causes crime but 
inequality. 
Rebuttal Argument 3: It’s Not Only Kids From Gray’s Farm and Point... 
In constructing the prompt for the Blocked Opportunities frame, I cited Gray’s Farm 
and Point as examples of two economically depressed areas of the country. I chose 
these two areas because in my preliminary research they were often associated with 
crime and I was interested in the reaction of peer group discussion participants to this 
association.   In half of the discussions, 15 participants argue as Lavern argues in the 
Redcliffe Street discussion group, that it is ‘not only kids from Gray’s Farm and Point.  
That is stigmatising that community because [those who commit crime] come from all 
over.  They come from Hodges Bay10 too’.  The excerpt below, taken from the peer 
group discussion conducted in Crosbies, an upper middle class community near 
Hodges Bay, underscores Lavern’s point: 
Group: Crosbies  
 
Facilitator:  You disagree with the idea that crime stems from a lack 
of opportunity and poverty and that kids from Grays 
                                                
10 Hodges Bay is one of the wealthiest and most exclusive communities in Antigua and Barbuda. 
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Farm and Point are the culprits? I believe you said earlier 
Indigo that it is not just kids from Gray’s Farm and 
Point? 
Indigo:  No it’s not. There are kids around the corner who have 
broken into houses.  
Doreen: Look at [the ambassador’s son].  [That boy] is so spoiled 
I blame his mother completely. 
Facilitator:  And who is [this person]? 
Doreen: [The ambassador’s son] is the one who went to jail for a 
year after firing off shots outside the white fete.11 Even 
driving he’s not supposed to be driving because he’s 
written off over seven cars already. The last one he 
almost died in. But, he’s so accustomed to his mom 
getting him out of everything because she’s the 
ambassador to Columbia or whatever, you know. 
Additionally, participants argue that middle class people commit crimes also but have 
the resources to either keep the matter quiet or out of the formal criminal justice 
system.  For example, Nadine, a participant in the Golden Grove peer group discussion 
who is a Black Antiguan trust manager in her 30s warns:  
in the general discussion of crime you should not forget the…middle 
class people who commit those crimes and the depth of their pockets 
that they can simply…do something  to get it out of the way and so 
nobody knows that their child did something so that those things never 
crop up in the statistics. 
Participants in the Cedar Valley peer group discussion echo this sentiment as Toya 
says, ‘maybe it’s what is played up because we don’t hear of the crimes that occur in 
the other areas.  And, there are children from upper class who commit more crimes 
than those persons [Gray’s Farm or Point] but you don’t hear about it’. 
Group: Cedar Valley 
Toya: And, it’s reported more if that person is from [Gray’s Farm 
or Point] for a couple reasons: when you look at that 
somebody commits a crime in those areas, they do not have 
the wherewithal to hire a lawyer.  Once you hire a lawyer 
things get hush a lot of times.  Ok, so if it’s a well to do 
person, you might not hear about it.  But, obviously if it’s a 
poor person it’s what the media is going to play up. 
Precious: It’s something like Black and White crime – it’s something 
like that. 
Toya: We had a robbery in this neighbourhood. 
Precious: Nobody heard about that. 
Toya: You’re not going to hear about it.  Three houses in here. 
                                                
11 White fete is a popular party held during the carnival season. 
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Precious: Nobody heard about it, exactly. 
Toya: And the funny thing is it’s the second time it was happening 
since I was here.  The first time I didn’t hear about it.  And 
since then my neighbour has been robbed while I in my bed 
sleeping at 8:30 at night. But do you hear about it? 
Regine:    Did you put it on the radio? 
Toya: No, I most certainly wouldn’t. 
Regine:    Because you are not in the category of the melee. 
Precious: And you expect it in Gray’s Farm and those places. Only 
because like you say it’s stigma.  Yes, that’s what it is. 
Regine:  We just grow up knowing that Gray’s Farm and Point are 
da, da, da – but so many good things come out of there.  
In four of the discussion groups, participants explained further that offenders 
often apprehended in Gray’s Farm or Point are not actually from these communities, 
but seek refuge in the communities because they are more densely populated, the 
people in the communities tend not to cooperate with police investigations and/or the 
communities are already stigmatised as ‘bad areas’.  Moreover, in these discussion 
groups there was general unease surrounding the implicit definition of crime as street 
crime.   For example, in the Darkwood Beach discussion group Ronald says: 
I agree with that but I don’t agree with it in totality.  I mean, there are 
different types of crime.  A lot of street crime and stuff is specific to 
what you just mentioned but, there’s a lot more crime in Antigua than 
street crime. 
Similarly, in the Longford peer group discussion Jaquel, a Black Antiguan police 
officer in her 30s asserted: 
I agree with the majority of that but as for the named communities, I 
wouldn’t limit it to that, because while we’re more focused on violent 
crime and the crimes that are out there in our faces like break-ins there 
are a lot of fraud cases, and these are not committed by persons in 
Gray’s Farm…These crimes are committed by persons who are very 
much  highly educated and although its not out there per se, but 
persons don’t pay much attention to it until maybe a business collapse 
because of – but it’s something that is happening on a daily basis. 
 
 
II 
Social Breakdown 
The notion that crime stems from a breakdown of the traditional family and traditional 
community can be traced back to social ecology and urban mapping research 
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pioneered by sociologists in the University of Chicago’s sociology department (Rock 
2012; Williams 2012; Downes and Rock 2011).  Comprising what is known as the 
‘Chicago School,’ these sociologists, led by Robert Park, worked from the premise 
that the city was not just a set of buildings in a particular geographic area but a social 
organism – a living ecological environment in which the residents of the city and the 
city’s institutions were so inextricably connected that they tended to interact as a 
whole (Williams 2012).   From the 1920s through the 1950s social ecological thinking 
dominated criminological research as Chicago School sociologists sought to make 
sense of the city of Chicago’s crime problem.  In arguably the most influential 
research during this time, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (1942; 1969) developed 
social disorganisation theory, which holds that crime is associated with neither 
individual pathologies nor poverty but with rapid social change within urban 
communities.  Shaw and McKay argue that in the central areas of a city where there 
are very rapid shifts in population, residents see themselves as transient and do not 
take an interest in their surroundings or form bonds with their community.  Where 
contacts are extended, heterogeneous groups mingle, neighbourhoods disappear, and 
people, deprived of local and family ties, are forced to live under the loose, transient, 
and impersonal relations that are characteristic of cities, social institutions such as 
Church, school and family may be weakened.   This social change or ‘disorganisation’ 
allows for moral dissensus, which in turn allows for criminality (Williams 2012; Wirth 
1940, 1931; Downes and Rock 2011).    
Over time criminologists would refine social disorganisation theory and 
expand its parameters.  For example, Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997) argue a 
more nuanced version of social disorganisation theory asserting that it is actually 
‘collective efficacy,’ or social cohesion among neighbours combined with their 
willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good that is associated with reduced 
violence (Reisig and Cancino 2004).  And, Reisig and Cancino (2004) and Osgood 
and Chambers (2000) argue that both theories – social disorganisation and collective 
efficacy – can be generalised beyond city settings to nonmetropolitan and rural areas 
as well.   For all of these theorists, treating or severely punishing individual offenders 
would not remedy a community’s crime problem. The solution ought to lie in a 
bottom-up approach focused on social organisation and community stability. Made 
famous by Shaw’s Chicago Area Project, which consisted of 22 neighbourhood youth 
centres run and staffed by local residents, this approach is known as ‘community crime 
prevention’ (Williams 2012).   
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Equally, this notion that crime stems from a breakdown of the traditional 
family and traditional community is also linked to ‘social control theory’ or ‘control 
theory’, a theory advanced by Travis Hirschi (1969: 16), which holds that ‘delinquent 
acts result when the individual’s bond to society is weak or broken’.  According to this 
theory all people have the potential to violate the law and modern society presents 
many opportunities for criminality, however, not all people break the law because 
internal and external forces control their behaviour.  Such forces include attachment 
and commitment to conventional institutions, individuals and processes (Siegel 2011). 
Like social disorganisation theory, over time criminologists would refine and build on 
the core assumptions of control theory.   
In his 1989 classic Crime, Shame and Reintegration, Brathwaite argues that 
crime rates are correlated with a community’s ability to attach shame to an offender’s 
actions.  To the extent that community ties weaken over time, offenders care less and 
less about how they are perceived by the community and are less and less ashamed of 
their actions.  When offenders are not made to feel shame for their actions, they are 
not deterred from further offending.  Braithwaite’s central claim is that: 
...shaming affects us most when we are shamed by people who matter 
to us. It follows that people enmeshed in many interdependent 
relationships with others are exposed to more sources of effective 
shaming. (Braithwaite 1993: 12) 
Similarly informed by control theory and somewhat linked to the notion of shame, in 
Parental Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of Delinquency, Harriet Wilson (1980) finds 
that parents who are lax in supervising their children are highly likely to produce 
delinquents in areas that have high offender rates.  Articulating her concept of 
‘chaperonage’ Wilson (1980: 232-233) explains: 
In homes where parents exercise supervision it is difficult for children 
to join in the delinquent activities of their peers as a regular 
entertainment, even though they may get away with an occasional 
escapade or they may be tempted to engage in occasional shoplifting. 
Strictly supervising parents tend to explain their attitude not just in 
prescriptive terms (‘Don't do this and don't do that’), but primarily in 
terms of critical assessments of other children's behaviour of which 
they do not approve. In using the technique of labelling other people's 
children as bad these parents do not just indicate their disapproval of 
delinquent behaviour, but at the same time they personalise the 
problem. The child receives two messages: first, that certain forms of 
behaviour are undesirable, and secondly, that certain boys are not 
behaving in a manner that would warrant closer acquaintance...The 
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technique of strict supervision of the younger child turns into self-
imposed control; he prefers not to mix with boys whose behaviour he 
disdains and whose style of life has nothing in common with his own.  
In other words, when parents are effective chaperons and provide adequate supervision 
to their children, they tend to simultaneously transmit acceptable values to their 
children and may thus prevent their children from offending.  Braithwaite and 
Wilson’s arguments build on what Chicago School theorists first argued more than 75 
years ago and what social control theorists began arguing almost 50 years ago: with 
respect to crime, the bonds that community residents have to social institutions as well 
as those they have to each other matter.   
Social Breakdown in the Newspaper 
Components of the Social Breakdown frame appear in slightly more than one-third of 
the 68 newspaper articles included in this study. In each article, these components are 
not contested. Writers seem unanimously to support the fundamental premise that 
crime stems from a breakdown of the traditional family and traditional community.  In 
these articles writers supported the contention that in the past there was less crime 
because neighbours looked out for one another and parents supervised and disciplined 
their children. Writers invoke the Social Breakdown frame to propose solutions to the 
country’s crime problem in 19 articles that display the frame while they use it to 
explain the causes of the crime problem in only eight per cent of these articles. 
Proposed solutions take three main forms. The first solution, which is advanced in 13 
articles, calls for collective action by residents, churches, the police and the public and 
private sectors.  For example, in his letter to the editor John Richards asserts, ‘What 
we need is unity and community effort to fight crime.  Ours is a Christian society that 
requires us to be our brother’s keeper’ (The Daily Observer 2/1/2000: 3).  A 2005 
editorial asks, ‘...whose business is it to reverse this trend in our society that makes us 
cower to criminals and would-be offenders? The resounding answer is all of us (The 
Daily Observer 2/16/2005: 2).  Similarly, in a 2006 article entitled ‘Gov’t to Focus on 
Preventing Youth Violence’ the Prime Minister calls for ‘the strengthening of 
partnerships between the government, the school, the home, the church, community 
based organisations and the business community’ (The Daily Observer 2/28/2006: 5).  
But, notwithstanding this call to collective action, most articles proposing this solution 
specifically implore parents to get involved.  For example, a 2007 editorial entitled 
‘Time for Tough Love’ says: 
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It is telling that society is complaining, teachers are complaining, and 
the voices absent in the cacophony are those of the parents.  And it’s 
not enough for the parents of the ‘good’ kids to sit smugly in their 
corner, thinking that they need not galvanize around the solution.  
Because the paths of the good kids and the bad kids cross daily, and it 
is usually the former that bear the scars.  Enough of the talk without 
action...It is time for us to take back this country, and we must do so 
one home at a time and one village at a time, until we arrest the 
problem (The Daily Observer 2/26/2007: 2) 
In calling for schools, churches and families to work together to fight crime, a 1998 
editorial places particular emphasis on the need for a ‘partnership between parents and 
children’ because ‘[the editorial staff] believe that family is the strongest and most 
powerful instrument for social change and therefore appeal to all parents, especially 
the parents of the young, to review and evaluate the scale of values which they are 
presently imparting to the young’  (The Daily Observer 2/10/1998: 2).   In another 
article the then Youth Affairs Minister Winston Williams is described as 
‘reprimanding’ parents when he says, ‘adults should grab the bull by the horns and 
play a more active role parenting their children it they want to effectively address the 
problem.  Government cannot rear your children’ (The Daily Observer 2/23/2007: 24).  
Thus, in singling out parents, calls for collective action still seem laden with a 
fundamental message of personal responsibility and better parenting. 
 The second proposed solution, which is advanced in only seven articles, calls 
for interventions that include mentoring, counselling, and various programs aimed at 
at-risk youth.  For example, a 2005 editorial entitled ‘Time to Take Our Country Back’ 
argues that: 
Youngsters who have a criminal bent, who just won’t take warning 
need to be placed into a programme that takes them into the prison...to 
spend hours in the penitentiary observing life in confinement and 
seeing first-hand the fate of the convicted.  They need to see how 
being on lockdown breaks the backs of bullies and street heroes and 
learn that, contrary to the lore, there is no honour in thug life (The 
Daily Observer 2/16/2005: 2) 
   
Reminiscent of Shaw’s Chicago Area Project, another article proposed a range of 
programmes intended to provide educational support, develop parenting skills, assist 
with substance abuse and gang prevention, and strengthen community relations with 
the police force.  The article also revealed government plans to open a multi-functional 
community centre in the heart of one economically depressed community.  Sasson 
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(1995) rightly points out that these interventions all share in common the tacit claim 
that crime stems from inadequate supervision or a failure of moral integration. While 
one article called for collective action invoking imagery of more communal living and 
interdependent village life, the article rejects the need for government programmes 
designed to provide structure and discipline for at risk youth.  The argument is that 
‘government does not need to set up a boot camp to discipline wayward youngsters, 
but rather, that parents need to play a more active role in their children’s lives’ (The 
Daily Observer 2/2/1998: 24). 
 Consistent with a growing body of literature in the United States that focuses 
on the importance of faith in rehabilitative interventions, the final proposed solution, 
which is advanced in only six articles, calls for greater reliance on religion.  For 
example in the 1998 editorial that refutes the claims of the Blocked Opportunities 
frame, the writer embraces the Social Breakdown frame arguing that: 
The churches too must get their act together.  They must recapture the 
ground lost to the influence of television in directing the proper 
socialisation of children and while their traditional told has been to 
impart doctrinal faith, they must begin to chart a new course which has 
as its aim the achievement of social justice. (The Daily Observer 
2/10/1998: 2) 
Similarly, in a 2006 article Nasheta Richards describes the efforts of inter-
denominational police group called Cops for Christ and quotes the president as saying, 
‘...we feel apart from our duties as police officers, we can do more as Christians...With 
the prayers of the nation along with support, I believe we can see the best come out of 
all of our youths’ (The Daily Observer 2/8/2006: 5).  While this reliance on religion 
may be thought of as part of a more general call for strengthened partnership with 
societal institutions, references to religious interventions were coded separately 
because of the significance of church and religious doctrine in Antiguan and Barbudan 
culture and social life. 
 In the articles that conjure the Social Breakdown frame to explain the causes of 
the country’s crime problem all but two do so by comparing contemporary times to a 
more genteel time of yesteryear where ‘children were raised to become decent and 
law-abiding citizens of the land’ (The Daily Observer 2/2/1998: 2), when ‘police used 
to do foot patrol and not just be mobile’ (The Daily Observer 2/20/2006: 4) and ‘the 
main causes of death for [young people] would be a vehicular accident or a rare 
debilitating illness’ (The Daily Observer 2/27/2007: 2).  In the writers’ historical 
imaginations, neighbours looked out for one another, the extended family was 
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paramount, and social institutions were strong.   Collectively, the articles paint a 
dystopian portrait of an Antigua and Barbuda currently in the midst of social crisis. 
The excerpt below illustrates the point: 
It is clear that an alarming plague of social dry rot has set in.  The 
plague is upon our homes and families; it is upon our churches and 
upon our schools.  Indeed, it is upon our Government, which is 
deemed to be one of the most corrupt in the whole wide world. (The 
Daily Observer 2/10/1998: 2). 
Against this dystopian backdrop, writers attribute crime to family breakdown and poor 
parenting in six articles and to community disintegration and weakening social 
institutions in four.  The perception that family breakdown and poor parenting cause 
crime is not surprising considering the various calls for parents to get involved in 
crime fighting efforts by partnering with schools, their children, churches, and 
government.  In one article the Youth Affairs Minister suggests that, ‘the root of the 
problem stems from the home, and the quicker parents acknowledge this fact, the 
easier it would be to tackle out of control youth’ (The Daily Observer 2/23/2007: 24).  
The Youth Minister continues to argue: 
There are homes within this country, parents who claim to love their 
children but who can’t remember the last time they had a conversation 
with their child.  There are children who wake up in the morning and 
don’t see the parent.  There are children that can’t tell the last time they 
sit down at the dinner table with a parent...so the children become the 
parents, entrepreneurs and breadwinners... we need to go back to it 
takes a village to raise a child in this country.  It don’t take any big set 
of plans (ibid.). 
Likewise, a 2009 letter to the editor entitled ‘It Does Take a Village’ attributes the 
three fatal shootings during the first two months of that year to the fact that ‘our 
guardians are failing our children...Parents need to spend more time with their 
children, steer them in the right path’ (The Daily Observer 2/12/2009: 3).  With 
respect to this line of argument, a 2009 editorial aptly summarises the sentiment, 
‘While we cannot blame every mother for a son gone wrong, the biblical admonition 
of training up a child in the way he ought to go and when he is old he will not depart 
from it, still holds true’ (The Daily Observer 2/17/2007: 2). 
 As we will soon see, many of the arguments made in support of the Social 
Breakdown frame are echoed in the peer group discussions.   
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Social Breakdown in the Peer Group Discussions  
The overall performance of the Social Breakdown frame in peer group discussions is 
strong. Seven of the ten peer group discussions show strong support for the frame as 
participants unanimously agree with the contention that crime stems from a 
breakdown in traditional family and traditional community.  Across all discussion 
groups, slightly more than two-thirds of participants endorse this view.  In many cases, 
the enthusiasm that the participants have for the frame is evident in the way they 
interrupted the facilitator in order to express approval for the frame before the entire 
frame is read, or by participants chanting, ‘Yes! Yes!’ or similar exclamations of 
agreement.  The favourable reactions to this frame, in other words, are palpably strong.   
In two discussions there is a mixed reaction to the frame.  In these discussions, at least 
one group member articulates a cogent position contrary to the other group members 
when discussing the merits of the frame.  Participants in only one discussion 
unanimously reject the Social Breakdown frame and therefore have a weak reaction to 
it. Attitudes to this frame varied markedly by age, with older participants being much 
more likely to endorse it than younger participants.   
Supportive Arguments 
Like the newspaper articles previously discussed, peer group discussants who favour 
the Social Breakdown frame present a dystopian view of contemporary Antigua and 
Barbuda. Contrasting present-day contemporary society to that which they 
remembered from their childhoods, participants claim that neighbours no longer know 
the other residents in the community, crime is much more prevalent, parents no longer 
discipline their children, and people no longer care about their environment. In 
Antiguan parlance, life in Antigua and Barbuda is not like ‘before time’.   The 
distancing of relations between neighbours was frequently blamed on intra-Caribbean 
immigration.  Although immigration will be addressed in a later frame, the excerpts 
below illustrate the point:  
Group: Cassada Gardens  
Pericles: ...within the – up until they maybe mid 80s the um, rural 
areas in particular were more settled and people tended to 
know one another and people used to look out for their 
neighbours and so you basically could have left your doors 
open and go and ask your neighbour to look out. But there 
has been a transformation um, in these communities because 
of the influx of non-nationals and these non-nationals are not 
just coming in and settling permanently in the communities 
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they, well should I say they’re transient, they’re mobile 
when they come in. So they move, they may come to 
Jennings and they go elsewhere. And so people are much 
more um, people tend not to know each other that well or 
relate to each other as a sense of community which we had 
in the 60s 70s and early 80s and so it presents I believe more 
opportunities for crime. 
Group: Longford  
Donald: I agree with [the prompt for the frame]! I agree with that! What I can 
say, add to that is that we need a more community policing that 
would also assist. Because as you rightfully say neighbours would 
look out for neighbours but then again because this population is 
mixed with all different nationality, you find that persons would come 
from wherever their respective origin countries with whatever 
cultures that they have and we find that that is what is happening 
presently right now in Antigua. Where you might be coming from a 
bigger country, take for example Guyana where you didn’t even 
know your neighbour. You know and they come and they will 
continue that same kind of concept here. 
In the peer group discussions where at least one participant articulates a cogent 
position in favour of the Social Breakdown frame, the participants show their support 
for the frame by arguing either there has been a shift in cultural values, parents are not 
raising their children as they should or the solution to the country’s crime problem lies 
in collective or community anticrime activism or other types of interventions.  In some 
cases, participants make all of these arguments.  The analysis below examines each of 
these arguments in turn. 
Supportive Argument 1: There Has Been A Shift in Cultural Values Over Time 
Whether it be the waning influence of church or of shame, or a diminishing sense of 
civic duty, in each of the peer group discussions in which at least one participant 
supports the Social Breakdown frame, participants argue that there has been a shift in 
cultural values over time.  In language reminiscent of Pearson’s (1984) Hooligan in 
the Cassada Gardens peer group discussion Pericles argues, ‘people’s connection with 
the church and so forth...those things have broken down so it lends for more anti-
social and deviant behaviour’.  And, in the Golden Grove discussion group, Deege 
argues more pointedly: 
What I find has changed is that people don’t have shame like they 
used to have shame. Because when I was growing up committing a 
crime, or a police have you even for questioning – that was big shame 
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for your family. It didn’t just involve you it shamed your whole 
family...what we used to know as shame no longer is shameful. 
Deege’s argument is reminiscent of John Braithwaite’s work on reintegrative shaming, 
which was discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  Also underlying Pericles and 
Deege’s argument is a sense of increasing individualism – a shift away from 
interdependence.    As Judy, from the Redcliffe Street discussion group explains, 
‘...we’re supposed to be helping one another and we are not helping one another’. In 
each peer group discussion where the frame was favourably discussed, participants 
express this sentiment:   
Group: Redcliffe Street  
Lavern: Why I say agree, I agree because it’s a break down in not 
only the family structure but in terms of let’s say the civic 
community spirit as was rightly said because we don’t look 
out for each other now.  And, um, in terms of – I would want 
to blame it now on technology because we always texting, 
chatting on the phone or we’re on the Internet we have no 
time to look out.  Ok. And we are glued to our television be it 
whatever it is we’re looking at and then we look – if we are 
going to look at the Antigua context and I guess around the 
world, Caribbean, you may have the same problem. Whereby 
the multi-culture – Spanish, Guyanese, Jamaican, so I don’t 
know James, I know this is a James, the James live on this 
street, the Josephs the Jocks the whoever it is, is no longer 
there. It’s totally different all together. 
Tia:  Yeah, we’re more transient. Whereas the families used to live 
at the same house for 20, 30, 40 years, it’s not the same. 
Lavern: ...today you may see – if you want to be the nosy neighbour – 
you may see three women, then tomorrow you may see or 
next week a fourth you don’t even know whoever it is. Then 
you going to see, eh-eh you seeing this guy you didn’t see 
him last week at this house. It’s a next one coming. Next 
thing you know one day you leave for work and when you go 
home eh-eh she change curtains today. Ok, they doing better 
than me I ain’t change my own [curtains] yet for the year and 
when you catch yourself, its new neighbours.  
Group: Yeah that’s true. 
Participants in the Blue Waters discussion underscore the point:  
 
Group: Blue Waters  
 
Bolivar: Well I must admit, Elbee, I would say this, because this one 
really comes out and it hurts. [Our neighbour] has a – can I 
say son-in-law? Alexa’s boyfriend. Alexa boyfriend, I 
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mean, we’re there and Alexa’s boyfriend never says ‘hello’. 
Never. You come into a community. I think it’s rude. 
Elbee: It’s a modern thing. I may find myself pass people 
sometimes and it’s only when they say, ‘What happened, 
you can’t say howdy?’ I say, ‘Oh Lord, excuse me, my mind 
was far,’ because it’s not something I normally do.  
Mimi: He’s a stranger on the block 
Bolivar: No, but you never went to a community before and didn’t 
try to be polite to the people who were there. 
Each of these participants suggests that the type of interdependent relationships that 
are thought to reduce the likelihood of offending are now fragmented in Antiguan and 
Barbudan communities in ways they once were. 
 Interestingly, two peer group discussions made a more nuanced argument with 
respect to this shift towards individualism.  In ways that Sampson et al. (1997) refined 
the work of earlier social disorganisation theorists by arguing from a perspective of 
collective efficacy, participants in these two groups presented more refined arguments 
than those in other groups.  For these participants, the key difference between how 
Antiguans and Barbudans used to live and how they now live is not only 
interdependence and social cohesion among neighbours but neighbours’ willingness to 
intervene on behalf of the common good.  These participants imagine Antigua and 
Barbuda as having been a low crime society in the past because in Braithwaite’s 
(1989: 8) terms it was a society ‘where people [did] not mind their own business, 
where tolerance of deviance [had] definite limits...’ These two groups point to child 
rearing to make their point.  Consider first an exchange in the Blue Waters discussion 
and then an exchange in the Cedar Valley discussion group: 
Group: Blue Waters  
[responding to the frame’s prompt]  
 
Elbee: We agree, we agree. Strongly. I mean the neighbour could 
cut your – the neighbour could give you licks. And if you go 
home and complain you get more licks. 
Bolivar: If you go home and complain that an elderly person hit you 
for some reason, your parents just assume it’s something 
you did wrong and they put on theirs too.  Now what you 
have, if a teacher scolds a child, the parent wants to beat up 
the teacher. 
Lynn:  As a matter of fact, we had a code in my house, my mother 
said if you did anything, make sure you come home and tell 
me about it first. 
Elbee: I don’t know if we can get back to that you know – that has 
gone forever. 
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Bolivar: I don’t know – I think it has gone too. 
Group: Cedar Valley  
[responding to the frame’s prompt]  
 
Precious:   True. That’s a true statement. 
Toya: I believe that. 
Regine: Yeah, but we all endorse that but yet still we don’t do it.  
No, because I remember the days when...the neighbour 
would discipline me for something because...but now. 
People are saying, ‘Not me pickney12,’ yet still we wish 
those days would come back so we’re not practicing what 
we preach. 
Toya: You know that saying it takes a village? We no longer 
believe in that. We really don’t...It’s just because the 
population is so diverse now you know. We don’t know 
our neighbours anymore because it’s itinerant. Because 
the neighbours come and go. Before you lived in a 
neighbourhood like, ok take for instance where Regine 
lives. Regine could tell you everybody in her 
neighbourhood and we could tell you in Ottos everybody.  
Precious:  And we could in Ottos.  Oh yeah, we could. 
Regine: Not anymore. 
In the past childrearing was the responsibility of the entire community. The most 
common referent in these discussions is the African adage, ‘it takes a village to raise a 
child’ Neighbours had the authority to intervene and discipline each other’s child.  The 
views expressed in the excerpts identify childrearing as no longer being a community 
responsibility but a purely individual one.  Neighbours no longer intervene on behalf 
of the common good – they now mind their own business.  
Supportive Argument 2: Parents Are Not Raising Their Children As They Should  
In the discussion groups where there was partial or full support for the Social 
Breakdown frame, participants argued that crime resulted from parents inadequately 
supervising, disciplining and instilling proper values in their children.  For example, in 
the Lower Nevis Street discussion, Cynthia says: 
For me, I think lack of parental control causes undisciplined children 
and then into society causes a lot of crime. Before times we had 
parents who used to be at home with their children now we have 
parents going out and children are left unattended. TV playing the role 
of parents and now the television, things that they see on the television 
are not the things that are helping our children what they see is what 
they learn. Our values are not instilled in them. 
                                                
12 In Antiguan dialect, pickney means child. 
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The nexus between crime and negligent parenting that Cynthia articulates is 
rooted in social control theory.  More specifically, Cynthia’s insights are 
reminiscent of parental efficacy, a contribution to control theory that argues 
that effective parenting can help neutralise the effect of both individual and 
social forces that promote delinquent behaviour (Siegel 2012). With respect to 
this particular argument, there is not a noticeable age difference among the 
participants making the claim.  In the Russell’s discussion where all the 
participants are under the age of 40 and all but one are between the ages of 18 
and 29, Betty says:  
Kids are having kids nowadays too and the parents just seem to be 
wutless.13   There needs to be an application to have kids it seems 
nowadays because people are just being wutless – you know it’s kids 
having kids. 
The group elaborates further in the conversation: 
Group: Russell’s  
Ashley: Children need some bull bud on them. I’m joking no, when 
you look at young mothers, I think it goes back to what we 
were talking about, pregnancy and like young mothers and 
the increase in pregnancy, I mean they’re so young 
themselves they’re like what 14, 15 years old some of them. 
Betty: They can’t even take care of themselves 
Mary: There is a girl in my office who turned 28 today and who 
has 5 kids, single mother. 
Ashley:  Yeah, so how does she possibly – she’s still a kid herself 
when she had her first kid. How is she going to possibly 
instil discipline when she was probably some rude little 
skettel14 running around the place doing what she does. 
Eryn:  Exactly. They are so young trying to live their lives that 
they don’t have time to you know take care of the kids, or 
watch what their kids are doing they’re probably working 
anyway.... 
Ashley: And some of them are working two jobs. I have staff that 
work for me like females that work for me from 7:00am ‘til 
3:00pm and then go to a security job from 5:00pm to 1:00 in 
the morning. So when are you with your kid when that is 
happening? But they have to do it. They have to do it. They 
have to do it. And I know that some of them are single 
mothers but they have to do it because how else are they 
going to ... my salary is obviously not enough to support 
four children and she’s the sole provider in the family so 
you have to take a second job but that happens anywhere 
else in the world too for single mothers.  
                                                
13 Wutless in Antiguan dialect means ‘good for nothing’ or worthless 
14 Skettel in Antiguan dialect means a woman with loose morals, roughly synonymous with a whore 
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Similarly, Doreen, who is also between the ages of 18 and 29 and participated in the 
Crosbies discussion group, suggests that parents are not transmitting correct values to 
children, in part because they are young themselves: 
But then you also have these young people who are having all these 
young kids too... I don’t know if it’s just a different kind of concept 
now, the whole child, baby having or whatever but you see all these 
kids hanging around grownups and the grownups like they don’t even 
care what they’re doing in front of them. I mean I know even like 
something simple like smoking weed in front of their children, I 
personally think is wrong. You know? And listening to certain things 
watching certain things doing certain things in front of them. And 
saying certain things. I mean yeah, I used to hear daddy and mommy 
cuss when I was a child all the time. But I also knew that if I repeated 
it I was going to get my tail cut. And that’s not the case now. But you 
know, even simple things like carnival time. I think it’s wrong to see 
these young kids in Lions.15 It’s appalling to me when I see a woman 
working16 with her little child – boy child saying,  ‘Oh, they nuh have 
to let me in’ and lifting up her little boy child to grind up a woman on 
her bottom. I think it’s disgusting. That to me is child abuse. To me 
that’s disgusting.  Or to see your children be more vulgar than I see 
most adults and the young mothers or even the older mothers to say, 
‘Yes man show them how it’s done’. And that’s where I feel a lot rape 
too comes in because they don’t understand the concept too that that is 
maybe not the nicest thing or nicest way to behave. 
In the Blue Waters discussion group where all the participants are over the age of 40 
and all but one are between the ages of 60 and 69, Lynn says: 
What I have found is that the whole concept of passing values onto 
children has changed. It has changed – I think parents used to 
verbalize dreams for children – help their children to establish things 
they want out of life, encourage them to set goals and that sort of thing 
and I’m not so sure that this is a big conversation piece...[because] I 
think by and large most of the parents are really very young – haven’t 
had that passed on to them and therefore haven’t been able to hold that 
conversation easily. 
In response to Lynn in this group, Elbee replies, ‘Could be wrong but I think 
nowadays more single mothers, women, have at least two jobs and don’t have as much 
time with the children’. 
In all but two of the peer group discussions in which participants argue that 
parents are not adequately supervising and disciplining their children, participants 
attempt to explain this lax parenting by pointing to what they perceive as an increase 
in young girls having children and/or the increased need for single mothers to hold 
                                                
15 Lions is popular venue for nighttime parties during the annual carnival festival. 
16 Working in this context means dancing 
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more than one job. The excerpts above illustrate both of these arguments.  In the Blue 
Waters discussion group, Lynn draws on her professional experience to support the 
latter claim: 
I’m going to give you a real example of something that has happened.  
When I worked in the ministry of education I used to supervise 
secondary schools. And you know I’d come across a whole lot of 
different issues with the young people but this particular one. I had 
gone to one of the schools in the country and the teachers were very 
concerned about a particular young man. His grades used to be good 
and things like that but... anyway, his mother decided to take on two 
jobs so he was one of the first young men in his school to have one of 
these computer games and to have a little computer and stuff like that. 
So he had all these little things that she was going around and buying 
and presenting him with.  But when he got up in the morning, she 
wasn’t there, because she worked the night. So before he left he would 
put the kettle on knowing that when he left for school and turned off 
the stove, within 5 minutes of his leaving she would be arriving and so 
she would get a hot cup of tea as soon as she would have arrived. 
When he got home, his food was hot because she would have literally 
done the same thing. She would have prepared his meal and she’d be 
gone. So he never saw her. She was doing two jobs and that was the 
sort of ships passing in the night situation. And he got very angry with 
his mother but never said anything and was as he said angry with 
himself for not having the courage to say anything to his mother. So 
his grades started falling and nobody could find out why. So after he 
told me about it I said what time does your mother come home? And 
he told me well she get’s a break at about 4:00 and um, he would be 
home by then but she was just coming home to change to go off to the 
night work. And I said to him, he lived in Parham and I said boy, I am 
coming with you. So I drove over to Parham, he showed me where he 
lived and the afternoon I went out there and waited with him for her to 
come. And when she came I said your son has something to say to 
you. And I told him I would come and wait so that he can talk to you. 
And when he told her she bawled.  Within two weeks she had one job 
but she had a son who began to pick himself up and move. That 
conversation isn’t happening. Children are hurting and then they take 
that anger out on other people.  
Lynn’s comments are enlightening not only because they provide insight into her 
perceived causes of lax parenting but also because they illustrate a profound point 
made by Hirschi and other control theorists – children who hurt, hurt others.  Using 
herself as an example, in the Lower Nevis Street discussion Shana underscores this 
point with a powerful soliloquy:  
Can I just say something please? I’m going to use me.  When I was a 
little girl, I used to be very angry. I used to love vengeance a lot 
because why?  My mom used to give us a lot of food but not a lot of 
clothes. She used to make good money. She saved her money to buy 
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her property.  Now, she never gave us love. My mother used to swear 
a lot and she used to swear a lot of words at us. So I grew up in that 
environment and that environment made me more angrier, you know? 
I have a lot of bitterness inside of me so when I go to school and you 
pass and you mash me too hard you better be smiling because I’m 
going to beat you up real bad and when I say real bad, you gonna get 
cuts too. I used to walk with a knife because my uniform used to have 
a little bow belt so you have a little flap over so I used to put the a wha 
you call the knife – a hatchet knife in here, you going to get that. I 
used to beat the boys and them so so so...beat them bad. Bad, ‘til 
sometimes they can’t even raise their hand to hit me back. Because 
you know what happen? I never get love so I can’t show love. And 
because of that I was a victim too you understand. And I told myself 
that when I get a boyfriend and he put his hand on me I’m going to 
beat him. I used to beat my children’s father bad, very very bad...you 
know I – I carried it for years, even in my neighbourhood people never 
used to like me is what happened. I used to be a very aggressive 
person.  And when people don’t like me I get more power. I don’t like 
you either so I don’t care about you. For me, nobody was important 
except me and my own you understand. Even you know I built a bit of 
security around my kids. You know they don’t talk to – when I say 
talk to people they can talk to people at school but not at home. They 
can’t go by nobody. I give them everything they want. You 
understand, that was my protection. You understand? And, it’s like if I 
come home from work, and my child says um, no children not 
children, I never put it out on children, like the neighbours – a grown 
person interfere with my children they going to get it. Some way or the 
other they’re going to get it. And you know what make me most 
angry? If I’m cursing her and she does not respond, ooooh I turn 
crazy...So I believe it’s an individual thing. You know, it’s not only 
for the public, it’s not only for the police.  
In sharing her thoughts, Shana unknowingly supports Hirschi’s claim that family 
detachment, including intra-family conflict, child abuse, lack of affection and lack of 
supervision, are predictive of offending and reinforces Van Voorhis et al.’s (1988) 
conclusion that ‘bad homes’ place youth at risk.  In the Blue Waters group Bolivar 
makes the same point: 
...one thing you’ll notice about the guys, one, they’re young, relatively 
young and two, they will rob you get what they want and still turn 
around and attack you. Now, my take on that is that they are people 
who don’t seem to have any regard for anybody. And, um, when this 
happens right and you’re a victim, you also tend to look at the attacker 
and sometimes you have to feel for them and I am of the opinion that 
they are a bunch of young people who have never one, have never 
been shown any love or maybe I should say first of all they don’t 
know God right, you know, they never grew up in the fear of God and 
that I think is very important whether you believe in God or not, to 
have had the fear of God initially in your life. And two I don’t think 
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they have ever been shown love because anybody who I think had 
experienced love in their life, I don’t think after robbing somebody 
you’d still turn around now and want to attack them. That to me shows 
a total disregard of human life. 
In one peer group discussion participants argued that some parents actually encourage 
and profit from the misdeeds of their children.  Echoing sentiments expressed in 2007 
by the Youth Affairs Minister, that ‘[t]here are parents who depend on their children to 
support them financially... The fathers allow their sons to sell drugs in this country to 
support them, and they know where the money is coming from...’ (The Daily Observer 
2/23/2007: 24), participants in the Redcliffe Street argued that not only are parents 
negligent in raising their children, but are, in some circumstances complicit in the 
children’s wrong doing.  In this group Judy argues, ‘the children steal and [the 
parents] love what they getting because it’s the money come quickly.  Also they 
encourage them to do it and they even conceal the crime too’. 
Supportive Argument 3: Community Solutions Are Needed For Community 
Problems 
Three of the four discussion groups that advocate community based interventions 
suggest community programs in the vein of Shaw’s Chicago Area Project. The 
remaining group argues for both this type of community program as well as a 
coordinated neighbourhood watch.  In this latter group the idea of self-help and 
community led activism is strongest.  For participants in this group, it is the 
community that must band together, work with the police and restore order to their 
communities. 
Group: Lower Nevis Street  
Sam:  There is a good need for this neighbourhood watch – for 
communities to organise themselves you know. And 
perhaps the institutionalisation of that would help. If 
government got involved, put social services in place, get 
the community to organise into cells and so they look out 
for each other, they talk to each other, you even have 
meetings once a month to say what they want. Raise alarm.  
Malcolm: Village council maybe would do that.  
Sam: We have to really help and work closely with the police to 
do this. We really need to organize that way – to keep out 
the criminals. 
For Sam, organising the community in this way also allows for the community to 
make demands on government – there is, he argues, strength in making demands as a 
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unified group.  In a previous exchange, however, Sam’s frustration with the country’s 
crime situation is palpable as he admits to having contemplated organising a 
neighbourhood watch patrol far more radical than that he later proposes. Key to Sam’s 
argument is the fact that one should not be made to feel unsafe or to fear being his or 
her community. 
Group: Lower Nevis Street  
Sam:  I was getting a little bit concerned and even spoken to some 
of my friends in talking and saying, ‘Hey we might want to 
start thinking about vigilante. We go out there, form a group 
of 10 and so on and we go patrol the streets from 12:00 to 
2:00 and anybody found within our neighbourhood who 
don’t belong there, we arrest them we call the police’. 
We’ve been talking about doing this in connection with the 
police. But if you find anybody, any young man, anybody in 
the community between the time of 12:00 and 4:00 we stop 
you and you better be read- or we’re ready to shoot because 
we’re going to be armed. You know. When we say stop, you 
stop. It may be you alone or we going to open fire on all 1-
2-3 because people beginning to feel scared. You don’t feel 
scared in your community. It’s wrong for people to feel 
scared in their homes. And I say that if the men get together, 
and form cells, say I go from 2-4, working no less than 4 
people, hopefully we get a police to be with us, and we have 
our stuff and as soon as we see a [inaudible] we code them. 
We say code 1 – that means a stranger, we’re moving in on 
somebody. The police starts gathering close and when we 
stop that person, if that person doesn’t respond we say all 
right guy, drop whatever you have, hands up. That’s what I 
was telling you guys, my solution to it. Because I felt that 
we weren’t getting the police protection. 
Malcolm: That sounds scary. That sounds wild, wild, wild. 
Sam: Dr. King in his house, he and his wife at home, the guys go 
in while they’re there and you know, another place over in 
Crosbies, they broke in and these people are scared. And 
they’re shaking...they wonder if guys are going to jump in.  
These guys try to get in with a ladder on the second floor. 
The woman, the doctor was raped. How long do you go 
with that if you don’t have any police protection? 
Malcolm: Yes, we understand that, we understand that. 
Sam: You know, I was saying to a guy, ‘Quit being scared man, 
let’s go out there and meet those guys. You go after – ‘ 
Cynthia: They’re armed too 
Sam:  We know that, that’s why we’re going armed. And we’re 
going prepared for war... I hope we don’t get there... 
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Participants in three of the four groups that argue for community based interventions 
observe that young people are idle today in ways they were not idle in the past.  For 
these participants, structured programs with adequate supervision are needed to fill the 
void left by negligent parents and neighbours who increasingly mind their own 
business.  As Sam says, ‘...we need the authorities to put something in place such that 
the young people can be attracted to something constructive’.  The focus for some 
participants is the length of the school day for the average young person who attends a 
government school.  This is a popular topic in the country’s public discourse, as many 
have argued over the years that the school day should extend to at least 3:00pm rather 
than the current 1:00pm. The excerpt below echoes the call of the editorial:  
Group: Golden Grove  
Participants:  
Hulette, a Black Antiguan office administrator in her 60s  
Nadine, a Black Antiguan trust manager in her 30s 
Anne, a Black Antiguan information technology professional in her 
30s 
Deege, a Black Antiguan education administrator in her 40s 
Annette, a Black Antiguan counsellor her 30s 
Nicola, a Black Antiguan aircraft mechanic in her 40s 
Neicy, a Black Antiguan producer in her 30s 
Robyn, a Black Antiguan banker in her 50s 
Edy, a Black Antiguan human resources consultant in her 60s 
 
Edy: I think we need more social programs  
Annette: For whom? 
Edy:  for youth.  
Neicy:  I think the programs are there and the youth are not accessing 
them too. 
Edy: I think we need to extend the school day. 
Anne: Specifically for youth? There are too — too many programs 
specifically for youth. 
Robyn: I agree with Edy, the extending of the school hours, I agree. 
And not that I’m thinking that the extending of the school 
day is purely academic.... 
Edy: I am talking about a holistic program. 
Anne: I like the no child left behind thing too. For ours, it looked at 
extending the curriculum to include a lot more trade subjects 
a lot more curricula activities. Because we used to have 
curricula activities but your school could just decide this year 
that they were cancelling it. 
Annette: I would tend to agree with you all with extending the school 
day and doing that but what I think the breakdown is 
especially in secondary schools the teachers are not teaching 
anymore, they are lecturing. 
Edy: Well the teachers are not really trained. 
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Nadine:  Ok, on the trade part of it, that I think in Antigua it’s 
negative and I think those things need to be... vocational 
skills, should be it should be ok if a child – a child should get 
tested earlier and elect to do skills and trade instead of going 
along an academic path if that is what the child wants. 
Edy: And I think there should be a national service program here... 
where they – after they graduate high school or whatever 
they serve two years in the cadets or something like that... 
Anne: It doesn’t have to be military. It can be military service or 
social work but something. 
Other participants argue for interventions that include adopting a spiritual approach 
and encouraging young people to attend church and creating sports programs and 
encouraging them to get more involved in sports.  
Rebuttal Arguments 
Notwithstanding the fact that Social Breakdown is one of the least contested frames in 
this study, a fifth of all participants and one peer group discussion reject various 
components of the frame.   
Rebuttal Argument 1: Single-Parent Homes Do Not Cause Crime 
In one group where the participants have a mixed reaction to the frame, the main 
objection is that there is no causal relationship between single-parent households and 
crime.  In the Redcliffe Street discussion Tia is adamant that you cannot ‘draw a link 
between saying for example if a father is not there then this boy is gonna become a 
criminal you know’.  What is interesting about this rebuttal is that it reveals unspoken 
assumptions as to what the traditional family might mean. At no point does the Social 
Breakdown prompt define ‘traditional family’ but Tia, other discussion participants 
and newspaper writers seem to imagine the ‘traditional family’ as one with two 
parents in the house.  Although she wholeheartedly agrees with the frame, Lynn in the 
Blue Waters group realises this tendency and cautions against using a two-parent 
nuclear family as the default reference point when speaking about the ‘traditional 
family’ in a Caribbean context. While Lynn agrees that crime is caused by a 
breakdown in traditional family, contrary to the 1998 editorial that asserts, ‘it can no 
longer be acceptable, if it ever was, that a child is raised by a single parent, be that 
parent mother or father of the child...’, Lynn argues that, ‘the traditional family is an 
interesting one in this region because the traditional family is usually a single-parent 
family’.  Lynn continues to say of the two-parent nuclear family: 
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But traditional – that’s the textbook traditional, the biblical traditional. 
But, the fact of the matter we’re a slavesome society and what you 
have were parents who um, a father and a mother who in as much as 
they didn’t live together, respected one another up to a point and by 
and large the father attempted to support his children, even if he had a 
million he attempted in some shape or form, whether it is moral 
support or otherwise he would support his children.  And as Elbee 
would say, the relatives of both sides would look out for the children 
in one way or the other. Um, those of us who grew up in families 
where you had that sort of extended family and so on we still get 
caught in that kind of setting and we love it dearly and we sorry for all 
the people who don’t have it. But it is not a very common thing to see 
anymore.  
For Lynn, the breakdown of traditional family means not an increase in the prevalence 
of single mothers but an increase of parental responsibilities falling solely on the 
shoulders of that single mother.   Put differently using Lynn’s words, the breakdown 
of the traditional family simply refers to the shift that now places ‘the onus of bringing 
up the child...really on the mother’.  Given that she felt the need to make this point, 
Lynn’s contribution is another example of the unspoken assumption underlying this 
frame. 
 For years Caribbean sociologists and anthropologists have been issuing the 
same warning as Lynn. For example, Christine Barrow, a Caribbean sociologist argues 
that ‘research and policy on family in the Caribbean got off to a poor start in the post-
World War II colonial period, with culturally inappropriate conceptions of what 
constitutes “a family” and “a conjugal union”’ (Barrow 1996: 458).  Judged according 
to ‘Eurocentered ideals’ Barrow explains that Caribbean families were described as 
deformed and malfunctioning and constituted a threat to the social order.  According 
to European standards, families were stable units composed of a mother, a father and 
their children, owned or officially adopted, living together in one household.  Conjugal 
unions were defined as marriages – legally and religiously sanctioned, co-resident, 
permanent and based on love and togetherness.  The man was the head of the 
household and worked outside of the home and the woman worked within the home 
raising children, comforting her husband and doing the housework.  Caribbean 
households were described as incomplete and headed by women.  Women were 
thought to have too many children that were left alone while their mothers went out to 
work.  Conjugal unions that did not involve co-habitation or marriage were thought to 
be temporary with little love, affection or joint activity.  Children were described as 
‘illegitimate’ and ‘outside’ if they were born out of wedlock or to a parent who was in 
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another committed relationship.  Children were described as being shifted from one 
home to another. Parents migrated and aging grandmothers were saddled with the 
responsibility of training and disciplining the children.  Boys allegedly grew up 
without their fathers as male role models.  Barrow further explains that the task of 
colonial officials was to restructure Caribbean families and change the patterns of 
relationship, ‘what existed had to be removed, not understood.  Social policy, 
therefore, along with the Church, the educational system and the law, set about 
constructing proper families in the Caribbean, in accordance with European ideals’ 
(Barrow 1996: 458).  Given Barrow’s insights with respect to the colonial re-education 
effort, it is not surprising that this colonial understanding of the traditional family 
seems to be the default backdrop of the Social Breakdown frame and the source of the 
participants’ angst with respect thereto. 
Rebuttal Argument 2: The Traditional Family and Community Were The Site Of 
Crime 
Feminists have long argued that because it is hidden and unregulated by its very 
nature, the private realm of domesticity is where women generally experience some of 
the more punitive aspects of gender relations that are grounded in domination and a 
denial of agency. This power dynamic coupled with the lack of governmental 
intervention and scrutiny allows discrimination, subordination, and violence against 
women to run rampant because such matters are simply dismissed as ‘family matters’ 
or the actions of a ‘private entity’.  Frances Olsen (1993) argues, that for the 
‘powerless’, the private realm is frequently a sphere not of freedom but of uncertainty 
and insecurity.  Participants in two of the peer group discussions drew on this kind of 
perspective to challenge the idea that crime stems from a breakdown of the traditional 
family and the traditional community.  Indeed, for these participants, the traditional 
family and the traditional community were often the sites of crime and violence.  For 
example in the Golden Grove discussion Edy says: 
I think that crime has changed because before there was whole lot of 
crime going on in the family that nobody talked about. You had a lot 
of incest, you had a tremendous amount of domestic violence and stuff 
like that that absolutely nobody talked about. And, so I think it has 
changed but I don’t necessarily agree with that... 
Similarly, in the Darkwood Beach discussion Ronald emphatically rejected the 
dystopian view that life was so much better in the past and crime much less prevalent.  
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Ronald exclaims, ‘I don’t believe in the good old days.  The good old days to me were 
horrible when I was growing up here in Antigua. They were absolutely horrible...I 
think we as a society we were horrible.  I saw a lot of exploitation...’ Ronald also 
explains, ‘When I grew up here, they had known criminals – them people like Hash 
Riley and so. I don’t know if you know of him. Hash Riley is a guy that used to rape 
his mother and he lived in my community...’ Ronald strengthens his point by saying: 
You see, what we’re having here in Antigua now with the exception of 
the foreign element that has come in, and that has come in in the past 
10-15 years, but what you’re seeing now, we’re now reaping what was 
sown 20 years ago with how men treated their women and had kids 
and didn’t take care of them... I mean, when you look at circumstance 
now, I don’t know who’s political persuasion or what but I’m going to 
say it, when you have leaders in government who are openly 
consorting with underage women, and getting away with it, bragging 
and having children with them –  breeding them as they say – what do 
you expect our society to degenerate to? 
Both Edy and Ronald suggest that crime is not more prevalent now than it was in the 
past, it is simply that the type of crime that occurs now is different. Consider Ronald’s 
exchange with the other participants in his group: 
Group: Darkwood Beach  
Ronald: That’s a tough one because the thing that we’re seeing 
now right, is petty crime increasing. And yes, petty 
crime can be stopped if what you say is true. But there 
was a lot of institutional crime. That existed 40 years 
ago. There were crimes, and I know this to be a fact. 
There were a lot of crimes against women. When 
women went for job in business they were coerced into 
sleeping with the owners and managers and stuff 
because when I grew up here they used to call it the 
bruck foot industry. You know that. That was a crime.  
Facilitator: Can you explain that? 
Arnelle: The bruck foot? 
Terrence: Sexual harassment. 
Ronald: It’s like the casting couch in the States. Young women 
– and another thing that caused crime in Antigua that a 
lot of people seem to turn a blind eye to, is that a lot of 
fathers didn’t take care of their children 50 years ago. 
Arnelle: And bruck foot still exist today. 
Ronald: I don’t know why they call it bruck foot but I do know 
for a fact that a young woman went to get a job and 
whether you knew the family or not the employer made 
it a precondition of hiring her that he would have to 
have sex with her.  Before he even hired her.  
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Rebuttal Argument 3: Family and Community Breakdown Does not Cause Crime 
Eight discussion group participants argue that the frame accurately characterises the 
conditions of contemporary Antiguan and Barbudan society but those conditions do 
not cause crime, they merely provide more opportunity for it to flourish.  For these 
participants, crime is caused by some other factor in spite of there being a breakdown 
in traditional family and community, and they do agree that neighbours banding 
together with the police may restore order to the communities.  Neicy’s comments are 
illustrative: 
I disagree with that too.  It doesn’t stem from the fact that you no 
longer have that family base, it encourages it.  Because we no longer 
have that family base and we don’t have our neighbours’ back 
anymore, we’re not our brother’s keepers anymore it gives more 
opportunity for it but I don’t know that it stems from that breakdown. 
III 
Summary 
While one-third of the newspaper articles reference components of the Social 
Breakdown frame, fewer than one in ten refer to components of the Blocked 
Opportunities frame.  This tepid performance is in stark contrast to Social 
Breakdown’s performance in the newspaper discourse where components of the Social 
Breakdown frame are invoked favourably and uncritically. Writers seem unanimously 
to support the fundamental premise that crime stems from a breakdown of the 
traditional family and traditional community.  The frame performs even better in the 
peer group discussions where almost three-quarters of all participants agree with the 
components of the frame and more than two thirds of all discussion groups 
unanimously agreed with the frame.  With respect to Blocked Opportunities, there are 
no discussion groups that unanimously agree with the frame.  Although peer groups 
seem more nuanced in their understanding, at times linking family breakdown to 
economic conditions, in the peer group discussions as in the newspaper discourse 
Blocked Opportunities has a weak showing.   
The most striking difference between the performance of the Blocked 
Opportunities and Social Breakdown frames is that while participants reject the 
Blocked Opportunities frame in its entirety, they reject only specific components of 
the Social Breakdown frame.  It seems that the theme of personal responsibility 
resonate with Antiguans and Barbudans in a fundamental way – in a way that 
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structural failure does not.  Participants seem much less likely to entertain the idea that 
crime stems from structural conditions such as poverty and marginalisation.  In the 
words of Deege, ‘if you’re born poor big deal – plenty people born poor. It does not 
mean you have to stay poor’.  The emphasis is on one’s individual responsibility to lift 
him or herself out of poverty.  As evidenced in the Social Breakdown discourse, even 
while calling for collective action and interdependence there is still a strong sense that 
parents have an obligation to raise their own children.  Child rearing is not something 
that government or the community can do, the responsibility falls squarely on the 
shoulders of individual parents.  The message of personal responsibility is implied 
albeit not the personal responsibility of the individual offender.  Equally interesting is 
that many of the components in the Social Breakdown frame could be seen as ‘excuses’ 
or explanations external to the individual yet, in contrast to Blocked Opportunities, 
they are not seen as such. 
In much of the discourse surrounding Social Breakdown and Blocked 
Opportunities, intra-Caribbean immigration is prevalent as well as the infiltration of 
foreign cultural influences.  This is most apparent with respect to the Social 
Breakdown frame where participants talk about community residents as now being 
transient because many of them are immigrants from Jamaica, Guyana and other 
Caribbean islands.  All of these insights into Antigua and Barbuda’s popular 
consciousness with respect to crime can have profound political and public policy 
implications.  These implications will be discussed at the end of the study.  The next 
chapter develops the themes of immigration and foreign cultural influences.  
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CHAPTER SIX: ALIEN INFLUENCES 
‘...Perhaps the crimes are not what we used to hear but at the same token, Antiguans 
are being led by the Internet, by the television and certain things are creeping into the 
culture.  It wasn’t the culture when I was growing up.  But, the effect of the Internet 
and everything that is infiltrating the system wasn’t there when I was a kid’.  
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  
 ‘That’s true.  True true true…and you know where that was evident? With Lee 
Malvo17…the boy was from Jamaica and when they interviewed his dad in Tivoli 
Gardens or Trenchtown or whatever…the area that these folks were coming from, and 
the desperate situation…so, the immigrants that are coming from [Jamaica and 
Guyana], sad to say are the ones that are the bottom of their society.  And, I hate to 
use that word but that seems to be true.  You’re not getting people who – the majority 
of them are not skilled and educated’. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the ways in which newspaper articles and participants in the 
peer group discussions articulate the relationship between socialisation processes, 
exposure to various cultures, behavioural norms, and crime.  The chapter is a logical 
extension of the themes presented in the preceding chapter.  To the extent that Antigua 
and Barbuda is not the peaceful close-knit society it once was, newspaper articles and 
members of the public argue that it is in part because of ‘alien influences’ or those 
elements, foreign to Antigua and Barbuda’s culture that Antiguans and Barbudans feel 
are criminogenic.  Such influences include Jamaican dancehall music, cable television 
broadcast from the United States, criminal deportees sent back to Antigua and 
Barbuda from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, the Internet and 
immigrants primarily from larger Caribbean countries. In this chapter it becomes clear 
that a small percentage of newspaper articles and focus group participants tend to 
blame ‘non-nationals’ 18  and foreign influences for the country’s current crime 
situation.  
Like the chapters immediately preceding and succeeding it, this chapter is 
organised around two frames and is divided into three distinct sections. Section I 
focuses on the Foreign Cultural Influences frame, describing the various components 
of the frame, discussing its theoretical underpinnings, and reporting the frequency with 
                                                
17 This is a reference to Lee Boyd Malvo, the Washington DC ‘sniper’ who was convicted for murder.  Although Malvo is 
Jamaican, prior to migrating to the United States Malvo and guardian/accomplice, John Allen Muhammed, were living in Antigua 
and Barbuda. 
18 The term ‘non-national’ is Antiguan and Barbudan parlance for immigrant or foreigner. 
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which these components were found in newspaper articles.  Reactions to the frame in 
the peer group discussions will also be considered, paying particular attention to the 
supportive and rebuttal arguments proffered by the participants.   Similarly, section II 
will focus on the Poor Immigration Control frame articulating the various components 
of the frame along with their theoretical underpinnings. Section II will also report the 
prevalence of the components of the frame in newspaper articles as well as the 
reactions to the frame by participants in the peer group discussions. Lastly, section III 
will summarise the findings of the two frames and discuss their implications.  
While this chapter is similar in style and structure to chapter five, there is one 
important analytical difference.  Unlike the other frames, the Foreign Cultural 
Influences frame emerged from the data organically or spontaneously.  That is, the 
facilitator did not prompt the frame in any way during the course of the peer group 
discussions nor did the interview guide contemplate any of the frame’s components.  It 
was only after careful analysis of the transcripts of each discussion and discovering 
nuances in how participants discussed immigration and exposure to other cultures that 
the frame was constructed and its presence coded.  
I 
Foreign Cultural Influences 
The Foreign Cultural Influences frame posits that crime stems from exposure to and 
adoption of cultural elements foreign to Antigua and Barbuda.  The discourse 
surrounding this frame assumes that most of the crimes that occur in Antigua and 
Barbuda reflect patterns of criminality that are not indigenous to the country.  
Accordingly, the frame’s proposed solution to the country’s crime problem lies in 
protecting the indigenous culture from outside influences that have crept into the 
society through the perceived Trojan horses of criminal deportees, the Internet, North 
American television stations broadcast as local cable television, Jamaican dancehall 
music and immigrants.  At face value, there is substantial overlap between this frame 
and the Social Breakdown frame.  For example, television and music were similarly 
referenced in the crime discourse describing the breakdown of the traditional family 
and the traditional community. But, what is analytically important about the material 
coded to the Foreign Cultural Influences frame is the xenophobia in which it tends to 
be steeped. The argument is not merely that television has had a deleterious effect on 
Antiguan and Barbudan society, it is that North American television, most notably the 
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Black Entertainment Television station, has had a deleterious effect on Antiguan and 
Barbudan society.  The argument is not merely that music has had a negative impact 
on Antiguan and Barbudan youth, it is that Jamaican dancehall music has had a 
negative impact on Antiguan and Barbudan youth. Likewise, given the discomfort 
with the ethnic heterogeneity implied by the Poor Immigration Control frame, overlap 
with the Foreign Cultural Influences frame may appear to exist.  Yet, unlike the Poor 
Immigration Control frame the Foreign Cultural Influences frame does not assert that 
immigrants are actually committing the crime, rather it asserts that Antiguans and 
Barbudans are adopting criminogenic elements of the various immigrant cultures now 
present in the country.  Thus, while the Foreign Cultural Influences frame in some 
ways mirror the arguments of the social disorganisation theorists and strain theorists 
described in chapter five and referenced in section II, the xenophobic-tinged discourse 
coded as Foreign Cultural Influences fits more squarely within the ambit of imitation 
theories advanced by Jean-Gabriel Tarde (1890), Sutherland’s (1939) differential 
association and Sellin’s (1938) contributions to culture conflict theory.   
Jean-Gabriel Tarde is widely touted as the intellectual forefather of modern 
learning theory and his work focusing on the social origins of crime has become a 
mainstay of American criminological thought (Wilson 1954).  For Tarde, the criminal 
is not born but made – one becomes an offender by close association with friends and 
acquaintances not by any biological predisposition (see for example Wilson 1954; 
Beirne 1987).  In The Laws of Imitation (1890), Tarde describes the process through 
which a person becomes an offender as a process of imitation governed by three laws.   
According to Tarde, the first law of imitation is that persons imitate each other in 
proportion to the extent to which they live in close contact.  In crowds or cities where 
contact is close and life is active, imitation is most frequent and changes often.  In 
stable groups or in more rural areas where contact is less and life is less active, there is 
less imitation and little change. The second law of imitation posits that not everyone is 
worthy of imitation.  That is, imitation tends to be unidirectional – from cities to rural 
areas and from those in a position perceived to be superior to those in a position 
perceived to be inferior. Lastly, Tarde’s third law of imitation, what he calls the law of 
insertion, posits that when mutually exclusive ‘fashions’ or frequently imitated 
phenomena occur simultaneously, one will supplant the other.  The example that Tarde 
gives to illustrate the law of insertion is the way in which guns eventually supplanted 
knives as the weapon of choice in cases of murder in some jurisdictions (see Jones 
2013; Wilson 1954).   
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Influenced by Tarde’s theory of imitation, social learning theorist Edwin 
Sutherland (1939) builds on the notion that persons are not born criminals but become 
criminals through association with others. Although Sutherland does not focus on 
imitation per se, he argues that criminal behaviour is learned through ‘contacts with 
procrime values, attitudes and definitions and other patterns of criminal behaviour’ 
(Siegel 2012: 237).  For Sutherland, such learning is most effective if these contacts 
take place within the context of direct personal interaction.  Moreover, the result of 
this learning is not only the skills needed to commit a crime but also the attitudes 
favourable to delinquency and law breaking (Maguire et al. 2007).  While Sutherland 
acknowledges the possible effects of frequent contact with procrime values and 
attitudes through television and other forms of media, he argues that such contact is 
secondary to direct personal interaction (Williams 2012).  Thus, as Siegel (2012: 238) 
explains:  
...differential association theory holds that people learn criminal 
attitudes and behaviour while in their adolescence from close and 
trusted friends and/or relatives. A criminal career develops if learned 
antisocial values and behaviours are not at least matched or exceeded 
by conventional attitudes and behaviours.  Criminal behaviour, then, 
is learned in a process that is similar to learning any other human 
behaviour. 
According to Sutherland (1939), the underlying cause of differential 
association and thus systematic criminal behaviour is culture conflict (Galliher 1988: 
129).  Culture conflict, a theory popularised by Thorsten Sellin (1938), posits that each 
culture sets out its own rules of behaviour and inculcates them in each of its members. 
These rules of behaviour, or what Sellin terms ‘conduct norms’, pose little difficulty in 
an uncomplicated homogenous society but as a society becomes more complex with 
increased migration, an increased number of cultures and splintering subcultures, the 
likelihood that conduct norms will remain consistent across all members of society 
decreases.  Where conduct norms with respect to a given situation are inconsistent, 
conflict ensues.  This conflict can take the form of a primary culture conflict or a 
secondary culture conflict.  A primary culture conflict, which is the type of conflict 
most germane to the crime discourse in Antigua and Barbuda due to high rates of 
immigration, occurs when there is a clash of two different cultures – usually as a result 
of colonisation or migration (Jones 2013).  The suggestion is as Hayward and Young 
(2012: 116) argue, ‘multiculturalism generates a sense of ineluctable collisions of 
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[conduct] norms...’ A secondary culture conflict occurs when a single culture splinters 
into different subcultures, each with its own conduct norms (Jones 2013).  
 Imitation, differential association and culture conflict are critical to 
understanding the Foreign Cultural Influences frame that is identified in Antigua and 
Barbuda’s crime discourse because the frame posits that crime stems from a clash of 
cultures – from imitating procrime behaviour and/or adapting procrime attitudes that 
are not indigenous to Antigua and Barbudan culture. Accordingly, the solution lies in 
protecting Antiguan and Barbudan culture from outside influences that have crept into 
our society through criminal deportation, American cable television, the Internet, 
Jamaican dancehall music and immigration.   The remainder of this section will 
examine the prevalence of the Foreign Cultural Influences frame in newspaper articles 
and participant reactions to this formulation of the problem.  
Foreign Cultural Influences in the News 
Components of the Foreign Cultural Influences frame appear in just over 10 per cent 
of the newspaper articles included in this study.  In each article displaying the frame, 
there is palpable fear that crime has reflected or will reflect patterns of criminality not 
traditionally associated with Antigua and Barbuda although this claim is not bourn out 
by any empirical data.  For example, in a 1994 newspaper article entitled ‘On Crime 
and Justice For All’ the author argues that: 
The gunshot-wound bodies of three males and one female found 
dead, bound and gagged on board a deserted 65-foot yacht off the 
Barbuda coast last Saturday, is joyless evidence that gangland-style 
international crime has at last beset our shores. Even now, long 
before the work of combined local and international criminal 
investigation agencies is far from complete, there can be little doubt 
in the minds of a down-to-earth local populace that the mass-killings 
portray a foreign connection. The killings have sent shockwaves 
throughout this relatively peace-loving community.  That is grief 
enough. But that the crimes should be of international or rather, of a 
foreign tenor, fills us all with justifiable outrage. (The Daily Observer 
2/2/1994: 5) 
 Similarly, a 2007 editorial entitled ‘What’s To Be Done About Crime?’ laments:  
For a while last year, when the PM declared a zero tolerance policy 
and announced his six point plan, many felt a level of comfort which 
has since significantly eroded and citizens cringe after every report of 
criminals getting away with their deeds. There is a real fear that soon 
ordinary citizens might fight back and the spectre of vigilante justice 
could become a real possibility. As a matter of fact, with so many 
CARICOM nationals in our midst, where this kind justice is practised, 
it might be sooner than we think. (The Daily Observer 2/27/2007: 2) 
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None of the newspaper articles displaying the Foreign Cultural Influences frame 
challenge the underlying premise that exogenous influences are creeping into 
Antiguan and Barbudan society or that these influences necessarily have a deleterious 
effect on the society.  On the contrary, the newspaper articles displaying this frame 
take these assumptions for granted.  For example, in a 2006 news article entitled 
‘Probation Now an Option’, the Minister of Social Transformation is said to have 
pointed out that, ‘...the country is experiencing an increase in criminal activity, much 
of which could be blamed on deportees from the US (The Daily Observer 2/17/2006: 
19).  One editorial entitled ‘Time To Take Our Country Back’ asserts uncritically, 
‘[w]e take so many unwanted pages from America’s books...’ (The Daily Observer 
2/16/2005: 2) and yet another editorial entitled ‘Breakdown In Gun Control’ describes 
criminal deportees from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom as 
professional criminals ‘just itching to make their way in the world utilising the power 
of the gun’ (The Daily Observer 2/9/2004: 2).  In the analysis below, it is clear that 
these assumptions carryover to the peer group discussions where they remain 
unchallenged and form part of the taken for granted knowledge about crime.  
Foreign Cultural Influences in Peer Group Discussions 
The overall performance of the Foreign Cultural Influences frame in peer group 
discussions is strong. Notwithstanding the fact that this frame emerged organically 
from the analysis, unprompted by the interview guide, no participant refuted the 
claims made by its proponents.  As such, the strength of the Foreign Cultural 
Influences frame was assessed in light of the number of discussions in which it 
spontaneously occurred, the enthusiasm that the participants showed when the frame 
was conjured and the absence of arguments raised in rebuttal. Of the 20 participants 
who conjure this frame, only four are under the age of 40 suggesting that this frame 
may be particularly influential among older people, who may be most resistant to 
change and more protective of what is perceived to  ‘indigenous’ Antiguan and 
Barbudan ‘culture’. 
Participants in over three-quarters of the discussion groups drew on the frame 
by spontaneously lamenting the fact that Antigua and Barbuda is now a 
‘cosmopolitan’ society – ‘people from all over the place in Antigua’.   In language 
reminiscent of Thorsten Sellin and his culture conflict theory, these participants argued 
that with cultural diversity has come a general dilution of Antiguan and Barbudan 
values and culture. In no discussion did participants make this argument as ardently or 
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as stridently as the participants in the Cedar Valley discussion group.  As part of a 
conversation triggered by the Poor Immigration Control frame, participants explained:   
Group: Cedar Valley  
Participants:  
Regine, a Black Antiguan banker in her 40s  
Precious, a Black Antiguan retiree in her 60s 
Oliveen, a Black Antiguan senior legal secretary in her 30s 
Toya, a Black Antiguan attorney-at-law in her 50s  
 
Toya: Jamaicans and Guyanese, when they walk in, as soon as they walk 
in, they think Antigua belongs to them.  
Oliveen:   They don’t like to see you getting by more than them. 
Regine: But you know what? I’m going to defend them, our 
Antiguans allow them to, they even talking like them they 
dressing like them, they doing all kind of stupidness. 
Toya:  Oh, that’s another thing, I mean, Jamaicans 
especially…you cannot differentiate Antiguans from 
Jamaicans.  All the little boys and so now, they just look 
and act Jamaican. 
Regine:  We have our Carnival Queen 2008 Tashika Lavan, she’s 
studying in Jamaica.  
Oliveen: So I hear.  
Regine: Now, last year, when she was doing some carnival 
interviews, I wonder, who this woman? She go Jamaica 
for six months and come back and talk like Jamaicans? 
She wan kick19! 
Oliveen:  You know, Glen has a guy, a young guy selling down 
there by him. This guy have his hair cut in the Mohawk 
style. In this tight tight tight pants and this long mouth 
shoes and this tight tight shirt.  Nigel pass and say, 
‘Yardie20, a wha gwan21?’ Hear he, he look around and 
say, ‘Yow, me a no yardman nuh, a Antiguan me be 
nuh.22‘ So Nigel say, ‘But wait, if you’re Antiguan, what 
make you dress so?’ 
Toya:  But no, you can’t differentiate because a lot of the young 
people now are taking up that culture. The girls, the –  
Regine:  Causion23! No…we went...to this food fest thing. Music 
fest? ‘Bring a Can and Come’ at St. Paul’s rectory. Now 
all the other artists and them come but [Causion] is the 
one who organized it. So then [Causion] coming on, when 
he come on me say, ‘A Jamaica me dey.24‘ 
Toya:  And she asked me, ‘A who dat? It’s Antiguan? No, 
Jamaican? I said wait, no no me think he Antiguan you 
know but me nah certain anymore because –’ But, the guy 
from Antigua. He’s an Antiguan but looking at him, 
                                                
19 Antiguan parlance for, ‘She should be kicked’. 
20 Yardie is a colloquial term used to refer to recent immigrants from Jamaica. 
21Antiguan parlance for, ‘What’s going on?’ 
22 Antiguan parlance for ‘I am not Jamaican, I am Antiguan’. 
23 Causion is a popular Antiguan and Barbudan reggae artist. 
24 Antiguan parlance for ‘I am in Jamaica’. 
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talking, the way he acts and everything you’d think he’s 
from Jamaica.  
Precious:  But from long time nuh, these people like to act like 
Jamaicans talk like Jamaicans. 
Toya: But the Jamaican culture has literally taken over… 
Regine:  We complain but we allow it.  
Toya:  We do. 
Oliveen: Because I have a problem when we’re having carnival, 
and they give Jamaican license to have a reggae show in 
Antigua.  I have a big problem. I have a problem – 
Regine:  ‘Cause you cannot get a calypso show in Jamaica…during 
their festival. 
Oliveen:  Don’t give them any license thank you very much. I have 
a problem with it. 
 
As the Cedar Valley participants continued to describe the effect they felt other 
cultures were having on their own, they became visibly upset and grew more and more 
agitated.  The implicit argument seems to be that criminogenic behaviour or law 
breaking activity is antithetical to Antiguan and Barbudan values and culture, therefore 
dilution of the culture facilitates crime. References to Causion and Jamaican culture 
are particularly instructive because many Caribbean people associate Jamaica’s high 
crime rate with Jamaican culture. It is thus plausible that fear of adopting Jamaican 
culture is in part fear of adopting what is perceived as a criminogenic culture.  
Participants in the Golden Grove discussion group addressed more pointedly 
the type of cultural dissonance expressed in the Cedar Valley discussion group as well 
as the frustration felt by its participants and others who feel that outside cultural 
influences have diluted Antigua and Barbuda’s own culture. In response to the Poor 
Immigration Control frame the Golden Grove participants explain: 
Group: Golden Grove  
Participants:  
Hulette, a Black Antiguan office administrator in her 60s  
Nadine, a Black Antiguan trust manager in her 30s 
Anne, a Black Antiguan information technology professional in her 
30s 
Deege, a Black Antiguan education administrator in her 40s 
Annette, a Black Antiguan counsellor her 30s 
Nicola, a Black Antiguan aircraft mechanic in her 40s 
Neicy, a Black Antiguan producer in her 30s 
Robyn, a Black Antiguan banker in her 50s 
Edy, a Black Antiguan human resources consultant in her 60s 
 
Deege: ...I think that because [immigrants] have been socialised 
probably differently to us, that we see behaviours that we are 
not familiar with – that we don’t agree with – that we 
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condemn. For instance, I’ve heard people say, Guyanese 
people too beg.25 Right? And, those that I do know, they 
seem not to be shy at all to ask for anything. I don’t know if 
that is a good thing or a bad. 
Anne:  But, a lot of persons say Antiguans are too proud to ask for anything. 
Deege:  Well, I’d rather have pride than not pride. But again, it’s a different 
socialization so we might see it as a failing whereas maybe they see it 
as assertive or... maybe they see it as a strength.  Yeah. And…my 
experience with Jamaicans, living in New York, whatever they are, 
they take it to the extreme. If they are going to be a doctor, they are 
going to be the best doctor and according to them if they going to be a 
tief,26 they’re going to be the best damned tief. 
[Later in the transcript discussing the same subject:] 
Edy: Now, I had somebody say to me – come this close to telling 
me I wasn’t born here. 
Anne: I get that all the time. 
Edy:  And I let them know that I could trace my family roots back 
here to the 1700s and I ask them if they could do that.  But, 
then I had to step back and ask, ‘Why do they feel that way?’ 
and I think it’s because they feel that their culture is slowly 
being taken away from them and that is the reason why you 
know you find that Antiguans feel that way.  
 
In addition to discussing the increasing heterogeneity of Antiguan and Barbudan 
society, supporters of the Foreign Cultural Influences frame made two basic arguments 
with particular regard to crime: deportees returned to Antigua and Barbuda from the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom are responsible for Antigua and 
Barbuda’s crime situation, and, as Nadine expressed in the epigraph of this chapter, 
Antiguans and Barbudans are being led by cable television broadcast from the United 
States as well as the Internet.  Each of these concerns is discussed in the analysis 
below. 
Supportive Argument 1: Deportees are the Cause of the Country’s Crime Problem 
Participants in six of the eight discussions that displayed the Foreign Cultural 
Influences frame blamed criminal deportees returned to Antigua and Barbuda from the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom for Antigua and Barbuda’s crime 
problem. For example, in response to the question, ‘Who do you think are committing 
                                                
25 The literal translation is ‘Guyanese people are always asking for things’ but in Antiguan parlance this literal translation does not 
accurately reflect the connotation.  Imbued in the term ‘too beg’ is a sense of rapacious acquisition.  As Elisa Janine Sobo (1993: 
94) explains in her book One Blood: The Jamaican Body, ‘…people labelled “too beg” maximise benefits but feel no debts’.  
Sobo explains that the term connotes a parasitic relationship – the desire for a ‘free lunch’.  Sobo’s explanation fits precisely with 
the way in which the term is used in Antigua and Barbuda. 
26 Antiguan parlance for ‘Thief’. 
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these crimes?’ Oliveen and Toya, during the Cedar Valley peer group discussion 
responded, ‘Mainly deportees’.  Toya further asserted: 
We have a lot of deportees. And you will hear that, not in the media, 
we wouldn’t know that deportees are here, but you’ll hear it by the 
wayside and say, ‘Oh, no wonder because certain crimes that have 
been committed are not germane to our area’. It’s like the hold up with 
the masks and so... once you hear that you know boy well we say to 
ourselves, ‘We must have had a couple of deportees who came in 
lately and are doing these types of crime...’ 
Similarly, in response to the question: ‘To what extent is crime a problem in Antigua 
and Barbuda?’ Pericles, from the Cassada Gardens discussion group responds: 
…I would like to add another dimension um, although um, it is not, 
um, been documented um, in the way that I would like to see it. But I 
believe that the United States policy of um sending back people to 
their um, country of origin after serving their time also contributes...it 
means you’re bringing people who are more sophisticated um, in 
terms of their criminal activities. And some of these people really and 
truly don’t have the um any really ties to Antigua and Barbuda. I know 
of a few personally and one in particular in Jennings who when he was 
introduced to me at the police station I did not even know him. I only 
know him from his family reference but he had lived out of Antigua 
for 38 years and he probably would have gone away as a child maybe 
5 or younger. And so he has no real roots and then you take them and 
bring them back here in order for them to adjust, especially when they 
don’t have family. [They] have to find some way and um, means of 
surviving. 
 
And, in discussing the Blocked Opportunities frame during the Blue Waters peer 
group discussion, Elbee argued that the main culprits of Antigua and Barbuda’s crime 
problem are ‘…locals who were in the States.  They come back home but they not 
working and they have to live and they not going to do certain kind of work’.  The 
participants again bring up the topic of deportees when discussing the Poor 
Immigration Control frame and in offering solutions to the crime problem: 
Group: Blue Waters 
Participants:  
N’Jaedr, a Black Haitian telecommunications engineer in her 40s  
Elbee, a Black Antiguan civil engineer in his 60s 
Lynn, a Black Antiguan public servant in her 60s 
Mimi, a Black Antiguan retiree in her 60s 
Bolivar, a Black Antiguan engineer in his 60s 
 
[In response to the Poor Immigration Control frame] 
 
 154 
Bolivar: …I feel a lot of the people we’re sending back home, the 
Antiguans –   
Elbee: I think it’s like Antiguans who they send back home from 
the States and Canada. I think they are the main culprits… 
Bolivar: They are by far. From the time they started sending them 
back –  
Lynn: And they are influencing locals 
Bolivar: They are very well trained, boy... 
[In response to the question: What do we think should be done about 
crime in the country?] 
 
Elbee: Well as far as the deportees are concerned, they should be 
sending them back with a full CV 
Bolivar: Elbee, I can’t agree with you with sending them back 
because they didn’t learn them things here.  
Elbee: They are going to deport them, you might as well accept 
that. You might as well accept it, these things are not going 
to stop. 
Bolivar: You see this is where the first world countries have been 
cruel. 
Elbee: They are not going to stop. 
N’Jaedr:  Bolivar, they don’t tell us when they reach here? 
Elbee:  You see they just put them on a plane and they disappear. 
They need to come and everybody know and bap, bap, bap, 
and you hold them, and put them in rehab here – try the 
rehab ‘cause the rehab not going to work with everybody 
but you have to try. 
Lynn: Look at my niece Alexa, Alexa went to Canada when she 
was what 6? How old was Lexi, 6? Just about 6.  Alexa is 
what now, 42? She’ll be 42 this year.  
Mimi:  All Alexa know is Canada. 
Lynn:  Exactly. Um, just say that she had done something and they 
had deported her. Outside of her family, what really would 
she have in Antigua? And if she doesn’t have a receptive 
family, so she would have had to find maybe a gang or some 
group of people who will determine whether or not she’s 
easy to fit into their particular culture.  
Bolivar: And you know what is hard about it too? Many of them are 
in America legally you know.  They have green card you 
know…they there long enough that they could apply to be 
citizens so since they haven’t done that..... Some of them 
there from infancy – don’t have a clue about this country.  
One discussion participant recounts a personal experience as she says: 
Um, two years back my daughter and her husband were sitting in the 
car, and then we have a neighbour there have a garage and he fix cars 
and so, right at the side of the road.  After 7:00pm [they] see a light in 
the garage. What he doing? Break there and went in there and see a 
new brand car for the man and strip the car. Take all the amplifiers 
and whatever and so and walking down the road with the amplifier.  
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Where this man come from? They deport him from St. Thomas and 
then he did not have anywhere to sleep. He was sleeping in a old car 
by the side of the road. He not working, he wants money so he do 
what he have to do. 
Participants in the Longford discussion group quibble with the notion that deportees 
are actually committing the crime but are unwavering in their belief that deportees are 
teaching to locals more sophisticated crime techniques.  For example, in response to 
the question, ‘Who do you think are committing these crimes?’ Donald responds: 
Persons who live and reside here. Um...persons believe that deportees 
returning but [deportees], although we don’t have stats to show it, [are 
not] necessarily involved in these crimes. Some of them, they 
orchestrate – they mastermind – some of those crimes that are being 
committed. As I said we don’t really have stats to show it but based on 
information we would have received.  
Donald’s fellow discussion participant, Jaquel, further explains that: 
[Deportees] have been teaching others along the organized crime line. 
Before we would find that one or two persons would basically commit 
a crime unplanned. But, now the type of crimes we’re seeing you can 
tell that they plan it. Different individuals are responsible for different 
parts of the act so one person – let’s say in the case of house breaking 
– one person would probably be responsible for actually gaining 
entrance. Maybe another would be responsible for getting into the 
house.  Then in terms of selling the items you have different markets. 
It’s more organized. 
 
In an excerpt that is cross-coded as Poor Immigration Control, Pericles shares similar 
sentiments with respect to immigrants.  Pericles says: 
But when you look at some of the other criminal activity, some of the 
[non-nationals] are working in tandem with Antiguans.  It is quite 
possible that some of them have taught Antiguans new tricks...what I 
would strongly agree on, I believe we can put a dent in the crime if we 
took our immigration laws um, if we took them into serious 
consideration...in terms of determining who comes to your country. 
Supportive Argument 2:  Adoption of Foreign Values and Culture is a Cause of 
Crime 
Participants in five of the eight discussions displaying the Foreign Cultural Influences 
frame share the concern that Nadine expresses in the epigraph of this chapter, young 
people are being led by a popular culture that is not their own.  With respect to this 
argument, what all of its supporters have in common is the belief that crime is 
escalating in Antigua and Barbuda, in part because young people are adopting foreign 
values and culture. Regine, in the Cedar Valley discussion group says simply, ‘We’re 
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too Americanized...we’re just doing everything [Americans] do and want everything 
they have’.  In the Golden Grove discussion, Deege sums up the basic argument.  In 
refuting the Social Breakdown frame, Deege asserts that with respect to crime: 
One of the things that I think we can’t underestimate is the influence 
of other cultures on our culture because I think that the young people 
listen more to their peers and they’re more influenced by music and 
television –  Internet – than they are by what they see around them.  
While all participants agree with this core argument, they argue two slightly different 
points.  Some participants suggest a clear causal relationship between the violence 
depicted in foreign music and television and crime.  In terms reminiscent of Gabriel 
Tarde, these participants claim that Antiguan and Barbudan youth engage in criminal 
activity because they are mimicking the crime and violence glorified in North 
American television and Jamaican dancehall music.   For example, in the Crosbies 
peer group discussion, while refuting the Blocked Opportunities frame, Patrick 
explains that: 
I think television has a lot to do with it...it’s what they see on the 
television. All you see on television now is fighting fighting, gunplay, 
robbing, you know…they think that’s the way to go and nobody is 
there to teach them that it is not the way to go. It’s only a movie. 
Similarly, in the same peer group discussion, in responding to the question, ‘Who do 
you think are committing these crimes?’ Doreen, asserts: 
Well, what I think too is that a lot of the foreigners influence a lot of 
the younger kids. And, I think too a lot of the music that comes out of 
Jamaica influences the younger ones a lot too. Because listening to 
like my younger cousin who listens to this Gaza bull crap,27 you know 
it’s all about – they have no respect for life or no value for life you 
know so they do things and say things and if you ask them do you 
really understand what you’re saying or not really? Or are you just 
saying it because it’s the Gaza way? You know what I’m saying? And 
that is aggravating and frustrating. 
Later in the discussion in response to the question ‘What do you think we should do 
about crime in Antigua and Barbuda?’ Heather explains: 
You have the television. You have BET,28 which is horrendous as well 
as MTV29 and things like that coming out, which are what – are what 
                                                
27 Doreen is referring to the infamous feud between two of Jamaica’s most popular dancehall music fraternities: Gaza, led by 
Adijah Palmer most popularly known as Vybez Kartel, and Gully, led by David Brooks, commonly referred to as Mavado. As one 
Jamaican journalist explains, ‘[t]he feud between Gaza and Gully has led to many distasteful and violent lyrical exchanges and 
recently sparked public condemnation in Jamaica when followers, including students, started acting out their criminal messages’ 
(see  http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/results/Police-promise-to-address-Gaza-Gully-feud). 
28 The Black Entertainment Television channel broadcast on Antgiuan and Barbudan cable television from the United States. 
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– is causing the kids – what is teaching the children what to do, what 
not to do, what’s cool, what’s not… 
Other participants make a more subtle point, more akin to arguments put forth 
by Edwin Sutherland, notwithstanding the fact that Sutherland believed contact with 
the media to be secondary to direct personal contact.  These participants claim that 
through cable television broadcast from North America, Antiguan and Barbudan youth 
are in constant contact with a North American value system – a value system that the 
participants perceive to produce an excess of definitions favourable toward 
criminality, a value system antithetical to their own.  For example, in the Lower Nevis 
Street discussion group, Cynthia asserts that crime is caused in part by ‘…tv playing 
the role of parents’. Cynthia further explains, ‘…things that they see on the television 
are not the things that are helping our children.  What they see is what they learn. Our 
values are not instilled in them’. In other words, Cynthia argues that the negative 
values and behaviours that Antiguan and Barbudan young people are learning from 
North American television are not being matched or exceeded by conventional 
Antiguan and Barbudan attitudes and behaviours (Siegel 2012).  Participants argue 
that one manifestation of this constant contact with North American values is an 
appetite for material possessions, which Antiguan and Barbudan youth quench by 
robbing and stealing.  In response to the prompt for the Faulty System frame, Terrance 
from the Darkwood Beach discussion group explains,  
Let me just say this though.  The thing is our youngsters – our youth, 
our young women and young men – are products of the electronic 
media too. [They are] of an instantaneous gratification mind set.  
Therefore, in many instances frustration sets in and rather than going 
the long tough route…with their unrealistic expectations, 
instantaneous expectations, they turn to crime.  And so, you know, it is 
also partly due to the mindset that there’s not a lot of pleasure and 
happiness and fulfilment in doing the task…So, they’re focused on the 
reward aspect of it.  That instant gratification and I think that’s also a 
big result of the electronic media. 
Participants in the Crosbies discussion group make a similar point: 
[In response to the question: What do we think should be done about 
crime in the Antigua and Barbuda?] 
 
Doreen: I would probably propose a lot of things. Ban foreign 
elements like cable TV. 
Indigo: That’s a huge factor, because then there are expectations.  
                                                                                                                                        
29 The Music Television channel broadcast on Antiguan and Barbudan cable television from the United States. 
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Doreen:   These kids they get get get then they want want want like 
what they see these kids on tv get and there are also some 
rude kids on those shows. 
 
II 
Poor Immigration Control 
The notion that immigration leads to increased crime rates has its roots in Shaw and 
McKay’s (1942) social disorganisation theory as well as Edwin Sutherland (1934) and 
Thorsten Sellin’s (1938) work on culture conflicts.  The notion is also supported, 
albeit less explicitly, by Merton’s (1938) reformulation of anomie theory.   Although 
all three theories have been discussed elsewhere in this study, a very brief explanation 
as to how each theory relates to immigration in particular is warranted. 
 Recall from chapter five that social disorganisation theory holds that crime is 
associated with rapid social change within urban communities. In spaces where there 
are very rapid shifts in population the by-product is often ethnic heterogeneity, which 
impedes communication and cooperation among distinct cultural groups (Lee et al. 
2001).  Moreover, residents in these spaces often see themselves as transient and do 
not take an interest in their surroundings or form bonds with their community.  This 
community apathy leads to social disorganisation, which is a breeding ground for 
moral dissensus, which in turn is a breeding ground for criminality (Williams 2012; 
Wirth 1940, 1931; Downes and Rock 2011).  As immigration is a significant driver of 
this type of social dislocation, many social disorganisation theorists argue that there is 
a positive relationship between crime and immigration (Reid et al. 2005).  While Shaw 
and McKay (1942) developed their theory with particular regard to city settings, other 
theorists discussed in chapter five argued that the theory could be generalised beyond 
city settings to nonmetropolitan and rural areas as well.  
Notwithstanding Sellin’s (1938) general proposition that conflicts of cultures 
are inevitable when the norms of one cultural area migrate to or come in contact with 
another, Sellin (1938) and other culture conflict theorists such as and Sutherland 
(1947) also suggest that certain types of crime are more prevalent among specific 
immigrant groups as a result of cultural traditions they bring with them from their 
home country. Sellin (1938: 68) offers as example the case of a Sicilian-American 
father’s killing of his 16-year-old daughter’s seducer. The father, surprised when he is 
arrested for the killing, claimed that he had ‘merely defended his family’s honor in a 
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traditional way’.  Similarly, Martinez and Lee (2000: 490) cite a study of Hawaii 
during the 1920s that revealed that ‘...Chinese immigrants brought with them 
traditions of certain types of graft and gambling’.  
Chapter five also explains that Merton reformulates anomie as a structural 
disjunction between culturally prescribed goals and socially prescribed means of 
attaining these goals.  In other words, anomie ensues when wealth and material gain 
are communicated to all members of society as cultural symbols of success yet 
legitimate opportunities to achieve these goals are not available to everyone. Although 
it does so less explicitly, a Mertonian understanding of anomie theory also supports 
the link between immigration and crime because immigrants, especially new 
immigrants, are often in positions of relative disadvantage vis-à-vis the native 
population.   Martinez and Lee (2000) point to the fact that scholars have widely 
acknowledged that new immigrants tend to settle in areas characterised by poverty, 
substandard housing, poor schools and high crime rates.  Accordingly, immigrants 
may turn to crime in order to overcome blocked economic opportunities.   Martinez 
and Lee (2000) also cite scholars who suggest that previously noncriminal immigrant 
groups may simply be ‘contaminated’ by the many criminal opportunities that exist in 
their neighbourhoods.  Thus, these scholars feel that: 
...immigrant criminality is more a function of pre-existing structural 
factors like poverty, a preponderance of young unattached males, or 
the availability of alcohol than either the biological makeup or cultural 
traditions of immigrant groups. (489) 
As newspaper articles lament the ‘unsavoury characters’ that migrate to 
Antigua and Barbuda and cite examples of certain crimes being associated with certain 
ethnicities; and, as discussion participants support the contention that most of Antigua 
and Barbuda’s crime is committed by non-nationals, traces of social disorganisation 
theory, culture conflict theory and anomie theory are apparent in Antigua and 
Barbuda’s newspaper and public discourse.  In much of this crime discourse, the 
solution proffered is severe limitation of the number of non-nationals allowed into the 
country -- especially those from Jamaica and Guyana.  The remainder of this section 
will examine the prevalence of the Poor Immigration Control frame in newspaper 
articles and peer group discussions. 
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Poor Immigration Control in the Newspaper 
Components of the Poor Immigration Control frame appear in 7.4 per cent of the 
newspaper articles included in this study. Each article displaying the frame supports 
one or more components of the frame’s components. Writers appear unanimously to 
support the fundamental premise that crime stems from poor immigration control.  
More nuanced than the straightforward argument that increased immigration leads to 
increased crime, however, the articles suggest that it is the type of immigrant allowed 
into Antigua and Barbuda that has a negative impact on crime. Most articles make this 
point explicitly while one article does so implicitly.  For example, a 1994 article 
expresses explicit concern that foreign-born persons of unsavoury character may have 
been responsible for a murder involving four victims: 
It is true that, wittingly or unwittingly, foreign persons of unsavory 
character from the Caribbean region and beyond have been let into our 
country and from time to time, have been allowed to rehabilitate 
themselves, to construct and conduct decent lives for their families 
and themselves.  Even if we have not been exactly enthusiastic about 
their presence among us, they have been permitted to carry on the 
business of ‘living’ provided they conduct themselves with due regard 
for the law, and respect for our institutions and our countrymen.  Such 
is the nature of our imperfect society.  But, even in this imperfect 
society there can be no solace, no room for foreign mercenaries, 
murderers, or those found guilty of crimes of moral turpitude. (5) 
Similarly, a 1995 editorial decries the presence of immigrants from the United States 
perceived to be of ill repute: 
Today we have in our midst a place called Mafia Hill30 where the 
scum of the earth, and the dregs of society reside in cool comfort, safe 
and secure from the clutches of the United States government and with 
all the full knowledge and connivance of those who govern us.  One of 
the persons who graced the portals of our ‘beloved’ Mafia Hill was 
indicted a few days ago in Philadelphia in the USA.  According to the 
Philadelphia Daily News of February 22, 1995, this resident of Mafia 
Hill has been indicted on a US$2 Million fraud charge, dealing with 
what has been described as an ‘advance fees scheme’. In the 
meantime, the man involved who has a criminal record in the United 
States, evidenced by criminal file in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, has been given, or is about to be given, a license to 
carry a firearm in Antigua and Barbuda. There are many respectable 
citizens in Antigua and Barbuda who have no criminal record but who 
have been denied a license to carry a firearm by the same policemen 
that are about to license this seedy criminal...Why are foreign 
criminals being given licenses to carry firearms? It would appear to us 
                                                
30 Mafia Hill is a name given by Antiguans and Barbudans to an area of Antigua, where a critical mass of ex-patriots settled upon 
arrival in Antigua and Barbuda.  Many of the ex-patriots were involved in high profile businesses and were alleged to have 
engaged in illegal activitiy. 
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that certain people within the government structure have, through their 
naiveté or innocence, have allowed some of the most unsavoury 
characters to enter our midst and, because of their political contacts, 
become instant big shots.  Trouble is, after everyone has received his 
payoff and cuts, these characters will have become so firmly 
entrenched in our society that they will no longer be subject to the will 
of the government, [because] they will be in a position to impose their 
will on us all by force of arms.  Licensed firearms. Of course! We are 
told that, on Mafia Hill, all the imports with strange-sounding names 
carry guns on their person and many of them even sport machine guns 
under their offshore betting services to United States residents from 
the safe distance of Antigua...If Ministers of Government can 
apparently give official sanction to gun-toting residents of Mafia Hill, 
it is no wonder that ordinary people appear to feel the need to equip 
themselves with guns also. Now that that has happened, we find 
ourselves in deep trouble. People are taking matters into their own 
hands and are equipping themselves with unlicensed firearms. People 
tend to follow example and if the example is to carry firearms, they 
certainly will do so. It is no wonder therefore that incidents such as the 
one that occurred yesterday31 may continue to happen. This trend will 
not change until such time as the government gives a clear indication 
that they will no longer tolerate the proliferation of firearms in this 
country. On no account should the folks at Mafia Hill be given firearm 
licenses and Police Commissioner Potter should be made to 
understand that. 
The one article that implicitly links ‘less than desirable’ immigrants with an increased 
crime rate reflects thinking akin to Sellin (1938) and Sutherland’s (1947) suggestion 
that certain types of crime are more prevalent among specific immigrant groups.  In a 
1999 article entitled ‘Guyanese Man Narrowly Escapes Deportation,’ the Chief 
Magistrate associates with Guyanese nationals the crime of receiving stolen goods as 
he proclaims, ‘I don’t have anything against Guyanese but it seems to me most of 
these crimes seem to involve Guyanese, and I am beginning to wonder why’ (The 
Daily Observer 2/16/1999: 6).   
  Many of the arguments made in support of the Poor Immigration Control 
frame are echoed in the peer group discussions.   
Poor Immigration Control in the Peer Group Discussions 
The overall performance of the Poor Immigration Control frame in peer group 
discussions is fiercely divided. Four out of ten discussions show strong support for the 
frame as participants unanimously agree with the contention that crime stems from 
poor immigration control and must therefore be thwarted by restricting the number of 
                                                
31 A Canadian tourist was shot on a beach in the southern part of the island on 24 February 1995 (see Antigua Observer article 
entitled ‘Canadian Tourist Shot Dead on Local Beach’ p. 1).   
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non-nationals that come into the country.  Across all discussion groups, 45 per cent of 
all participants share this view.  In all but one discussion, the enthusiasm that the 
participants have for the frame is evident by the fact that they spontaneously conjure 
the frame within the first three questions of the interview guide.  When the facilitator 
finally prompts the frame towards the end of the interview guide, the participants 
again show their zeal for the frame by interrupting the facilitator with proclamations 
such as, ‘I agree strongly. I overstrong agree!!’  ‘[I agree strongly] like 10 Million 
times! Jamaicans and Guyanese okay!’ or ‘Yes! That is so true!’  
Equally, in four out of ten discussions participants unanimously reject the Poor 
Immigration Control frame. Fifty-five per cent of all participants across all discussion 
groups share this view.  These participants are just as ardent in their rejection as those 
who support the frame are ardent in their support.  For example, in rejecting the frame 
a number of participants vociferously retort, ‘That is not a fair statement!’ or interrupt 
the facilitator to emphatically declare, ‘Disagree!’ or ‘Oh God!’ Like the Social 
Breakdown frame in chapter five, the reactions to this frame are palpable. Participants 
in the remaining two peer group discussions have a mixed reaction to the frame.  In 
these discussions, at least one group member articulates a cogent position contrary to 
the other group members when discussing the merits of the frame.  The majority of 
those who support the frame are under the age of 40 while the vast majority of those 
who reject the frame are over 40.  Of those who support the frame, most participants 
are between the ages of 18 and 29.  This finding seems counterintuitive as one might 
expect proponents of this frame to be demographically similar in age to proponents of 
the Foreign Cultural Influences.  After all, both frames contemplate exogenous 
influences felt to be deleterious.  However, the difference may lie in what each of the 
frames protect.  Foreign Cultural Influences argues that Antiguan and Barbudan 
culture must be protected, in part, from outside influences in the form of foreign 
television, the Internet, music and existing immigrants. In contrast, Poor Immigration 
Control argues that Antigua and Barbuda’s borders must be protected from people 
allowed into the country.  It may be the case that younger people are more comfortable 
with or less aware of possible effects of foreign television, the Internet and music, 
which have become mainstays of modern Antiguan and Barbudan life but feel more 
economically insecure and are therefore threatened by immigration.  There was no 
noticeable difference between those groups that had at least one non-national member 
and those that were comprised of strictly Antiguans. 
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Supportive Arguments 
Although Poor Immigration Control is the very last frame contemplated by the 
interview guide and its prompt among the last three questions, participants in all but 
one discussion supporting the frame spontaneously introduces it within the first three 
questions of the discussion.    And, when these participants spontaneously conjure the 
frame, they all make the same argument – increased immigration leads to increased 
crime.  For example, in response to the very first question, ‘To what extent do you 
think crime is an issue or a problem in your life,’ Toji, from the Darkwood Beach 
discussion group, explains that he now takes precautions ‘because there’s definitely 
been a raise in the level of crime around the country’.  Toji then diagnoses the 
perceived crime problem by surmising, ‘I think people feel like that has a lot to do 
with the um, relaxing of the immigration laws, the CSME.32  We’re not geared up for 
big island crime I would say’.   As Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana are the largest 
CARICOM countries and colloquially referred to as the ‘big islands,’ Toji is making a 
link between increased crime levels in Antigua and Barbuda and immigrants from 
these CARICOM countries.  The link between increased immigration and increased 
crime is thus the first supportive argument below. 
Supportive Argument 1: With Increased Immigration Comes Increased Crime 
During the Cassada Gardens peer group discussion, Pericles responds to the very first 
question, ‘To what extent do you think crime is an issue or a problem in your life,’ in 
much the same way Toji responded earlier.  Pericles asserts: 
Personally, I wouldn’t say that crime is not a problem.  I think there 
has been a big fundamental shift...um within – over – the past 20 
years, which I believe um, doesn’t necessarily have to do with, um, 
economic issues but mainly has to do with the demographic shift. 
When pressed on the meaning of ‘demographic shift,’ Pericles references ‘the influx 
of non-nationals’. Terms like ‘demographic shift’ and words like ‘cosmopolitan’ 
appear to be veiled references to increased immigration.  In the Lower Nevis Street 
discussion group, Sam responds to the Blocked Opportunities prompt arguing that 
crime has increased because ‘now we have a cosmopolitan society’.  When he is 
pressed on the meaning of cosmopolitan, Sam says in an exasperated tone, ‘People 
from all over the place in Antigua’.  With little regard for niceties or veiled references, 
                                                
32 CSME is the abbreviation for the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, which is an attempt by Caribbean governments to 
create one large market among the participating member states.  Among key elements of the CSME is free movement of labour.  
Such free movement has involved inter alia, ‘removing all obstacles to intra-regional movement of skills, labour and travel...’ 
(http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/single_market_index.jsp?menu=csme) 
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few peer group discussions were as direct and as clear as the Russell’s group.  In 
response to the third question of the interview guide, ‘Who do you think are 
committing these crimes,’ the group very quickly responded:  
Group: Russell’s  
Participants:  
Brock, a Black Antiguan human resources manager in his 30s  
Betty, a Black Antiguan accountant in her 20s 
Ashley, a White Antiguan landscape designer in her 20s 
Mary, a White Antiguan environment officer in her 20s 
Eryn, a Black Antiguan market officer in her 20s 
Eryn: Immigrants. 
Brock: Yardies. 
Ashley: Leave my Jamaicans alone. 
Brock:  And Guyanese. 
Ashley: I will not have that.  
Brock: Who tief your bag that night?33 
Eryn: It was a Yardie. 
Mary: To be honest, I think the majority are foreigners because they 
come, they don’t have jobs, they can’t get work permits, they 
are not getting paid, they don’t have money and therefore are 
almost forced to commit crimes... 
Beyond the fundamental contention with which all supporters of the frame 
agreed – that increased immigration leads to increased crime – participants argued 
both that current immigration laws do not contemplate the ‘quality’ of persons given 
permission to reside in the country and certain crimes are associated with certain 
immigrant groups.  Thus, in the peer group discussions in which at least one 
participant articulates a cogent position in favour of the Poor Immigration Control 
frame, the discourse mirrors that found in the newspaper.  Supportive arguments two 
and three further explore these points. 
Supportive Argument 2: We Get The Bottom Of The Barrel 
Many participants construct a hierarchy of sorts preferring some immigrants to others.  
Like the articles in the newspaper, these participants argue that it is also the type of 
immigrant allowed into Antigua and Barbuda that has a negative impact on the 
country’s crime rate.  The basic sentiment is the same as Ronald expresses in the 
Darkwood Beach discussion group, which appears in the epigraph of this chapter: 
...the immigrants that are coming from [Jamaica and Guyana] are the 
ones that are the bottom of their society. And, I hate to use that word 
                                                
33 Antiguan parlance for, ‘Who stole your bag that night?’ 
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but that seems to be true.  You’re not getting people who – the 
majority of them are not skilled and educated. 
In the Golden Grove discussion, Edy echoes Ronald’s view as she laments that, ‘as far 
as our immigration is concerned we bring in individuals who do not necessarily add 
value to the society’. The only other person in the Golden Grove group who supports 
the Poor Immigration Control frame, Annette champions Edy’s position by insisting:  
We get the bottom of the barrel...I’ve gone to Mona34 on stage and 
gotten into trouble for it. I tell them some of you lecturers should 
come to Antigua, because we have the bottom of the barrel, and send 
[the others] back. We’ll take a hundred of you and send back all that 
are there now. At least I know you all will contribute and pay [your] 
tax.  
However, in making this argument, many participants point out that undesirable 
immigrants also come from the United States and Europe.  Consider the example 
below from the Crosbies discussion group in response to the Poor Immigration Control 
prompt: 
Group: Crosbies  
Participants:  
Patrick, a Syrian/Lebanese Antiguan retiree in his 60s  
Indigo, a White Antiguan archivist in her 50s 
Heather, an Antiguan student in her 20s who racially identifies as 
‘other’ 
Doreen, a Syrian/Lebanese cake decorator in her 20s 
 
Patrick: [Agree] strongly. 
Doreen: And Santo Domingans35. And they love a knife, boy.  And 
cutlass. 
Indigo: But it’s just so easy for them to falsify police records and 
just come in here and start fresh. 
Facilitator: So, are you saying then that you think that we’ll have a 
decrease in crime if we had more stringent immigration 
controls in place? 
Indigo: I think so... 
Patrick: It’s gone so far now that we escort them here. 
Doreen: The same way that people have to pay so much money 
even to go to the United States I think there should be 
some sort of immigration policy like that here.  Just 
because I think Antigua has been so taken advantage of.  
Not with just people from Guyana and Jamaica but even 
rich people like Mr. Stanford or like people from all over 
Europe who come here and do what they want and nobody 
troubles them.  Nobody does anything about it.  And they 
do a lot of things that you would never even think they 
                                                
34 A Reference to The University of the West Indies, Mona campus located in Jamaica. 
35 Antiguans and Barbudans typically call all those who are from the Dominican Republic Santo Domingans  
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were doing.  Look at Jonathan with the whole child 
pornography thing. What happen to him with that? 
Nothing. 
Responding to the same prompt, participants in the Russell’s peer group discussion 
make a related point: 
Group: Russell’s  
Eryn: But it’s not just Jamaicans and Guyanese 
Ashley: Dominicans tief nuh rass too you know36 
Eryn: Exactly 
Brock:  I think they need to... not saying that you don’t want to let people in 
but... 
Mary: I think that the point of that is that when you have poor immigration 
policies and they’re trying to change them not for the better but for 
some other shit37 – I think when you have poor immigration policies 
and you bring in people or they come in illegally – however, and they 
can’t get jobs legally then [they] turn to crime. 
Ashley: See I was like baffled with that idea, that they should – like 
when they start letting people into the country – high school 
diplomas and all that should be taken into account. But then at 
the same time it’s not like the States 38  where they do 
background checks and all that kind of stuff on you. They 
should but they don’t and I don’t think they ever will.  
Mary: But they can’t. 
Brock: And then I hear the people and them from Jamaica lie about them stuff 
too.  
Betty: It needs to be a Caribbean wide thing all the different islands are like 
connected and honestly sharing information. 
Notwithstanding Ashley’s comment in the excerpt above, that Dominicans also tend to 
steal, participants suggest that immigrants from neighbouring Eastern Caribbean 
countries such as Montserrat, Dominica and St. Kitts are perfectly acceptable and they 
exclude them from definitions of ‘foreigner’.  In the Cedar Valley discussion group 
when asked explicitly why immigrants from the Eastern Caribbean are any different 
from Jamaican or Guyanese immigrants, the following below captures the general 
sentiment: 
Group: Cedar Valley  
 
Toya: Oh, they’re quiet people.  
                                                
36 Antiguan parlance for, ‘Dominicans steal a lot also’. 
37 Mary is alluding to popular conceptions or speculations that during when national elections are called certain political parties 
relax the immigration laws for CARICOM nationals seeking residence in Antigua and Barbuda so that they are eligible to vote in 
Antigua and Barbuda’s elections.  
38 A reference to the United States. 
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Regine: Because we’ve always accepted them.  Montserratians? 
They’re like Antiguans.  St. Lucians? They’ve been 
coming to New Winthorpes village since I was a little girl. 
Toya: The Dominicans, you’re not going to hear them.   
Precious: Oh no, they’re different. St. Lucians... 
Facilitator: So there is this hierarchy then of immigrants such that 
there are certain immigrants that are better than others? 
Toya: Yeah, yeah. Exactly. 
Regine:  Of course, anywhere.  
Toya: [It’s] by their actions. By their actions. 
Precious:  Yeah, definitely. 
Supportive Argument 3: Certain Immigrants Commit Certain Crimes 
As cavalierly as Doreen says that Santo Domingans love a knife and a cutlass and 
Ashley exclaims Dominicans ‘tief nuh rass,’ participants showing support for the 
frame associate certain crimes with certain nationalities.  Like the Chief Magistrate in 
the newspaper article discussed earlier in this chapter, participants associate Guyanese 
immigrants with theft and property crime.  Additionally, participants associate 
Jamaican and Guyanese immigrants with more violent crime such as robbery and rape, 
immigrants from Spanish speaking countries with theft and misappropriation of 
services and ‘non-nationals’ collectively with prostitution.  The excerpts below are 
illustrative.  
Group: Darkwood Beach  
Participants:  
Ronald, a Black Antiguan educator in his 50s  
Toji, a White Antiguan online gaming operator in his 30s 
Terrance, a Black Antiguan dental surgeon in his 50s 
Franklin, a Black Antiguan heavy equipment operator in his 20s 
Arnelle, a Black Antiguan banker in her 50s 
 
Arnelle: One of the reasons I think the rape has reduced in the last 
year, maybe nine months is because the recognized type of 
violence leading up to the rape was of a particular nature 
and they have recognized it to be Guyanese and they have 
tapped into that ring and have sent them home. 
Toji: Did they reckon that it was one person?  
Arnelle: No. 
Ronald: But why send them home and not prosecute them? 
Arnelle: But, why feed them here? Why feed them in our jail? 
Ronald: No, but I mean if somebody has committed a crime and you 
have the evidence it seems to me that they would prosecute 
them and...that’s what I’m asking, was this proved or did 
they just deport them. 
Arnelle: The types of things they were doing to the ladies they could 
identify them with the type of things that were happening in 
Guyana and they tapped into a particular ring of Guyanese 
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people with soldier background and they have actually sent 
them home.  
Toji: Certainly that string of rapes all had the same 
characteristics. 
Terrance: My concern with um, I think the foreigners though, right, 
they are they have borne the brunt of the accusations about 
crime. My concern with them is not so much the violent 
crime and I concur that that rape situation seemed to have 
come out of somebody with some sort of military 
background some sort of awareness of how crimes are 
perpetuated. But I think in terms of the foreigners, my big 
concern is the blue-collar crime that they perpetuate.  For 
instance you put them, you employ them, and wherever they 
can use their position to create profit for themselves they do 
it...I do see that the Guyanese in particular are very, very 
overt to doing committing such crime. I would never – I 
personally would never employ a Guyanese and put them in 
any position responsible for my stock my cash or any 
valuables whatsoever. I mean. I say that and I have the 
greatest respect for my fellow Caribbean men and sisters 
and I personally, I have been an immigrant in another 
country and I understand that immigrants are motivated 
people and over the years the immigrants who have come to 
Antigua have greatly contributed like they have done to any 
society because of what they bring right. However, I have a 
serious problem with the type of immigrants that we’ve 
been getting on our shores in the last 4 5 7 8 years right. 
 
Group: Cedar Valley  
 
Toya:  ...there are some of the crimes that we know – that you can almost 
tell – that unfortunately comes from Jamaica or Guyana or what 
have you. 
Oliveen: Jamaicans do a lot of hold up.39  
Regine: They’re thieves. Because they have to live. Not to jump 
but there’s another situation that’s on the rise as well that 
I’m told about. Especially the Spanish community where 
um a friend of mine has a Spanish girlfriend. The Spanish 
girlfriend’s mother lives in the Spanish territory...Santo 
Domingo. The girlfriend goes to a Spanish doctor here in 
Antigua who gives her a prescription because she’s like 
on the books, she’s paying medical, social and stuff like 
that. She gets the prescription and she goes to fill it at 
medical benefits every month. She doesn’t have the 
disease. She sends it home to her mother. Every month. 
Well, in a way, maybe she’s entitled to the drugs if she 
has that illness because she’s contributing to the scheme 
but she’s not, you know – 
Toya: There’s a lot of white-collar crime but go ahead, finish. 
                                                
39 Hold up is a reference to robbery. 
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Regine:  These people who we seem to be allowing in the country, 
they’re not contributing to the economy. 
Oliveen: A lot of them take out more than what they contribute. 
Regine: An example is like having a balloon.  You just keep 
stuffing it with water it’s going to pop. 
[Later in the transcript:] 
Oliveen: Me have some Guyanese live side me and me know they 
commit crime and they tief and me report them to the 
police. And police catch them and when the police come 
to them one day they carry the police show the police the 
wrong house and tell them it’s a wrong house. 
Toya: But then again...too, part of it is a lot of the police officers 
are non-Antiguans. 
Oliveen: Me love to tell them a go back home. 
Precious: I talk to my radio every day. Ya’ll go home. Everyday me 
talk to the radio. Ya’ll go home. They need to go home. 
Oliveen: Let me explain something to you. They have some 
Guyanese police they are the scampish thing you ever find 
in the police force. Me actually catch one a tief the woman 
gas tank one night. Hurricane nuh.  
Regine:  Police? 
Precious: Guyanese are the worst you know. 
Oliveen: A me friend. He go to tek one TV from Courts.40 And 
Courts bailiff a look for the [police man] for the TV 
because he nah pay for the TV. A plenty crime he do 
nuh...And Courts’ bailiff chat and he say something and 
he say how the man say something – somebody take the tv 
or the tv a gone to Guyana. Me say, he lie. The tv over 
there in the house. Because me know the tv inside because 
me min in...he say how you know? Me say because me 
min dey yesterday. The tv inside there go for the tv. Me 
ketch he with the pliers at cut off the woman gas tank 
Precious: You see you can’t trust these people for real though. 
[Later in the transcript:] 
Facilitator: So is it from personal experiences...why you know? 
Oliveen: All that.  Then they park up car between Corn Alley and 
so and make people knock their car fa get insurance 
money 
Toya: Oh, that’s another thing that’s rampant in Antigua. 
Oliveen: Police me say! 
Toya: ...And back to the crimes, a lot of the type of crimes are 
strictly not Antiguan. The car situation. We never knew 
anything about stealing cars and changing number plates 
and so forth. 
Precious: Hijack – and hijacking car and all that kind of nonsense. 
                                                
40 Oliveen is referring to Courts, which is the Caribbean´s largest furniture, appliance and electrical retailer.  Courts operates 93 
department stores across 11 Caribbean countries. 
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Toya: Yeah. You know? And that we can say, that’s been 
imported. Yes. That’s imported. You know? The daylight 
robberies. Before you would hear of a robbery, but it’s 
late at night people are sleeping. Now you know, you’re 
like, wait a minute, this is high daytime. 
Regine: Like a gas station robbery and so when people gone home.  
You know? But now? 
Precious:  Because they’re bold.  
Toya: Yeah. And those I can tell you are non-Antiguans. 
Antiguans don’t do them kind of robberies. 
In describing the ways in which he believes that poor immigration control leads to 
crime, Pericles introduces the topic of prostitution in the Cassada Gardens peer group 
discussion:   
Group: Cassada Gardens  
Participants:  
Pericles, a Black Antiguan consultant in his 40s  
Senaa, a Black Antiguan executive secretary in her 50s 
Dawn, a Black Antiguan district officer in her 30s 
John, a Black Antiguan personal/administrative assistant in his 20s 
Pericles:  [Poor immigration control] leads to other criminal 
activities. For example, you know, um, women um, giving 
sexual favours to men in terms of um – 
Senaa: yep...getting their status regularized   
Facilitator: So, then would you say there’s a sort of um, underground 
prostitution then? I mean is that what you’re suggesting? 
That there are people who – that there are women who 
will sleep with an immigration officer –  
Group:  Yeah! Yeah that happens of course. 
Facilitator: And how prevalent do you think that is? 
Senaa: On a scale of one to ten, ten being the highest, hmm.... 
five maybe between five and six 
Pericles: You think it is that high? But there is that connection in 
terms of – especially when they are not in a position to 
pay the cash. I’ve seen some of it reported in the papers if 
I’m not mistaken. 
Dawn: You also hear them talk about it too. 
Pericles: They talk about it? 
Senaa: Yeah, they actually say it. You know, these non-nationals 
they nuh easy nuh. They barefaced nuh [choops]41 
Pericles: You know some of them are directly imported in the 
country just for that – at the established brothels. You 
haven’t come across that in your reading? 
Facilitator: I’ve come across speculation. 
Pericles: Speculation? 
                                                
41 According to the Dictionary of Caribbean English Usage edited by Richard Allsopp and Jeannette Allsopp, ‘choops’ is ‘an 
imitative word representing the sound of sucking the teeth’.  Antiguans and Barbudans choops in order to show annoyance or 
disgust.  Including Senaa’s choops in the transcript is important in conveying the level of her annoyance or disgust with what she 
appears to perceive as the shamelessness of non-nationals. An alternative spelling for choops is ‘chuptz’. 
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Senaa: It’s a fact! 
Pericles: I don’t know how you’ve missed it in the papers, for 
example, the way they pick up these people who are 
connected with these brothels. Especially the one that was 
burned down on Fort Road, um, most of them, a lot of them 
were illegal –  
Senaa: They were imported... 
Pericles: ...and then there is the other underground portion. Um, 
because I remember I had a neighbour [who was renting a 
house]. I always remember that one because she was a very 
beautiful lady and one day I asked [the owner of the house] 
where she was. And she was saying ‘Oh! I had to trow she 
out42 because um, she had the little girl up there and when 
one man inside the bedroom, one a wait pon the gallery,43 
and the car them lining up and the Antiguan bringing them 
a whole pay check and just giving to her’. She was a 
Jamaican but the other lady who had rented the place was a 
Vincentian but she had been living here for some time. But 
the [homeowner] had come from Jamaica and she had took 
her in...I notice I used to see some activities there but I 
didn’t understand what was actually happening. 
Senaa: People sick eh? These men. Oh Lord! Antiguan men... 
Pericles: These things do happen. [We] laugh but I mean... I’m sure 
you can get some of these guys – I don’t hang on the block 
as much but I’m sure some of these guys will tell you these 
things. 
A similar point is made by Edy during the Golden Grove discussion:  
First of all, I don’t know if we want to say that they’re Guyanese and 
they’re Jamaicans.  That I don’t know.  But, I do think that there is one 
part of our society where the majority of those individuals are non-
nationals and I’m talking about the houses of prostitution.  The 
majority – 99.9% of them – are non-nationals, and that is creating a 
problem. 
Even participants who adamantly refute the Poor Immigration Control frame make 
casual connections between certain immigrants and certain crimes.  For example, in 
the Longford discussion Jaquel connects immigrants from Spanish speaking countries 
with auto theft as she casually mentions, ‘...we have a large population of [Spanish 
residents] and the trend is now that they are fairly good on auto theft’. Additionally, a 
number of these participants reluctantly concede as Pericles does, that ‘what I would 
agree strongly on – I believe we can put a dent in the crime if we took our 
immigration laws um, if we took them into serious consideration’. 
                                                
42 Antiguan parlance for, ‘throw her out’. 
43 Antiguan parlance for, ‘one was waiting on the verandah’  
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Rebuttal Arguments 
Although only four peer group discussions unanimously reject the Poor Immigration 
Control frame, more than half of the participants across all groups reject the frame. 
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the arguments participants proffer in 
rebuttal.  The first argument discussed is the most prevalent. In every group in which 
at least one member rejects the frame, the participants argued that Antiguans are 
responsible for Antigua and Barbuda’s crime situation.  Some participants making this 
claim contend that the statistics are likely to disprove the frame and others point to the 
fact that the vast majority of those imprisoned are Antiguan and Barbudan. 
Irrespective of the way in which they make the argument, participants blame the media 
for distorting reality by giving the impression that non-nationals are disproportionately 
committing crimes.   The remaining argument that participants make in refuting the 
Poor Immigration Control frame focuses on the nationalities singled out in the frame 
as they argue that it is unfair to single out Jamaican and Guyanese immigrants.   
Rebuttal Argument 1: It’s Mainly The Locals Who Are Into Crime 
Participants who reject the claim that crime stems from poor immigration control 
disagree vehemently with the frame’s proposition that most of the crime that occurs in 
Antigua and Barbuda is committed by non-nationals. These participants challenge the 
frame’s underlying premise that immigrants cost Antigua and Barbuda more than they 
contribute, arguing that immigrants are hardworking and in search of opportunity.  
According to Donald: 
I think that the non-nationals...come here and most of them are here to 
work, to find a job somewhere.  Most of them are not here – yeah, 
there are a few who get caught up but when they get caught up they 
are with Antiguans, you don’t find them doing it by themselves...to 
say something like [the frame’s prompt], I strongly disagree with that. 
Additionally, every participant rejecting the frame argues that immigrants are simply a 
scapegoat – it is mainly Antiguans and Barbudans who commit crime. Janet’s 
comments, which she makes in the Redcliffe Street discussion, are illustrative:  
...when you really check it out it’s the Antiguans themselves who are 
doing it. And, they blaming the Jamaicans and Guyanese but when 
you get the real information it’s the Antiguans who are doing it. 
Because I’m not saying that the Jamaicans and the Guyanese and the 
non-nationals – some of them have their ways, yes – but sometimes 
certain things happen and because of their trend they get blamed for it 
when – whereas – it’s the Antiguans that are doing it. 
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The excerpt below from the Blue Waters discussion is similarly illustrative: 
Group: Blue Waters 
Elbee: I’m going to tell you something...Bolivar has that 
experience from the Bahamas.  [They complain] crime, 
crime, and they blaming the foreigners, until they started 
catching the people involved and they were local 
Bahamians.  And, I think it’s the same thing here. 
Lynn: It’s mainly the locals who are into crime.    
Bolivar: I have said that.  You might have a few but it’s going to be 
mainly locals. 
To support their contention that immigrants are unfairly blamed for the country’s 
crime situation, participants point to official police statistics and the number of 
Antiguan and Barbudans currently incarcerated.  Consider the excerpts below:  
Group: Golden Grove  
Nadine: What are the statistics to actually say that is so...I challenge 
the statistics, that it’s actually so and while there is a harmful 
effect I think on some of the other cultures on Antiguan 
society, I don’t question that.  I can’t say that some of the 
horrendous crimes we have been hearing about ought to be 
attributed to non-nationals. 
Deege: Most of the non-nationals I know are just like me.  They 
want an opportunity to work, to earn, to mind their families 
and make their life better. I would say that 99% of them are 
like that. 
Nicola:  That you know. 
Deege:  Yes, I said 99% of them that I know. 
Neicy: I think they are just people. People are just people. 
Deege:  I think there is the same percentage of criminal element 
among immigrants as there probably is among Antiguans.   
Annette: I would disagree with that completely. 
Edy: I’m going to disagree with you. 
Deege: OK. Wait I not finished. The reason I say that is because I 
have been an immigrant right. And I know the purposes for 
which I immigrated and I believe that the same purposes 
apply here. And, most of the immigrants that I know and I 
can only speak for the those I know – maybe the bag run skip 
away from me – right? They want an opportunity.   
In the Longford peer group discussion Wayne confirms Nadine’s suspicion. As a 
police officer in his 30s, Wayne speaks from his knowledge of official crime statistics: 
Nearly all of the prison population are Antiguans.  Nearly all the 
murders committed in Antigua are by Antiguans.  For the year we 
have three murders committed.  One is a Dominican and the others are 
Antiguans. 
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The obvious question that emerges with respect to this frame is why? Why 
might some Antiguans and Barbudans blame immigrants for the perceived increase in 
crime? In two discussion groups the participants blame the media for perpetuating this 
notion.  For example, in Redcliffe Street peer group discussion Lavern says, ‘we can 
work the ratio out. You always hear [on the radio] Guyanese national or Jamaican but 
when you don’t hear anything they come from Antigua’.  Lavern’s fellow group 
member Judy adds, ‘...sometimes Antiguans do things and you never see it in the 
papers’.  Additionally, participants in the Blue Waters discussion adamantly believe 
that the main perpetrators of this notion are first-generation Antiguan and Barbudans 
and recent immigrants themselves.  Bolivar says: 
...I came to this realisation when I was living in Bahamas, 
right...people who tend to perpetuate this type of thing are the children 
of non-nationals...I have never seen people hate non-nationals more 
than the children of non-nationals.  I saw it in Bahamas when I was 
there. The Bahamians who came from Bajans.  Their fathers and 
mothers were Bajans and Grenadians and so, hated Haitians and 
Jamaicans and non-nationals.  Hated them with a passion. [I] saw 
it...We have friends who are not from [Antigua and Barbuda] and they 
will make statements like, you know since all them Jamaicans and so 
come here the place just gone bad.  Why? 
Bolivar continues to say, ‘What I’m really getting at is the immigrant who comes here 
for a better life and after they have made it, no others must comer here for a better 
life’. 
Rebuttal Argument 2: It’s Unfair To Say Especially Those From Jamaica and 
Guyana 
In constructing the prompt for the Poor Immigration Control frame, I deliberately 
emphasised Jamaican and Guyanese nationals as examples of the most problematic 
immigrants. I chose these two nationalities because in my preliminary research 
Jamaicans and Guyanese were most often associated with crime and I was interested in 
the reaction of peer group discussion participants to this association.  In two peer 
group discussions participants argue that it is unfair to singly out Jamaicans and 
Guyanese.  The statements Malcolm and Renee make are illustrative.  Malcolm 
asserts: 
It is not a fair statement.  As Sam said, it’s that Antigua has become a 
cosmopolitan country.  We have persons from various nationalities.  
And, so it’s not a fair statement.  Yes, we know that coming out of 
Jamaica they have a record of you know, being involved in violent 
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crimes and all of that.  We have – yes, we have some influence from 
those islands – but we have from other Caribbean islands also.  So, it’s 
not a fair statement because within the prison we have Vincentians 
there for drug offences, and others. So, it’s not quite a fair statement. 
Similarly, Renee explains: 
I have been doing prison ministry for a number of years – over 10 
years since I’m in Antigua.  And, um, they – what they call it – the 
statistics of foreigners in the prison, you might be surprised.  I 
remember at one time there was – it was in the papers where they were 
talking about how many Guyanese  was in the prison at the time.  How 
many Jamaicans, how many Trinidadians.  I think it was around the 
time when they have the Columbians they catch on a boat was there.  
And, I don’t even think they had 10 Guyanese and 10 Jamaicans. 
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III 
 
Summary 
Components of the Foreign Cultural Influences frame appear in just over 10 per cent 
of the newspaper articles included in the study while components of the Poor 
Immigration Control frame appear in just over seven per cent. It seems that journalists 
and newspaper commentators are slightly more comfortable with the idea that 
exogenous influences are creeping into Antigua and Barbuda and having a deleterious 
effect on the society than they are with the idea that immigrants are at the root of the 
country’s crime situation.  Notwithstanding this slight difference neither exogenous 
criminogenic influences nor increased immigration are particularly popular themes in 
the newspaper’s crime discourse.  In this respect newspaper coverage contrasted with 
the views expressed in the peer group discussions. 
Both the Foreign Cultural Influences and Poor Immigration Control frames 
were more popular among peer group discussion participants than they were in the 
newspaper coverage although the Poor Immigration Control frame enjoys less unified 
support.  Notwithstanding the fact that the Foreign Cultural Influences frame emerged 
organically from the analysis, unprompted by the interview guide, the frame is 
triggered in over three-quarters of the discussion groups. On the other hand, with four 
discussion groups supporting the frame and four rejecting it, the Poor Immigration 
Control frame is as fiercely contested in the discussions as it is supported.    Even in 
the remaining two peer group discussions, where participants have a mixed response 
to the Poor Immigration Control frame, the reactions are palpable.  The crime 
discourse emerging from the discussions thus suggests that while Antiguans and 
Barbudans may be wary of foreign influences they deem criminogenic, the biggest 
concern is not a causal connection between increased immigration and increased crime.  
Indeed, 54 per cent of all participants in the study reject this causal connection.  These 
participants argue that Antiguans and Barbudans are responsible for the vast majority 
of crime, as evidenced by the number of Antiguans and Barbudans incarcerated and 
official police data.  A smaller percentage of participants argue that the frame’s 
assertion that it is especially Jamaicans and Guyanese who are responsible for the 
country’s crime situation unfairly stigmatises these nationalities. 
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 Instead, the biggest concerns seem to surround criminal deportees and the 
perceived tendency for Antiguans and Barbudans to adopt foreign values.  
Additionally, participants exhibit angst with respect to the type of immigrants granted 
permission to live in the country.  This angst is captured not only by the Poor 
Immigration Control frame but also by the Criminal Culture frame discussed in the 
next chapter. The next chapter, which focuses on Governance, Crime, Culture and 
Control, will discuss in greater detail the fact that even participants who 
wholeheartedly reject the Poor Immigration Control frame express concern that 
immigration officers are breaking immigration rules by allowing people into the 
country who would be otherwise ineligible to permanently reside in the country.  
While these participants do not think immigrants are the root of the country’s crime 
problem, they accuse immigration officers of a corruption they feel is endemic in 
Antigua and Barbuda. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GOVERNANCE, CRIME, CULTURE AND 
CONTROL 
‘But I do believe that people who are thinking about crime in this country regard the 
police force as such a total joke that it motivates them – why not? Because the risk of 
[you] getting caught is almost zero unless you’re a complete idiot...’  
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  
 ‘And I guess what I’m hinting at here is that we have a very corrupt society, right. 
And, a lot of the businessmen are involved in fraudulent transactions and the drug 
trade – whether it’s drugs, whether it’s arms, whether it’s defrauding the government 
of it’s revenue, right. And, therefore you end up with a class in society that projects 
serious wealth...so it’s a message that we as a society sending out to the youth, they 
not looking at the doctor who struggled and did his do and now can come back and 
buy his vehicle and build his house what have you.  They’re looking at the classmate 
of theirs who didn’t go anywhere and he’s making money hand over fist and he’s not 
even in the league of the doctor – he’s way ahead of the doctor, so why I need to 
emulate [the doctor]? I need to emulate that big man and that big man is one of the 
biggest crime lords in the island’. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the last of the three major themes emerging from the analysis 
– Governance, Crime, Culture, and Control. The data suggest that a significant number 
of newspaper articles and focus group participants are sceptical of the criminal justice 
system proclaiming that it is antiquated, inefficient, corrupt and in dire need of reform.  
Moreover, a number of newspaper articles and focus group participants argue for 
either increased police presence or stiffer penalties, or both.   Additionally, the data 
reveal sentiments that Antigua and Barbuda has a ‘criminal culture’.  That is, people 
are thought to happily cut corners and commit seemingly victimless crimes such as 
misappropriating government resources, including water and electricity. This chapter 
is thus organised around two distinct frames: Criminal Culture and Faulty System. 
 Rooted in Edwin Sutherland’s differential association, section I of this chapter 
articulates the various components of the Criminal Culture frame, discusses its 
theoretical underpinnings and reports the frequency with which these components 
appear in newspaper articles and peer group discussions. Similarly, section II traces 
the roots of the Faulty System frame back to the 18th century classical criminology 
built around the reformist ideas of Cesare Becarria and Jeremy Bentham.   
Additionally, the section articulates the various components of the frame and reports 
the frequency with which these components appear in newspaper articles as well as 
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peer group discussions. Lastly, in section III I will summarise the findings of the two 
frames and discuss their implications.  
 As the Criminal Culture frame emerged from the data organically, this chapter 
is most similar in style and structure to chapter six.  Like the Foreign Cultural 
Influences frame in chapter six, the facilitator did not prompt the Criminal Culture 
frame in any way during the course of the peer group discussions nor did the interview 
guide contemplate any of the frame’s components.  It was only after careful analysis 
of the transcripts of each discussion and discovering the nuances with respect to the 
ways in which the participants discussed both the Faulty System and the Poor 
Immigration Control frames that the frame was constructed and its presence coded. 
 
II 
Criminal Culture 
The Criminal Culture frame posits that crime stems from excessive contact with 
systems and authorities that send pro-crime messages. According to the frame, when 
there is widespread corruption among government officials and in government 
institutions, when police officers and politicians break the law and when the justice 
system treats people differently based on who they are and who they know, people feel 
justified in cutting corners and breaking the law themselves.  Therefore, the solution to 
Antigua and Barbuda’s crime problem, according to the frame, lies in a transparent 
justice system that treats everyone equally irrespective of wealth or status and rooting 
out corruption in all of its forms.  Integral to this frame are notions of legitimacy and 
procedural justice.  On some level, the Criminal Culture frame appears to have much 
in common with the Faulty System frame discussed in section II of this chapter. After 
all, the premise of both frames suggests systemic failures of the criminal justice 
system.  For example, the logical conclusion of the assertions made by the Criminal 
Culture frame does seem to point to a fundamental failure to apprehend and punish 
offenders.  And, like the Faulty System frame, the Criminal Culture frame suggests 
that offenders know they can do whatever they want to do and get away with it.  But, 
the umbrella idea that the criminal justice system is a systemic failure obscures 
essential aspects of the Criminal Culture frame.  The Criminal Culture frame is less 
about poor detection and lenient punishment and more about an atmosphere conducive 
to and supportive of even the most seemingly benign criminal activity. The very name 
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of the frame emerged from the excerpt below taken from the Golden Grove peer group 
discussion in which Deege and Anne discuss what criminal behaviour actually means 
in an Antiguan and Barbudan context.  Deege points to a man nearby who appears to 
be misappropriating water at a government building, on a Saturday, to wash a 
privately owned vehicle: 
Group: Golden Grove  
 
Deege: Like I wonder if this man using government water to wash 
his car, wonder who authorise him to come up here and use 
public utilities, you know?  
Anne: But, there is that, but that seems to be a – I really don’t look 
at that as crime as much as culture in Antigua and Barbuda. 
Deege:  But, it’s a crime.  
Anne:  But here, I look at it as it seems to be the culture of the place. 
Deege: Maybe it is, so we have a criminal culture. 
Anne: People abuse those things. 
Deege: I think we have a criminal culture but we don’t recognise 
it...I feel like we have a criminal mentality in...our 
expectation.  Anywhere else it would be a crime. 
Similarly, at first glance the Criminal Culture frame appears to overlap somewhat with 
the Poor Immigration Control frame discussed in chapter six. The overlap is most 
glaring where peer group discussion participants exhibit angst with respect to the type 
of immigrants granted permission to live in the country. However, coding such 
discourse to the Poor Immigration Control frame would be analytically imprecise 
because the concern is not that immigrants are the root of the country’s crime problem, 
it is that immigration officers are breaking immigration laws by allowing people into 
the country who would be otherwise ineligible to permanently reside in the country.  
Participants accuse immigration officers of corruption they feel is endemic in Antigua 
and Barbuda. It is this corruption that fits squarely in the ambit of the Criminal Culture 
frame.  Thus, the Criminal Culture frame is more about an environment of lawlessness 
and people doing whatever they need to do in order to get by.  The frame is a about the 
myriad pro-crime definitions that are thought to abound in Antigua and Barbuda.  At 
the core of this frame is Edwin Sutherland’s differential association.  Discussed in 
chapter six, differential association holds that people turn to crime ‘...if learned 
antisocial values and behaviours are not at least matched or exceeded by conventional 
attitudes and behaviours’ (Siegel 2012: 238).  Stephen Jones (2013: 96) explains 
further that: 
A person who is exposed to ‘an excess of definitions favourable to 
violation of the law over definitions unfavourable to violation of the 
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law’ is likely to become a criminal.  The likelihood is determined by 
variations in the frequency, duration, priority and intensity of the 
associations.    
 
In addition to differential association, the Criminal Culture frame reflects elements of 
neutralisation theory, which is a theory most closely associated with Sykes and Matza 
(1957) and Matza (1964).  Neutralisation theory holds that offending behaviour is not 
rooted in a deeply oppositional morality but that offenders master techniques that 
enable them to neutralise conventional values and drift back and forth between 
illegitimate and conventional behaviour. The theory suggests that offenders are able to 
navigate effortlessly the terrain between legality and illegality, in part, because of 
‘subterranean values’ or morally tinged influences entrenched in the culture, which 
exist alongside conventional values (Siegel 2012).  While these subterranean values 
may be condemned in public, they may be admired or practiced in private.  Sykes and 
Matza (1957: 668) argue that one of the ways in which offenders neutralise 
conventional values is by ‘condemning the condemners’ or ‘rejecting the rejectors’.  
Put simply, Siegel (2012: 242) explains that: 
[a]n offender views the world as a corrupt place with a dog-eat-dog 
code.  Because police and judges are on the take, teachers show 
favortism, and parents take out their frustrations on their kids, it is 
ironic and unfair for these authorities to condemn his or her 
misconduct. 
Moreover, Sykes and Matza (1957: 668) argue: 
[t]he rewards of conformity – such as material success – become a 
matter of pull or luck, thus decreasing still further the stature of those 
who stand on the side of the law-abiding. The validity of this 
jaundiced viewpoint is not so important as its function in turning back 
or deflecting the negative sanctions attached to violations of the 
norms. The delinquent, in effect, has changed the subject of the 
conversation in the dialogue between his own deviant impulses and 
the reactions of others; and by attacking others, the wrongfulness of 
his own behavior is more easily repressed or lost to view.  
Although neutralisation theory does not apply to this study in ways that it would if 
offenders had been interviewed and given the opportunity to rationalise their own 
behaviour, conceptual arguments inherent in the theory are helpful to understanding 
Antigua and Barbuda’s crime discourse.   The sentiment that this frame captures is 
systemic failings potentially release people from social norms and gives them 
permission to offend. In making this argument, some of the frame’s proponents 
reference a popular Antiguan adage, ‘if the top is slack, the middle and the bottom 
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can’t be tight’. The remainder of this section examines the prevalence of the Criminal 
Culture frame in newspaper articles and peer group discussions.  
Criminal Culture in the News 
Components of the Criminal Culture frame appear in 13 per cent of the newspaper 
articles included in this study.  All the articles displaying the frame endorse all of its 
components.  Where the Criminal Culture frame is conjured, writers argue that crime 
stems from contact with pro-crime messages sent by law breaking politicians, 
government officials, the prime minister and the police.   To the extent that leaders in 
society are breaking the law, it is held to be unsurprising that others follow their 
example.  In a 1995 article entitled ‘Commentary on Crimes of Violence,’ the author 
accuses the Prime Minister and politicians from both political parties of sanctioning 
violence and rejects the idea that they can effecitvely eradicate the crime problem.  In 
other words, for this author politicians cannot be a part of the solution if they are part 
of the problem: 
Unhappily, we are reluctant to call upon the politicians to join our 
national appeal for a national renunciation and repudiation of 
violence.  Our reluctance stems from the fact that [the Prime 
Minister] among them, have demonstrated a proclivity towards 
violence...and we are convinced there are others on either side of the 
parliamentary divide who share his sentiments. (The Daily Observer 
2/23/1995: 7) 
Similarly, a prominent news reporter’s open letter to the Attorney General entitled 
‘AG Cort: Injustices Breed Crimes’ underscores the point that ‘crime appears to have 
official sanction’ as he writes: 
Under no circumstances, are we supposed to encourage crimes.  You 
said zero tolerance to crimes, but I would like to go a little further and 
say ‘-0’ tolerance to crimes.  But, Mr. Attorney General, if we do not 
stop injustice, especially organized injustices, as practiced by your 
government, we are bound to fail in our fight against crime.  No 
maybe, if, or but.  For years now, the teachers who were wrongfully 
dismissed by your ‘democratic’ government, have been waiting to be 
reinstated and paid as ordered by the High Court.  Just in case you 
forgot, may I remind you that Justice delayed is Justice denied.  In any 
other country violence would have erupted like the volcano in 
Montserrat.  When government officials can break the law with 
impunity and then be given a royal pardon, as in the case of Hilroy 
Humphreys, I say that is injustice, not only to the man in prison, but 
also to the man on the street.  When a government minister could say 
to the nation, after we had been hit by a hurricane, that the 
government’s priority was to take care of its supporters first, then 
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everyone else after, what do you say Mr. Attorney General? Justice or 
Injustice? Mr. Attorney General, I could go on and on, but space 
demands that I stop at this one.  In the General Elections of March 
1999, Guyanese, Jamaicans, Dominicans and especially Spaniards 
were illegally allowed to vote.  Some of them voted in Antiguan’s 
names and when the Antiguans tried to vote they were denied the right 
to vote.  There could be no greater injustice than this one, where 
‘foreigners’ are allowed to illegally choose our destiny.  If we are 
going to fight crime successfully, let your government put its house in 
order, because some of the crimes in our society today are as a result 
of government sanctioned injustices.  An ardent government supporter 
was freed from prison after he had been convicted for raping his own 
daughter, while prisoners for far much lesser offences are still behind 
bars.  I shall join the fight as long as I am guaranteed JUSTICE FOR 
ALL. (The Daily Observer 2/22/2000: 3) 
 
In addition to the argument that politicians and other government officials set a poor 
example, authors also argue that a justice system that is not transparent and treats 
people differently based on their socioeconomic class and their connections to 
prominent politicians, police officers or business people delegitimises its authority. 
For example, in a 2006 article entitled, ‘Gray’s Farm Residents Upset With Police,’ 
the writer relays the story of residents in the economically depressed Gray’s Farm 
community, who claim that a 19 year old held in connection with the murder of a 22-
year-old non-national was not charged because of police corruption.  The writer 
explains: 
Allegations said the youth had turned himself in to police headquarters 
after the shooting death.  The source alleged the case had been 
transferred from the original investigating officer to a relative of the 
suspect.  [The source] feared lawmen would now drop the ball, based 
on his conflict of interest.  ‘It is the cousin of the boy that they let go 
and investigate the murder,’ she said.  ‘They...let he go, and now we 
hear the boy going England Monday...They corrupt, and something 
need to be done about the whole thing...nobody seem to care about 
anybody, or is it because we are not from Antigua?’ [Residents] said 
the community’s interaction with the village station was guarded.  
‘Nobody in the village trust the police,’ a source said.  ‘Only certain 
people in Gray’s Farm go to jail [but] the ones that have money, run 
the drugs and have the guns, it seems as if they are untouchable’. 
Another woman, who became tearful as she spoke about the way [the 
victim] met his death, echoed similar sentiments.  On Friday, another 
family also lashed out at the police for what they described as ‘a poor 
and biased investigative approach...’ (The Daily Observer 2/27/2006: 
1) 
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This message is aptly summed up in the 2003 editorial entitled, ‘That’s What Friends 
In High Places Are For,’ where the editorial writer observes that the law as 
administered sends the message that ‘all men are created equal, but some are more 
equal than others’ (The Daily Observer 2/13/2003: 2).  This sentiment is further 
echoed in the following excerpt of a 1995 editorial entitled ‘No Guns For The Folks 
On Mafia Hill’: 
What concerns us is that a great deal of our crime appears to have 
official sanction.  Politicians seem attracted to criminals in much the 
same manner as bees are attracted to honey...we have in our midst a 
place called Mafia Hill where the scum of the earth, and the dregs of 
society reside in cool comfort, safe and secure from the clutches of 
the United States Government and with the full knowledge and 
connivance of those that govern us. One of the persons who graced 
the portals of our ‘beloved’ Mafia Hill was indicted a few days ago in 
Philadelphia in the United States...In the meantime, the man involved 
who has a criminal record in the United States...has been given, or is 
about to be given, a license to carry a firearm in Antigua and 
Barbuda. There are many respectable citizens in Antigua and Barbuda 
who have no criminal record but who have been denied a license to 
carry a firearm by the same policemen that are about to license this 
seedy criminal. It seems somewhat strange that [an American] 
criminal from Mafia Hill can get a license to carry a gun in our 
country while a local person cannot.  The government and the 
commissioner of Police owe us an explanation. Why are foreign 
criminals being given licenses to carry firearms? It would appear to 
us that certain people within the government structure have, through 
their naïveté or innocence, allowed some of the most unsavoury 
characters to enter our midst and, because of their political contacts, 
become instant big shots.  Trouble is, after everyone has received his 
payoff and cuts, these characters will have become so firmly 
entrenched in our society that they will no longer be subject to the 
will of the government, they will be in a position to impose their will 
on us all by force of arms... If Ministers of Government can 
apparently give official sanction to gun-toting residents of Mafia Hill, 
it is no wonder that ordinary people appear to feel the need to equip 
themselves with guns also. Now that that has happened, we find 
ourselves in deep trouble. People are taking matters into their own 
hands and are equipping themselves with unlicensed firearms. People 
tend to follow example and if the example is to carry firearms, they 
certainly will do so. It is no wonder therefore that incidents such as 
the one that occurred yesterday may continue to happen.44 This trend 
will not change until such time as the government gives a clear 
indication that they will no longer tolerate the proliferation of 
firearms in this country. On no account should the folks at Mafia Hill 
be given firearm licenses and Police Commissioner Potter should be 
made to understand that. (The Daily Observer 2/25/1995: 2) 
                                                
44 The incident to which the writer refers is the attempted robbery of a 26-year-old female tourist who was shot and killed when 
she refused to relinquish her handbag.  The victim was killed on a beach in broad daylight in the presence of her mother, father, 
sister and brother. 
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Criminal Culture in Peer Group Discussions 
In peer group discussions, the overall performance of the Criminal Culture frame is 
strong. Like the Foreign Cultural Influences frame in chapter six, the Criminal Culture 
frame emerged organically from the analysis, unprompted by the interview guide.  
Consequently, the strength of the frame was assessed in light of the frame’s 
spontaneous occurrence in eight out of ten discussions, the enthusiasm that 
participants showed once their fellow group members conjured the frame and the 
absence of arguments put forth in rebuttal. 79 per cent of all focus group participants 
support the frame. Supporters of the frame appear to span all age groups as nearly half 
are under the age of 40 while just over half are over the age of 40.  
Discussion participants trigger the frame in much the same way as Terrence, 
who is quoted in the epigraph of this chapter.  Participants spontaneously lament the 
corruption they perceive to be endemic in Antigua and Barbuda. Specifically, 
participants make one of three claims: Antigua and Barbuda’s justice system treats 
people differently based on who they are and who they know, government agents are 
easily bribed and break the law with impunity, and crime is actually orchestrated by 
politicians.  Irrespective of the claims they make, the vast majority of participants use 
language reminiscent of Sykes and Matza (1957) and Matza (1964) to explain the 
ways in which offenders may rationalise their behaviour.  In the analysis below each 
claim is discussed in turn.   
Supportive Argument 1: Justice is Determined By Who You Are And Who You 
Know 
The idea that the justice system treats people differently based on who they are and 
who they know appears in slightly less than half of all peer group discussions. For 
example, in response to the prompt, ‘What do you think should be done about crime in 
Antigua and Barbuda,’ participants of the Cedar Valley peer group discussion respond: 
Group: Cedar Valley  
Participants:  
Regine, a Black Antiguan banker in her 40s  
Precious, a Black Antiguan retiree in her 60s 
Oliveen, a Black Antiguan senior legal secretary in her 30s 
Toya, a Black Antiguan attorney-at-law in her 50s  
 
Toya:  We might need to strengthen the laws too...or, I don’t 
know if we want to strengthen the laws or –  
Regine: No, enforce them.  
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Toya:   Enforce the laws yeah. I would change it to enforcing the 
laws because we have some very strong laws. 
Regine: Plus interference from authorities.  Whether they’re 
politician or whatever, they hear such and such lock up – 
[a prominent person] lock up in prison, [the Minister of 
National Security] get one phone call, [the prominent 
person] get out.  Me no wan no interference.45 
Precious: Exactly.  It should be you do the crime and – how it go? 
They do the crime [they do the time]. 
 
This behaviour is what Lavern, from the Redcliffe Street discussion calls, ‘friendism’.  
In her response to the very first question of the interview guide, ‘To what extent is 
crime a problem in your life,’ Lavern explains, ‘Okay. It’s a very close society like 
many societies.  But, [police and other government agents] fail to like, separate their 
professional relationship from their relationship as friends...’ In a conversation 
prompted by the last question of the interview guide, ‘How important are forgiveness 
and rehabilitation in the criminal justice system,’ Pericles, from the Cassada Gardens 
peer group discussion expounds on Lavern’s point: 
You know this is a small place, as Jamaica Kincaid wrote, I mean not 
in the same sense but it is a small place and sometimes who you are 
connected with and your political persuasion can determine a lot of 
these things even to the extent of crime... 
In each peer group discussion in which participants discuss this notion of ‘friendism,’ 
the participants speak as though this behaviour is a common and taken for granted 
feature of Antiguan and Barbudan life. The sentiment is very much captured by 
Doreen in the Crosbies discussion where she exclaims, ‘...so it’s all about who you 
know.  Antigua is just one big ball of corruption’. 
Supportive Argument 2: Bribery Abounds And Officials Break The Law With 
Impunity 
In nearly three-quarters of all peer group discussions, participants make a deeper point 
– the problem with Antigua and Barbuda’s criminal justice system is not only that 
people are treated differently based on who they know or to whom they are connected, 
it is also that government agents are easily bribed and break the law with impunity. 
High-ranking government officials, police officers, immigration officers and customs 
officers bear the brunt of these accusations.  For example, during the Cedar Valley 
                                                
45 Antiguan parlance for ‘I don’t want any interference’. 
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discussion, in response to the question, ‘Who do you think are committing these 
crimes,’ Regine explains: 
Well, I think initially, the real criminal, the real thieves were doing 
their do – or the real lawbreakers – and then the police started to crack 
down on them so they feel very threatened and, I think the thieves 
toned down or they just kinda lie low. But the police are now taking 
advantage of this situation and they themselves are doing it...We still 
go to them for protection. We’re pretending that you know they’re our 
friends but in the back of our mind we think they’re doing stuff so 
even with them you’re uncomfortable. 
Participants in the Redcliffe Street discussion make similar accusations as they discuss 
the Poor Immigration Control prompt: 
Group: Redcliffe Street  
Participants:  
Lavern, a Black Guyanese programme officer in her 40s  
Peaches, a Black Antiguan clerical assistant in her 30s 
Tia, a Black Antiguan social development practitioner in her 20s 
Judy, an Antiguan security officer in her 30s 
Janet, a Black Dominican janitor in her 20s 
 
Lavern: And, immigration break immigration laws.  
Tia: They’re not following their own structure. 
Lavern: Not whatsoever. 
Judy: Immigration cannot track...where these people – where they 
are their whereabouts and all of that.  
Lavern: But, sometimes they know. They know sometimes. 
Judy: And some immigration because they are getting money under 
the table –  
Lavern:   Of course. 
Judy: They won’t say anything. 
Lavern:  They won’t say not a thing. All of them driving their big car 
and all kind of thing and I still walking. 
Judy: And then they’re catching up on them because they’re 
forging stamps and all kind of thing. 
Lavern: They come to work and...[they] driving already. Maybe I 
need to become an immigration officer. I’m serious, I’m 
serious, I’m serious. 
Tia: How that go? 
Judy: I see persons join the immigration department last year and 
in fact they don’t have no rice land,46 no big way in terms of 
getting money. I don’t know how the family structure – they 
never have no gold mine or no oilfield or whatever the case 
may be. [They] join lets say last year and this month its like, 
oops the person driving no ordinary trade in kind of car its 
car with the seats still in plastic. 
Tia:    Yeah, it’s corruption 
                                                
46 Lavern is referring to farm land, which is often a source of income for the plantocracy in many Caribbean countries. 
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Lavern: Guys, you guys need to do it sometimes.... drive around. And say, 
‘Uh...who is living here?’ An immigration – an immigration who? 
How long the person in the immigration department? One year. If you 
see the structure. I’m serious. Apartments and them sort of things. So 
Immigration breaking immigration law. So I normally say um-hmm, I 
better go and get a job as an immigration officer. Because I am going 
to stop walking and get a big house too. It’s a fact. It’s a fact. 
Peaches: Yes it’s the hook up. 
Lavern: ...we’re talking about trafficking in terms of when they 
collude with persons who bring persons inside the society for 
sexual and other pleasures. Yes...whorehouses. Bring them in 
for whorehouses. 
Judy: Because the immigration will be paid under the table and 
they know that um, these people they’re coming in to work at 
the whorehouse and these people come and tell the 
immigration, ‘Oh I’m bringing in 10 ladies to come and be 
waitresses in my establishment’ and [immigration] know that 
well it’s not true. The immigration get paid to conceal that 
crime... 
Again, as participants make this supportive argument, they speak as though the 
behaviour they describe is a common and taken for granted feature of Antiguan and 
Barbudan life.  When asked to clarify whether she was suggesting that there a lot of 
police officers who accept bribes, in the Crosbies discussion group Doreen replies, ‘Of 
course! Come on. That’s Antiguan’s nature.  Stemming from [the Antigua Labour 
Party]. Papa Bird.47‘ Eventually conceding that she does not believe bribery to be the 
exclusive domain of the Antigua Labour Party as she believes the United Progressive 
Party also indulges in the practice, Doreen explains: 
The government is supposed to be your prime example, right? And 
you have, like, the youth of the country is going to look up to all their 
elders.  So when you have all the elders of the country doing crap, 
that’s how they follow...I think it’s just gone so bad. 
In the Russell’s discussion, Eryn offers her opinion as to why she believes corruption 
is so pervasive in responding to the question, ‘What do you think should be done about 
crime in Antigua and Barbuda’: 
But I feel like the government wants the system to be like that. That’s 
why there’s so much corruption ‘cause you know, we pay you nothing 
‘cause we expect you to take advantage. Like the immigration 
officers... So you know, they know their salaries could be better but 
it’s like you – what, whatever, we could get the kickbacks. You know 
like the immigration officers. They wonder why illegal stamps are 
cropping up in passports [but] what do you think? It’s because they 
get paid nothing so someone comes to them with 500 dollars 1000 
                                                
47 Doreen is referring to Vere Cornwall Bird, the architect of the independence and first Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda. 
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dollars just to stamp [a passport] you know?  They’ll do it.  I’m sure if 
I was them I would probably do it. Well...  
Implicit in Eryn’s response is a sense that corruption is systemic and deliberately so.  
There is a sense that the behaviour is, on some level, just another unfortunate aspect of 
the culture.   This reflects Tankebe’s (2009) observation that in developing countries 
the relationships between the public and the police are fraught with distrust and 
alienation. 
Supportive Argument 3: Politicians Orchestrate Crimes 
The last main argument that participants make with respect to the Criminal Culture 
frame appears in slightly less than one-third of all peer group discussions.  Participants 
argue that politicians actually orchestrate crimes.  Participants in the Cassada Gardens 
peer group discussion make this argument most intelligibly as they respond to the 
question, ‘In general would you say crime is getting better, worse or staying the 
same?’ 
Group: Cassada Gardens  
Participants:  
Pericles, a Black Antiguan consultant in his 40s  
Senaa, a Black Antiguan executive secretary in her 50s 
Dawn, a Black Antiguan district officer in her 30s 
John, a Black Antiguan personal/administrative assistant in his 20s 
Senaa:  ...most of [the crimes] are orchestrated.  
Facilitator: What do you mean by that? 
Senaa: Um, from the political standpoint 
Facilitator: So, in what way? Do you think politicians are [committing 
crime]? 
Senaa: Mmmhhhmm. Mmmhhhmm. No, not the politicians 
themselves. 
Pericles:  But, they have the um –   
Senaa: I’m going to put it plain and simple and you can put it 
how you want it.  Some of the crimes that are committed, 
the persons are being paid by politicians to destabilise the 
country. 
Pericles: To destabilise the country. 
Senaa: And that is a fact. 
Facilitator: On what do you base that conclusion?  How do you know 
that? 
Senaa: Some of the people, they talk.  They admit to these things. 
They even call names. They even call names. 
Pericles: Well I, I can say for example, in the context of my 
brother’s house.  But that was back in 1994 when the 
person confessed that he was paid by the politician to 
vandalise the house. 
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Senaa: That was politically orchestrated, year. 
[Further in the conversation] 
Pericles: ...from reading the historical records it seems that when 
you’re going through a period of political crisis in Antigua 
and Barbuda, the spate of criminal activities increase and I 
don’t believe it’s accident.  If you go back and read the 
papers in the 1970s, 1960s when they were having turmoil 
you’d see that crime was rampant.  Especially during the 
period of the PLM government.  The destruction with 
respect to government properties – bombs, fires set to 
cane fields and so forth.  Those were pretty active period – 
at heightened periods of political tension in the country.  
And so, that would tend to support the case that she’s 
making. 
Senaa: And the same thing is happening now.  At a certain time 
and it comes right back to now, a different party is in um 
rulership and the crime thing has come up again.  You 
know like in 71 to 76 when there was when the Birds are 
not in power so to speak. 
Facilitator: So, you think prior to 2004 there wasn’t that much crime? 
Is that what you’re saying? 
Senaa: Yes. I can safely say that.  It has increased tremendously 
after 2004. 
John: After the 2004 election. 
Senaa: Whether it is rape, robbery, you know that kind of stuff.  
It’s like crazy after 2004 elections.  And, even like, the 
vandalism of schools and you know, that kind of stuff, it 
has increased after 2004 elections.  Computer access 
centres that um, was, introduced by this administration – 
most of them were vandalised – computers were stolen, 
computers were smashed up. You know, that kind of stuff. 
 
During a conversation prompted by the Social Breakdown frame, participants in the 
Blue Waters peer group discussion make the connection between individual 
politicians and criminal gangs:  
Group: Blue Waters 
Participants:  
N’Jaedr, a Black Haitian telecommunications engineer in her 40s  
Elbee, a Black Antiguan civil engineer in his 60s 
Lynn, a Black Antiguan public servant in her 60s 
Mimi, a Black Antiguan retiree in her 60s 
Bolivar, a Black Antiguan engineer in his 60s 
 
Elbee: Several years ago when the gangs things started forming 
in Antigua, [Orville Grant] preached.  He said you have to 
nip that in the bud.  That’s how the crime started in 
Jamaica, some of the politicians were encouraging them. 
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Lynn: Yeah. They used to boast about who had what gang and 
so. 
Facilitator: Do you think that’s the issue here – a connection between 
politics and gangs?  
Bolivar: At one time.  It seems as if it has subsided a little bit. 
Elbee: People say it seems to be subsiding but I don’t know...I 
don’t know if they feel good to have – I don’t know what 
they ask them to do. 
Bolivar: Some have actually said it openly. 
Facilitator: And when they talk about it, what is it – each party has a 
particular gang?  
Bolivar: No, not the parties, individuals, not the parties. 
Lynn: I remember when I was studying in Jamaica, Edward 
Seaga was known to have his gang. You know, you knew 
they were Edward Seaga’s people so he was literally 
untouchable.  So, I guess it’s the same sort of syndrome 
being played out to the fullest. 
Facilitator: Is this a recent thing? 
Lynn:  I’m not sure. 
Elbee:  In 2004 [a prominent politician] was [a government 
Minister] – no 1999 – my Minister. And, one day I went 
down to open his office door, the door was locked and I 
asked his secretary who was in there with him and she say 
Red Shirt Gang.  And, I turn around and went back to my 
office and they asked me if I ‘fraid.  I said, ‘No, I just 
don’t want to be associated with these people’. I’m not 
going to go and sit in a meeting with them.  
 
As Doreen’s comments in the excerpt above suggests, irrespective of the supportive 
argument participants make with respect to the Criminal Culture frame, the vast 
majority of participants make a connection between the perception of a two-tiered 
criminal justice system rife with ‘friendism,’ corruption, or politically orchestrated 
crime and the country’s overall crime rate. In language reminiscent of neutralisation 
theory, Pericles more pointedly makes the argument:  
...I would also say, which is something that I neglected to say initially. 
The fact that some people in this country can get off with impunity, 
whether it’s politicians or people of high influence in society – can get 
away with certain criminal activities, um, makes um, people think that 
there are a different set of laws for people and therefore they can do 
whatever too. And I don’t think we should take it lightly in terms of 
the way people perceive politicians as being thieves. The way people 
perceive certain high government officials. Or, not even government 
officials but people who – people in society who are connected to 
government officials. If they can get away with it, why can’t I? So I 
don’t know how – I would perhaps call that the crime perception 
index, how people perceive how they’re treated can have an impact on 
how they um, you know, relate to the um, criminal justice system and 
the laws of this country. 
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II 
Faulty System 
In their popular song ‘Get Tough On Crime,’ Burning Flames, Antigua and Barbuda’s 
most celebrated musical group, proposes severe punishment as an antidote to the 
country’s crime problem. In so doing, the musicians articulate the law and order meme 
so prevalent in the country’s crime discourse.  The musicians sing: 
Get tough on crime, Judges get tough on crime.  
Let the criminals serve their time.  
They will rob, they will kill, they don’t even care, 
Now we have to live in fear. 
Ah what we do? Lock them up and throw ‘way the key, lock them up, 
Lock them up and throw ‘way the key, lock them up, 
Using gun, using knife, steal and kill as they like, 
Lock them up and throw ‘way the key, lock them up. 
Get tough on crime, Judges get tough on crime, 
Let the murderers serve more time. 
Poisoning our youths, they don’t even care. 
Now we have to live in fear. 
Ah what we do? Lock them up and throw ‘way the key, lock them up. 
Lock them up and throw way the key, lock them up. 
Day and night on the street, selling drugs as they like, 
Lock them up and throw ‘way the key, lock them up. 
 
The fundamental message of the song is similar to a critical message of the Faulty 
System frame – the courts need to ‘get tough’ and make criminals do ‘hard time’.  
This message, however, presupposes that offenders are rational and choose to offend 
after engaging in a utilitarian calculus promising more advantages than disadvantages.   
This presupposition is the outgrowth of eighteenth century Enlightenment-era theories 
put forth by Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1833) (see 
Rock 2012; Siegel 2011). In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation Bentham (1907: I.1) famously explains that: 
[n]ature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand 
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and 
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all 
we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our 
subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. 
Although Bentham and Beccaria were social theorists and not criminologists in any 
modern sense of the word, much of their work has been applied to crime and crime 
control nevertheless.  For example, Bentham’s (1907) observations that the temptation 
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to offend is weakest when the advantages derived from offending are small relative to 
the accompanying troubles and dangers and Beccaria’s (1963) insights that offending 
can be controlled by fear and punishment as long as the punishment is swift, 
proportionate and certain, are the very foundation on which classical criminology is 
built (see Siegel 2011).  Seeking to explain criminal offending, the classical 
perspective assumes that individuals have free will to choose between criminal and 
lawful solutions to meet their needs.  Classical criminology further assumes that 
criminal solutions may be attractive if for little effort these solutions promise 
significantly more gains.  Thus, classical criminology posits that an individual will 
choose a criminal solution if she or he believes the pain of expected punishment will 
be greater than the expected reward.  Moreover, the individual will only understand 
the potential pain of punishment if the punishment is proportionate, certain and swift 
enough to convince her or him that ‘crime does not pay’ (Siegel 2011).  Although the 
popularity of classical criminology waned in the nineteenth century, the classical 
principals on which it is based enjoyed a resurgence during the late twentieth century 
under the guise of Rational Choice Theory (see Becker 1974).  
Rational choice theory, best understood through the prism of economics, holds 
that offenders make a rational assessment of the potential consequences of their 
actions and will commit an offence only if the economic advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages (Becker 1974; see also Jones 2013). Rational choice theory is a theory 
that recognises that offenders do not simply commit ‘crime’ in some amorphous sense 
of the word but that they carry out specific crimes, each of which has its own 
particular motives, purposes and benefits (Cornish and Clarke 2008).  More pointedly, 
according to Cornish and Clarke (2008) rational choice theory: 
[v]iews the desires, preferences and motives of offenders and potential 
offenders as similar to those of the rest of us, and as in continual 
interaction with contemporary opportunities and constraints to 
produce, reinforce and sometimes reduce criminal behaviours.  At its 
core are the concepts of choice and decision-making, present-
centredness, and the centrality of the crime event to continued 
criminal activity – success in offending driving the development of 
criminal lifestyles, and failure leading to reduction and change in 
criminal activity, or to desistance. (21) 
Additionally, Cornish and Clarke (2008) argue that rational choice theory is more of a 
conceptual tool than a true criminological theory as it developed in a pragmatic and 
piecemeal way in response to very real public policy questions.  That is, ‘rather than 
setting out to provide a complete explanation for criminal behaviour, the rational 
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choice perspective has been more concerned with how to prevent or disrupt it’ 
(Cornish and Clarke 2008: 38).   For proponents of rational choice theory, the solution 
to a community’s crime problem lies in reducing the physical opportunities for 
offending and increasing the risk of an offender being caught and punished (Downes 
and Rock 2011).  
In Antigua and Barbuda’s newspaper discourse as well as in the peer group 
discussions, arguments reminiscent of rational choice theory abound.  Unsurprisingly, 
like the Bentham, Beccaria and their intellectual progeny, the solutions proffered are 
rooted in better apprehension of criminals, harsher penalties and greater surveillance.  
The remainder of this section will examine the prevalence of the Social Breakdown 
frame in newspaper articles and in peer group discussions. 
Faulty System in the News 
Of all the frames identified in Antigua and Barbuda’s crime discourse, the Faulty 
System frame appears most frequently in newspaper articles. Indeed, components of 
the frame appear in almost half of all newspaper articles included in this study. In 
these articles, writers seem almost unanimously to support the fundamental premise 
that crime stems from the failure of the criminal justice system to apprehend and 
punish offenders.  This support takes two main forms. Writers either emphasise that 
the police are inept and thus ineffective or they focus on the fact that the courts need to 
impose stiffer sentences. 
 In half of the articles displaying the frame, authors draw attention to the 
perceived ineptitude of the police force and implicitly associate this ineptitude with the 
‘spiralling crime rate’. Eight articles complain of police failure to respond to distress 
calls in a timely manner, seven articles note the lack of police visibility throughout the 
community and three articles lament the lack of adequate resources allocated to law 
enforcement.  For example, a 2005 article entitled ‘Shake-Up At Dockyard Police 
Station’ asserts that the lack of police visibility at Falmouth and English harbours may 
have ‘given the criminals license for the recent spate of robberies on yachts moored in 
the area...’ (The Daily Observer 2/16/2005: 1), and in a 2006 article entitled, ‘Task 
Force Targets Youth Violence, Drug Abuse in Barbuda,’ reporter Nasheta Richards 
quotes a Barbuda councilman who reminisces that, ‘[b]ack in the days, police used to 
do foot patrol and not just be mobile.  Policemen walking on the streets used to make a 
difference’ (The Daily Observer 2/20/2006: 4).   Similarly, in a 2008 letter to the 
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editor entitled ‘Urgent Police Assistance Needed in Jennings,’ the writer complains 
that: 
A lot of us in this neighbourhood have to live in fear, looking over our 
shoulders and praying that we will not be the next victim of robbery, 
assault or rape.  There are persons who are targeting this community 
and we are not getting good assistance from the police... We have 
called the police on many occasions and they have not responded to 
our calls. We’ve received excuses like there are no vehicles on the 
compound (even though they have new ones) or there is no one who 
can drive them. I am absolutely fed up. All of us are.  We cannot tell 
the last time we saw a police vehicle patrolling the area.  If they were 
hunting for drugs they would certainly be around.  Tuesday night, I 
called them after I was seeing this really suspicious car circling the 
neighbourhood and this officer said in a don’t care manner, ‘What do 
you want us to do now?’ It was this incident which led me to write this 
letter.  This is usually the response we’ve been receiving or sometimes 
even with a chuptz.48 (The Daily Observer 2/1/2008: 2) 
 And, in a 2006 article entitled ‘More Residents Blast Police’ the writer chronicles the 
woes of residents who ‘complain bitterly about members of the Royal Police Force of 
Antigua and Barbuda’ relaying that: 
The man, in a telephone interview, chided the police for promising to 
come to the scene, and not doing so sooner than three hours after the 
call. ‘I calling the police, I call 911, I call St. John’s [Police Station] 
and I call C[riminal] I[nvestigation] D[epartment] and the police keep 
telling me somebody is going to come for the past three hours,’ the 
Trini said. ‘Until now, no police have showed up.  I really angry, and 
somebody could ah dead,’ he said. ‘I have to ask the woman at 911 if 
only when somebody dead they going to show up’. (The Daily 
Observer 2/19/2007: 16) 
In applauding efforts to revamp the police force and calling for a corresponding 
revamping of entrenched mind sets within the institution and in government, a 2008 
editorial entitled ‘Police, Political Will and Partisan Politics’ asserts: 
...the matter that has gripped the entire nation is that of the spiralling 
crime rate and the seeming ineptitude of the Royal Police Force of 
Antigua and Barbuda.  None among us can dispute that the police 
force has limped along these past years, plagued by infighting, 
apparent disunity, lack of clear commitment, by officers – many of 
them transplanted Caribbean nationals – to Antigua and Barbuda and 
to the ideal to protect and serve, and a lack of public trust.  A record 
high of 19 murders on record for 2007 and with a serial rapist 
terrorising the nation tossed in, with the overall increase in crime has 
caused sundry persons to call for the problem to be addressed 
comprehensively and immediately...If it is truth, justice and positive 
change that we desire, then we must give the proposed changes a 
                                                
48 See footnote 40. 
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chance...The police have been deliberately and systematically under-
trained, under-staffed, underpaid and demoralised for decades.  The 
officers did not do this to themselves.  So, as we focus on the police 
officers, their practices and procedures, we must not be so quick to let 
the politicians, past and present off the hook for the hash they have 
made of what should have been a noble unit...We all accept that, 
generally speaking, the police have fallen down and off the job.  But 
we must also acknowledge that the script could end no other way; this 
was the design, the will of the political directorate, although it is the 
police who now shoulder the blame. (The Daily Observer 2/28/2008: 
2) 
In short, the implicit argument at the heart of each of the articles in this category is one 
that Beccaria or any one of his intellectual progeny might make – if police are not able 
to swiftly apprehend offenders, or if there is little certainty as to which offender the 
police will choose to apprehend, there is no deterrent to future offending. Although, 
very few articles explicitly propose measures aimed at correcting these perceived 
deficiencies, those that do focus on increased police visibility.  For example, in an 
article entitled ‘Police Crack Down To Curb Criminal Activity,’ a police officer 
proposes what a classical criminologist or rational choice theorist might view as 
common sense,  ‘We must control the criminal activities in this country...so to do this 
we have to step up our patrol throughout the Nation’ (The Daily Observer 2/16/2000: 
3). 
 In the remaining half of the articles supporting the Faulty System frame, the 
overarching theme is ‘tough on crime’.  In these articles writers bemoan the perceived 
lack of severity in dealing with offenders, including at-risk youth. For these writers, 
like the proponents of classical criminology, courts and other criminal justice 
institutions must send a clear message that ‘crime does not pay’.  The overall message 
of these articles is best captured by the 2006 article entitled, ‘Former Educator: Spare 
The Rod, Spoil The Child,’ in which a former educator is quoted as saying: 
In Antigua we are becoming too loose, and we are sorry for the 
person who commits the crime and not the victim...Young people are 
going into people’s houses, stealing and reverting to violence.  And 
instead of dealing with them appropriately, we have this soft 
approach to the problem, and it is not working because they laugh at 
us and keep on committing the crime. (The Daily Observer 2/9/2006: 
6) 
In making this point the vast majority of writers call for stiffer penalties generally, 
however, a small number of writers call for increased use of the death penalty or a 
strict boot camp for young people specifically.   
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 In calling for stiffer penalties, five articles argue as the legal maxim, ‘justice 
must not only be done, it must be seen to be done’.  In these articles writers claim that 
criminal penalties serve a function that is symbolic as well as practical.  Criminal 
penalties are not only about punishing the individual offender, in a very Durkheimian 
(1964, 1965) way they are also about reinforcing a moral code and ensuring members 
of society that the society’s abhorrence of crime is understood and duly reflected.  For 
example, in a 2000 editorial entitled, ‘Courts Should Impose Appropriate Sanctions,’ 
the writer expresses concern that courts are not imposing the maximum penalties 
ascribed to their respective offences. In lamenting the decision of a trial judge not to 
impose a custodial sentence in a case involving Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily 
Harm, the writer cautions: 
Asking a layman to second guess what sentence a court of criminal 
justice will likely impose in any case given its own peculiar facts and 
circumstances can be problematic at best...But, if this nation is at all 
serious in its commitment to come to grips with crimes of violence, to 
fight against them and to end them, then criminal justice must be 
meted out in such a way as to reflect this society’s abhorrence to such 
crimes.  And, among other measures it is perhaps through the 
imposition of stiff sentences that the public will know that the 
authorities are in earnest...Courts ought not to be timorous in 
imposing appropriate sentences when required to do so.  And the 
message should be sounded loudly and clearly throughout the land 
that the Courts of the nation shall never flinch from their obligation to 
impose appropriate sanctions against persons found guilty for vicious 
criminal behaviour. (The Daily Observer 2/28/2000: 2) 
In protesting the perceived lenient treatment of a sex offender, a 2003 article entitled, 
‘Bawl Murder! Bawl Advantage!’ underscores the point:  
...a little girl of 11 years is raped by a man more than four times her 
age.  And what for it? Five years in prison! Murder! Advantage, 
indeed, when one realizes that the penalty allowed for this crime is life 
imprisonment...The latest buzzword is penal reform; the welfare of the 
criminal is suddenly paramount.  But what kind of message does this 
five-year sentence send the victim? What are the authorities telling the 
more than 9000 persons who petitioned the Prime Minister for greater 
protection of our daughters, granddaughters, nieces, cousins, 
neighbours? With this brand of justice, one now wonders whether the 
parents of the pornography-ring victims did not have the right idea 
when they sent away their children.  After all, the message has been 
clearly received that girls have little value in our society.  The last 36 
years of our existence have been under so-called self-rule.  We have 
no English colonials to blame for our condition.  But nature it is said, 
abhors a vacuum and so we have created our own massas to fill it, and 
we have perpetuated our own daughters’ degradation in the post-
colonial era.  The truth is that we have brushed off their rapes as the 
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indulgences and foibles of old men handed down to their sons. (The 
Daily Observer 2/5/2003: 2)  
Nine articles, however, claim that stiffer penalties will deter offenders from 
reoffending and would-be offenders from ever offending.  For these writers, offenders 
and would-be offenders are at the fore.  The penalties do not only send messages to the 
wider society generally but to those who may and do run afoul of the law specifically.  
Many of those making this argument focus on young people given the puported ‘ever-
increasing scourge of youth violence’ with which many newspaper writers appear 
preoccupied. For example a 2007 editorial calling for a youth ‘boot camp’ warns: 
But, we can get tough now, starting with the [boot camp] idea posited 
here, or we can look forward to joining the queue outside 173549 on 
visiting day or worse, standing over lifeless bodies at either of the two 
morgues.  When we look at it that way, the choice seems an obvious 
no-brainer. (The Daily Observer 2/26/2007: 2)  
Along similar lines, in a 2005 article entitled, ‘Legal Heads Address HMP’s 
Overcrowding Problem’ the Attorney General is quoted as saying: 
...young persons must understand that there is a certain modicum of 
behaviour which is expected of them and if they do not behave along 
those lines, then they will face the full wrath of the law and if it means 
that they have to be incarcerated before they can obtain bail, then so 
be it. (The Daily Observer 2/17/2005: 9)  
This argument is also echoed in three of the four articles that call for increased use of 
the death penalty.  In each of these articles the writers argue that the death penalty is 
an effective means of preventing violent crime.  For example, in a letter to the editor 
entitled, ‘The Case Of The Jammed Button,’ the writer says: 
Rumours abound in the upper echelons of Antiguan society that the 
current governor general is opposed to capital punishment.  This issue 
needs to be aired and clarified, because one of the best deterrents to 
violent crime is the knowledge that at the push of a button you could 
be in the company of some of the world’s most notorious misfits.  The 
hangman’s button seems to be jammed in this country.  Please apply 
some WD40 immediately. (The Daily Observer 2/1/2005: 3) 
 Likewise a 2002 editorial entitled, ‘To Hang Or Not To Hang’ the writer explains: 
The arguments against the death penalty are convincing to a point but 
fail to convince me on one critical question: is it a deterrent or not? 
First, it cannot be denied that an executed murderer is forever deterred 
from committing the same crime again.  Second an analysis of my 
                                                
49 Antigua and Barbuda’s sole prison, Her Majesty’s Prison was built in the year 1735 and 1735 is inscribed above its portals.  It is 
common for Antiguans and Barbudans to refer to the prison as 1735 when speaking colloquially.  
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own feelings indicates to me clearly that the threat of a death penalty 
has stayed my hand on occasion in moments of extreme stress.  Third, 
my opinion is that anyone who claims that the threat of losing one’s 
life is not a deterrent to acting unlawfully, is not being honest about 
their feelings...If execution of murderers does prevent some murders 
then I will be comforted by the thought that my family, my friends and 
my countrymen will be spared some grief because some of us will be 
held back from killing because of fear of the death penalty...To me the 
bottom line is the survival of as many potential victims of murder as 
our consciences and laws allow us.  It may not be a universally held 
view but it seems to me that the rights of society as a whole must 
supersede those of the individual. If we accept that premise, along 
with the view that the death penalty is a deterrent to violent crime, 
then retaining capital punishment is essential if we are to preserve our 
quality of life and indeed, improve upon it. (The Daily Observer 
2/5/2000: 2) 
 In 4 per cent of all articles, writers conjure the Faulty System frame to refute 
one or more of its components.   In each of the articles in this category, writers reject 
the call for stiffer penalties as well as ‘get tough’ rhetoric.  While one article makes a 
very practical claim, that alternatives to prison and rehabilitation are critical because in 
the long run the costs of incarceration are significantly greater, two articles challenge 
the frame on more fundamental grounds.  For example, in a 2000 guest commentary 
entitled, ‘It Is Cheaper To Kill Them,’ writer Dobrene O’Marde challenges the frame 
on the grounds that offenders are far less rational than many believe and are likely not 
be deterred by harsh punishment as he asserts: 
The majority of murders are crimes of passion, acts that take place in 
the split second of loss of mind, loss of control – death penalty or not! 
The premeditated murder or the gangland slaying are (sic) planned 
under the shadow of the death penalty.  So they are planned more 
carefully – the murderers plan not to get caught. The death penalty is 
not a deterrent; it is just another variable that is taken into the planning 
of premeditated murder...It is the association of punishment with pain 
which propels our teachers to break children’s hands, which justifies 
parents in the physical abuse of their off-spring; which motivates men 
to continue beating women like road marches.  None of the above will 
change until we regain respect for human rights and human life (The 
Daily Observer 2/8/2000: 2) 
O’Marde‘s commentary echoes the critique that many criminologists have made with 
respect to classical criminology and rational choice theory.  Downes and Rock (2011: 
251) describe as unwarranted the assumption that:  
[t]he simplicities of rational choice theory afford us a good enough 
comprehension of the way in which would-be predators decipher their 
environment and formulate plans, being deterred or seduced by signs, 
obstructions, and opportunities.  
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Similarly, in particular regard to certain types of street-level crime, Neal Shover notes 
in his foreword to Armed Robbers in Action: Stick Ups And Street Culture (Wright and 
Decker 2011: xi) that: 
Street-level robbers typically make decisions in contexts of hedonism 
and desperation in which the likely consequences of their acts are 
neither weighed carefully nor taken seriously.  When offenders 
describe their crimes, they employ a rhetoric of utilitarianism that 
contrasts markedly with the fanciful attributions of motives and 
meanings suggested by interpreters who lack...first-hand knowledge...   
Moreover, both O’Marde, in his commentary discussed above, and an editorial writer 
in the editorial discussed below, denounce painful punishment on the grounds that 
violence spawns violence irrespective of whether that violence is state sanctioned. In 
criminological terms, the writers essentially claim that painful punishment has the 
‘brutalisation effect’ described by scholars such as Dann (1935) and Bowers and 
Pierce (1980) in their work on the death penalty (see also Gilligan 2001).  That is, 
offenders may model their behaviour after the state or act violently because the 
violence associated with the state’s response cheapens the value of life (Bowers and 
Pierce 1980).  In excoriating corporal punishment, the editorial writer of a 2000 
editorial entitled, ‘Missing The Message,’ argues that: 
We are of the view that the entire culture of violence has a rich 
spawning ground in the classrooms of the nation where ill-tempered 
men and women constantly abuse the young.  As a result, students are 
shooting, stabbing and raping fellow students; and teachers who 
should know better are violently turning on students in a disquieting 
number of instances.  If we believe violence has no place in the 
nation’s classrooms, we are then under a moral obligation to ensure 
that it doesn’t happen. (The Daily Observer 2/10/2000: 2) 
Many of the arguments made in the newspaper with respect to the Faulty 
System frame are echoed in the peer group discussions.   
Faulty System in the Peer Group Discussions 
The overall performance of the Faulty System frame in peer group discussions is 
strong. Eight out of ten discussions show strong support for the frame as participants 
generally agree with the contention that crime stems from the failure of the criminal 
justice system to apprehend and punish offenders.  Across the discussion groups, 94.2 
per cent of all participants share this view.  In many cases, the enthusiasm that the 
participants have for the frame is evident by participants interrupting the facilitator to 
express approval for the frame before the entire frame is read and by making 
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comments such as, ‘very strong – not only strong but very, very strongly agree!’   
Enthusiasm for the frame is further evident by the fact that in five of the ten discussion 
groups the frame was conjured before the facilitator prompted it.  In two of the ten 
peer group discussions there is a mixed reaction to the frame.  In these discussions, at 
least one group member articulates a cogent position contrary to the other group 
members when discussing the merits of the frame.  No peer group unanimously rejects 
the Faulty System frame.  As such, at least one person in each of the ten peer group 
discussions conducted in this study support the Faulty System frame.  Supporters of 
the frame appear to span all age groups as nearly half are under the age of 40 while 
just over half are over the age of 40. There is no other frame identified in Antigua and 
Barbuda’s crime discourse that enjoys such a high level of support.  
Supportive Arguments 
In peer group discussions, participants ardently support the fundamental premise that 
crime stems from the failure of the criminal justice system to apprehend and punish 
offenders.  While journalists and commentators either emphasise police ineptitude and 
ineffectiveness or the ‘need’ for the courts to impose stiffer sentences, peer group 
discussion participants argue more broadly.  That is, participants claim there is 
ineptitude across the entire spectrum of criminal justice institutions, not only the 
police, and that the entire system is ineffective. In keeping with the newspaper writers, 
however, many participants also argue that the courts must impose stiffer sentences. 
The analysis below examines each argument in turn. 
Supportive Argument 1: Our Institutions Are Broken 
Whether they lament the ineptitude of the police, bemoan the inefficiency of the 
judicial system or deplore the state of the country’s adult and juvenile custodial 
centres, in each of the peer group discussions where at least one participant supports 
the Faulty System frame, participants argue that the institutions comprising Antigua 
and Barbuda’s criminal justice system are broken.  The implicit message of this 
supportive argument is that broken institutions are antithetical to ensuring swift, 
certain and severe punishment and will encourage rather than stymie offenders. 
Mary’s sentiment underlies the basic tenor of this supportive argument: 
[The criminal justice system is] not efficient. No government office is 
efficient. Not one – not a single one. You go down to legal affairs and 
they don’t have filing systems. They cannot find files and that is – I 
mean, I work in a government office and we’ve had court cases 
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brought against the government and the legal department cannot find 
files, which are essential for cases. When the key bodies aren’t 
functioning correctly and efficiently I don’t know how anything else 
falls into place. 
In five out of ten discussions participants focus on police ineffectiveness and the lack 
of resources available to the police, and in seven out of ten discussions participants 
complain bitterly about the lack of professionalism within the police force. The 
excerpts below are illustrative. 
 In the Darkwood Beach discussion group, Toji responds to the frame’s prompt 
by saying:  
The reason I agree with that is because a lot of people probably 
wouldn’t get into crime in the first place if it was like we have an 
intelligent police force that’s going to get you most of the time. I think 
a lot of kids around here are just idle and it seems far too easy to them 
and that’s what motivates them. 
Participants in the Redcliffe Street discussion expand on Toji’s point. 
Group: Redcliffe Street  
Participants:  
Lavern, a Black Guyanese programme officer in her 40s  
Peaches, a Black Antiguan clerical assistant in her 30s 
Tia, a Black Antiguan social development practitioner in her 20s 
Judy, an Antiguan security officer in her 30s 
Janet, a Black Dominican janitor in her 20s 
[In response to the question, ‘Why do you think the crime problem is 
getting better, worse or staying the same?’] 
Tia: But I think too what [Judy] said about the police. And, I 
think people feel that they’ll get away with it. 
Group:    Yeah, yes. Yeah.  
Peaches: If the Police would have solved the problem, right, if they solve a 
problem occasionally  –  
Lavern: And make persons examples 
Peaches: Right. You will say, well ok if I go and steal this or if I go and break 
into somebody’s home that police would catch me eventually, you 
know. They would go all out and catch me. So [people] wouldn’t go 
back and do it or other people out there that wants to do it, even if 
they’re unemployed they wouldn’t do it again because they know the 
police are gonna be on their trail, you understand?  
Lavern: And, and –   
Peaches: But they’re not doing anything.  
Lavern: And not only –  
Peaches: You go to them, they come they do a little dusting – 
Lavern: Dirtying not dusting, dirty the place. 
[In response to the frame’s prompt] 
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Tia: Also, when you have been victimised you really do realise 
how ridiculous the system is or how ineffective the system is. 
Once you have to go through it, once you see the perpetrator 
still walking the street next to you, you know, once you call 
the police and they have nothing to tell you, you really see 
how ridiculous the whole structure can be. 
Lavern: And, and other than that. You know, you’re a victim over 
and over again and it makes no sense you go to them and 
report it. And maybe sometimes you short changed yourself 
because that [one] time when you will go to make the report, 
maybe that’s the time they’re going to apprehend the person 
but because you have gone so many times, you’ve worked 
with them on so many occasions, them nuh do nothing, so 
why go now? I mean it happens not only to me, but to so 
many other persons in society. So why are they going to go 
to the police? For what? They’re not going to do anything 
about it. 
Tia: And depending on your situation, your personal situation – I 
mean for me personally, next time I wouldn’t tell the police I 
would tell an uncle or a brother or my boyfriend. I would 
look to somebody else for a solution, which may not be 
within the confines of the law.  
 
With respect to the lack of professionalism found in the police force participants argue 
that police officers operate according to their political loyalties, fail to follow up on 
cases or respond to calls, collect evidence incorrectly or are simply rude and 
unnecessarily belligerent.  A number of participants also express concern with respect 
to issues of confidentiality and crime reporting.  In the words of Judy from the 
Redcliffe Street discussion, ‘...when you give them the information about things, the 
police release your information to other people in the public’. The Cassada Gardens 
participants broached the idea of professionalism in responding to the question, ‘What 
do you think should be done in Antigua and Barbuda about the crime situation?’ 
Group: Cassada Gardens  
Participants:  
Pericles, a Black Antiguan consultant in his 40s  
Senaa, a Black Antiguan executive secretary in her 50s 
Dawn, a Black Antiguan district officer in her 30s 
John, a Black Antiguan personal/administrative assistant in his 20s 
Pericles:  I think there needs to be a revamping of the Antigua – of 
the police force. More professionalism in the police force 
because the police force is dividing along political 
loyalties. Right. And that gives opportunities for crime. 
Facilitator: How so? 
Pericles:  Um, in the sense that if your government is not in power 
you are very lax in how you enforce the laws. Or, how you 
police. Let me put it this way. So for example, if you 
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know there is criminal activities happening in a particular 
way in a particular community, you are not interested in 
doing anything about it as long as it makes the 
government look bad. I think they would say that openly. 
Senaa: I think some of the criminal activities could be aborted if 
there was police presence, you know, in the communities. 
You know, if they had more police presence in the 
communities. But, you don’t see the police. You don’t see 
anybody. You know you have to call when anything 
happens. And sometimes you have to wait so long for 
them to respond. of course sometimes they don’t respond 
at all. So, you know with these loopholes, you know 
people don’t care because the police don’t come anyway, 
‘No police dey50 so let me go and do what I want to do’. 
And, I think we have enough police on the force that the 
situation could be different. 
Pericles:  I believe so too but they are saying they don’t have 
enough –  
Senaa: Who? It have more than enough police in the force, you 
know. 
Pericles: over 600 police officers in the force, I believe they can – 
but police themselves, I have two police officer friends 
and every time I go there my wife is always on them 
saying you know, you’re police officers how do you 
expect to stop people with the tint on their car when your 
car is tinted? 
Senaa: That is the thing again. Some of the things, they’re doing 
it themselves so they can’t trouble nobody because they’re 
doing the same thing. 
Senaa also raises an important point with respect to police visibility.  In six out of ten 
discussion groups, calls for a higher level of police professionalism include calls for 
greater police visibility and initiatives in line with community policing. In the 
Russell’s discussion group Eryn and Mary discuss the fact that cases are often thrown 
out of court as a result of poorly collected evidence. Supporting Eryn’s claim that, ‘...it 
comes down to the police force and they never ready,51‘ Mary, whose father is an 
attorney-at-law, explains: 
I know that so many people – we were driving through town today – 
and my dad was like that guy is a rapist.  Known.  And he’s just 
walking on the streets. And half of them get out because the police 
haven’t collected evidence in the correct way... 
In the Crosbies discussion participants lament the lack of professionalism within the 
police force while also claiming that police are not adequately trained and do not have 
                                                
50 In Antiguan parlance, ‘No police are there’. 
51 In this context Eryn is using the phrase ‘they never ready’ in a way that Antiguans and Barbudans typically use the phrase in a 
colloquial setting.  The idea is not that the police are not literally ‘ready’ in the standard English use of the word but that they are 
amateur and inept.   
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proper resources.  Continuing a conversation in which Doreen describes members of 
the police force as arrogant and claims that they ‘think because they have a little bit of 
power, they can do what they want...’ Heather and Doreen have the following 
exchange:  
Group: Crosbies  
Participants:  
Patrick, a Syrian/Lebanese Antiguan retiree in his 60s  
Indigo, a White Antiguan archivist in her 50s 
Heather, an Antiguan student in her 20s who racially identifies as 
‘other’ 
Doreen, a Syrian/Lebanese cake decorator in her 20s 
 
Heather:   They’re not trained properly.  They’re afraid. They’re 
afraid and they’re not equipped...I don’t think they are 
trained enough. Sometimes they’re not equipped to handle 
a situation whether it be guns or Tasers or drugs or 
whatever. They don’t have police vehicles – they don’t 
have enough police vehicles in enough police stations. 
Like the time there was a problem in Coolidge I remember 
they called the Coolidge police station and there was one 
policeman there with no car so he couldn’t do anything 
about it. Or they’re afraid to go into the situation because 
they don’t have the gun, whatever the case may be. 
Doreen: I don’t think they’re afraid...Even a time I was parking in 
town this was late in the afternoon and it was a regular 
parking space and this pompous police came up to me and 
said, ‘You can’t park there’. I said, ‘Well, why not?’ [He 
said,] ‘Me say ya cyaan park dey! Move!’ Is that really 
necessary? Instead of you saying something like, ‘Well, 
the truck with all the money is coming and you can’t park 
there or it’s reserved for –’ Nothing. It’s just ‘Me say you 
cyaan park dey! Move!’  
Participants argue just as forcefully that the judicial system is inefficient with 
participants in four out of ten peer group discussions claim that the judicial system is 
too slow.  For example, in the Redcliffe Street discussion group Lavern says, ‘And, 
additionally, um, other than the police, we have to look at the whole judicial system.  
They have a very tardy way’.  Likewise, in the Lower Nevis Street discussion group 
Malcolm bemoans judicial backlog asserting, ‘...I think the challenge we have is the 
whole court system...the matters take so long to go to court...’ and in the Russell’s 
discussion Brock underscores the point by relaying a personal account:  
I know somebody who committed the crime and then when the case 
got called [the judge] had to postpone it and they kept postponing it 
for years until they just eventually threw it out. 
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But, the problem is not only that the judicial system is too slow.  In four out of ten 
discussion groups, participants argue that the laws are antiquated.  In the Russell’s 
discussion group Brock expresses his surprise that there are existing laws that still 
contemplate medieval weapons: 
I think a lot of the laws need to be revisited too because I was looking 
at something the other day and they were talking about swords and 
I’m like what the hell is that? 
Similarly, in the Longford discussion Wayne concludes:  
We need to make some amendments.  Some of the laws were amended 
in 1994 yeah and 95 but just a few.  We’re living in modern times we 
need modern things – not to be fighting crime with 83 year old laws! 
Additionally, participants in two peer group discussions explicitly attack the judicial 
system for what they see as inconsistent sentencing. For example, in response to the 
frame’s prompt Mary almost immediately responds: 
It’s not a straight line with the courts here, some people can go to jail 
over the most petty thing and be in there for like five years because 
they just never got to it – you know? And, then there’s people that 
actually deserve to be in jail but get out in like two years, you know 
what I mean? 
Later in the conversation, in response to the same prompt, Mary’s fellow group 
member Ashley makes a similar point about sentencing: 
They’re not at all consistent because it depends on the judge.  Like the 
judges here are so inconsistent that you don’t feel like there is a true 
level of like sentencing for the same crime.  It depends on what judge 
it is and what lawyer.  The judge will give a different sentence like we 
all know that there’s a female judge who when it comes to guns has a 
zero tolerance with gun policy, you know like she has zero zero zero 
tolerance.  Once you were with a gun, you’re getting some kind of 
time or a huge huge fine, you know? But she’s very big on – and then 
there are some judges who will let it go and I thin you have to keep it 
consistent. 
Along these lines, in the Cedar Valley discussion group Regine denounces the 
prospect of a mitigated sentence in cases where the offender pleads guilty saying:  
...there’s a penalty for this crime? That’s the crime – you did it? That’s 
the penalty.  Why the court have to be cooperating with you because 
you say you’re guilty? 
Importantly, in the Russell’s discussion group Ashley makes a point about inconsistent 
sentencing with respect to class and race.  In discussing a friend who was detained for 
11 months while awaiting trial for shooting a gun in the air three times, Ashley 
emphasises the seemingly random nature of the detention in the excerpt below. 
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Group: Russell’s  
Participants:  
Brock, a Black Antiguan human resources manager in his 30s  
Betty, a Black Antiguan accountant in her 20s 
Ashley, a White Antiguan landscape designer in her 20s 
Mary, a White Antiguan environment officer in her 20s 
Eryn, a Black Antiguan market officer in her 20s 
Ashley: It was a statement because obviously his mother is an 
ambassador and his father is like a stature in the 
community and they were trying to make a point that even 
though you’re not white you’re high coloured and you 
going. We going to make an example out of you and they 
did, because trust me, me never go fire off no gunshots in 
front of anybody. I might not even tase you – I think they 
were making an example and they’ll happily do that. I 
mean, how many of our friends have been thrown in jail 
over night for stupidness – just because they’re white and 
they want to prove a point. 
Facilitator: Do you think it’s just because they’re white? 
Ashley: No not just because they’re white. Like when we were 
growing up – I think the point I’m trying to make is when 
I grew up I was under the mentality that I could get away 
with anything on this island and it’s not so much anymore. 
Facilitator: Because you were white? 
Ashley: No not because I was white. Because of the social group that I was 
in.  
Betty: Maybe who you were 
Facilitator: Because of class 
Ashley: Yeah because I’ve always had a mix race of friends, it’s never 
been just white people or you know, whatever. Now it’s like the 
police are so angry and they seem so much meaner nowadays 
 
Lastly, participants argue that Antigua and Barbuda’s custodial facilities are 
also broken. Participants in three discussions decry the only juvenile correctional 
facilities in the country, the Boy’s Training School and the Sunshine Home for Girls, 
as inadequate and ineffective.  These participants argue that the conditions of the 
Boy’s Training School primarily are deplorable, members of staff of both institutions 
are not qualified and the young people who are released or escape are more dangerous 
than when they were first admitted.  In the Blue Waters discussion group Lynn 
explains: 
Because the environment in which the boys are required to survive 
does not provide them with anything positive. The beds are made of 
some 2x4s knocked up together and they are really ugly. The 
furniture, they’re sort of crudely done. And so its really depressing. 
Everything about the place is depressing but I’m really concerned that 
there is really not enough care and attention.   
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Participants in the Crosbies peer group discussion make the point more vividly: 
Group: Crosbies  
 
Indigo:   I wouldn’t put my dogs in there. 
Heather:  Same with the prison. 
Indigo:  How can you rehabilitate somebody that’s not being fed 
properly –  
Heather:  Getting raped constantly 
Indigo:  Yeah, being molested. Being put down constantly. 
Especially Boys Training School. You got young kids in 
there, yes some of them are bad eggs, but some of them 
are just there for stupidness and then you’re putting them 
with these other elements and there’s nobody there saying 
well guess what, maybe you can do this, maybe you can 
do that and try motivate them and finding out why they’re 
doing it. 
In four out of ten discussion groups participants complain that Her Majesty’s Prison, 
Antigua and Barbuda’s sole adult prison is inadequate and ineffective.  In two of these 
discussions participants argue that the prison is ineffective because the conditions are 
deplorable, inhumane and offer no hope of rehabilitation.  Again, the Russell’s 
discussion group recalls their friend’s experience: 
Group: Russell’s  
Brock: The women are separated from the men? 
Ashley: They are but they still pass around a shit bucket.  This boy 
had to shit in a bucket and they would not remove it from 
your cell until the shit bucket is full.  Ok? Now, if you put 
me in there and I went and that kid was not of the strong 
mentality that he went in there with – a good, I mean he 
had a good support system around him to keep him level 
headed, you come out there fucking crazy man.  Like, I 
would have killed myself in there, I’m not lying to you. 
Betty: You come out worse than you went in. 
Ashley: One week in there I would have lick off my head. Like, 
somehow, some way – I would have told them to bring me 
about 10 sleeping tablets.  Let me just go to sleep, can’t 
manage. 
Brock: I would have taken some people out with me, I wouldn’t 
have gone by myself. 
Contrastingly, participants in two discussions claim that the prison is ineffective 
because it treats inmates too well.  The Cedar Valley discussion group complain that 
even if rehabilitation programmes in the prison exist, these programmes are not 
mandatory and thus inmates choose not to attend.  According to these participants, 
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inmates enjoy the unwarranted luxury of choice in matters pertaining to how they exist 
in their confinement. The exchange below is illustrative. 
Group: Cedar Valley  
Toya:  There are programmes in place but they don’t attend them.  
Precious: Well, I was very shocked to understand that before, 
prisoners could have locks and so forth and so on. Now 
they can have their locks and their cell phone and they do 
whatever they doing like they at home. 
Regine: And the most handsome prisoner is in love with the prison 
officer. 
Precious: All kind of stuff going on.  Up there is like their home or 
like a nice getaway.  They don’t treat them like before.  
They do whatever.  They’re having a good time in prison 
then. Let me just say.    
Supportive Argument 2: The Courts Need To Get Tough!  
Participants in six out of ten peer group discussions support the frame by fervently 
agreeing with the second half of the frame’s prompt, only when more criminals are 
made to do ‘hard time’ will the message get out that ‘crime does not pay’.  Much like 
the newspaper writers, peer group participants who make this argument call for stiffer 
penalties generally, while a small number of participants call for increased use of the 
death penalty specifically.   
 In calling for stiffer penalties, participants in four peer group decry seemingly 
short prison sentences and inexpensive fines as a ‘slap on the wrist’ that does little to 
deter the offender from reoffending.  In these articles, participants seem more focused 
on recidivism than on sending broader moral messages reflecting societal outrage.  
The most powerful example of this line of argument comes from Wayne, a police 
officer in the Longford discussion group, who eloquently makes the point as he 
enthusiastically embraced the frame: 
Because crime fighting is not just for the police, it encompass the 
judiciary as well. When the politicians go to parliament, when they go 
to pass the laws if they don’t pass strong laws, it can’t help us. Even if 
we apprehend someone and we take them before the court and the 
penalty is two weeks probably they will just go spend their two weeks 
go out and go back and do the same thing. We don’t have penalties for 
repeat offenders. If we had something like that in place – like three 
strikes – I think that would be very helpful, and it would, to me, be a 
deterrent.  But, we don’t have anything like that. We’ve had cases 
where some persons do something today, they get out of jail and 
tomorrow they gone back doing the same thing. Why? Our laws are 
not preventing them from doing things like that. We don’t have strong 
enough laws. I could remember in either 2004 or 2005 a law was 
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passed where if you meet anyone carrying an offensive weapon they 
will be detained. Now, that law deters people from walking around 
with the knives and cutlasses. We had seen a decrease in those kind of 
offences like wounding and such. There was a public outcry and they 
went and repealed that law and everything went back to the way it 
was...it was acting as a deterrent.  So we’re out there everyday trying 
to do our best solving the crimes but it doesn’t just stop with us 
arresting someone and taking them before the court because the 
penalty has a lot to do with what the person who was arrested may 
think about whether or not they’ll do it again, or they’ll stay away 
from it. 
When asked if his comments applied to all laws or whether there were any laws he 
thought were too harsh, Wayne further commented: 
I don’t think any is harsh. I think, drawing attention to another thing, 
before 2004 we had this law that if someone is found with cannabis – 
a spliff – $5,000 that was compulsory.  The magistrate could not go 
below that. Now persons are found with so much drugs and the 
ridiculous penalties that they are given. That does not present anything 
to them. They go back on the street and they still sell the drugs. 
In two discussions, rape and sexual offences dominated the conversation.  While 
N’jaedr in the Blue Waters discussion calls for castration for ‘the people who are 
raping school children,’ participants in the Golden Grove discussion demand life in 
prison for those who rape: 
Group: Golden Grove  
Participants:  
Hulette, a Black Antiguan office administrator in her 60s  
Nadine, a Black Antiguan trust manager in her 30s 
Anne, a Black Antiguan information technology professional in her 
30s 
Deege, a Black Antiguan education administrator in her 40s 
Annette, a Black Antiguan counsellor her 30s 
Nicola, a Black Antiguan aircraft mechanic in her 40s 
Neicy, a Black Antiguan producer in her 30s 
Robyn, a Black Antiguan banker in her 50s 
Edy, a Black Antiguan human resources consultant in her 60s 
 
Deege: I think in terms of rape and so on, the sentences are not harsh 
enough and I mean there is provision in the law for it. People 
still treating rape as if it’s just a little sex. 
Edy: They’re definitely not harsh enough. 
Annette:  I don’t know about that. I have known of three cases where 
they get from 18-25. 
Edy:  They didn’t get life yet.  
Annette:  They can get life for it? 
Deege: Yes, you can. 
Edy:  The law does provide that but nobody get life yet.  
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Deege: Nobody. 
Edy:  When you have a 67-year-old man going with his 
granddaughter and he getting five years – 
Deege: He never supposed to see the light of day again. 
Edy:  Thank you.  Not even in prison. 
Deege: For true – supposed to have to feel for he food. 
 
 In four out of ten discussions participants call for increased use of the death 
penalty.  In three discussions participants emphasise the general and specific deterrent 
effect of the punishment while one participant in the fourth discussion argues simply 
that the state must not have the expense associated with long-term incarceration.  For 
example, in the Redcliffe Street discussion Lavern asks:  
...they ever had the death penalty here? Bring back the death penalty.  
I can tell you it worked in Guyana in the early 80’s when it was ‘hang 
them high’ with Desmond Hoyte.52  He brought back the death penalty 
and crime went zoop, over night.  I’m serious.  Because they who love 
to kill, they don’t want to be killed.  Bring back the death penalty.  I 
would volunteer. 
Similarly, in the Lower Nevis Street discussion group, when Timothy responds to 
general calls for the death penalty by explaining that his experience in England 
suggests that the death penalty failed to deter offenders, Sam responds: 
I think it varies from society to society.  It was certainly a deterrent for 
the longest while here...When I was growing up, young men literally 
speaking against killing somebody because they were going to get 
killed.  I hear young men say now and I’ve heard them say, I feel I’ll 
go to jail – relax, watch my TV, work out read my books and stuff like 
that. 
Rebuttal Arguments 
Notwithstanding the fact that Faulty System is the least contested frame in this study, 
5.8 per cent of all participants reject one or more of the frame’s various components. 
Participants in three discussions argue that the police are actually doing much more 
crime solving and therefore enjoying increased public trust. Participants in two 
discussions argue that the police do not get paid enough to put their lives on the line 
and are therefore limited in what they can realistically accomplish.  But, participants in 
two peer group discussions lodge more fundamental complaints against the frame 
challenging its core assumptions.  In these discussions participants argue firstly, that 
crime fighting is not something law enforcement, the judiciary and prison personnel 
                                                
52 Desmond Hoyte was a Guyanese politician who served as Guyana’s Prime Minister from 1984-1985 and President of Guyana 
from 1985-1992.  Hoyte is well known for confronting Guyana’s crime situation with a call to ‘hang them high’. 
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can do alone.  To the contrary, crime fighting is a community effort.  Bolivar makes 
this clear in the Blue Waters group responding to the frame’s prompt by insisting:  
Disagree strongly! Because, I don’t see how you can expect the police 
to fight crime if they don’t get community involvement.  Look at that 
thing in New York last weekend.  The community was so involved 
from the first minute.  You know, the guy with the [backpack]...Let’s 
face it, if they’re not getting information, what can they do? Let me 
give you an example right. The guy who used to do our gardening at 
one time – and he would say to us – he said to me where he used to 
live he knew of a mechanic who was just a little further down the ally 
from him. And he said to me he would say to me that many mornings 
– two, three, four in the morning he would see when those guys come 
in with car parts. Right. This is car parts from stolen vehicles. He’s not 
saying that to the police. So you have to have the community 
involvement. 
 
Secondly, participants argue that punishment is simply not a deterrent to crime. Also 
in the Blue Waters discussion group Elbee says plainly:   
I don’t think punishment deters crime... Uh, uh. For example, I don’t 
think capital punishment stop people from murdering people. But, I’m 
all for capital punishment. The state mustn’t have the expense of 
feeding you and looking after you. 
In the same group, Bolivar subsequently says: 
I do believe in having appropriate punishment, however, what about 
rehab?  We need to start to deal with – I mean significant rehab.  Let 
me give you an example, when I was water engineer, I had a guy came 
to me, one morning, and this is how he started: ‘Good morning sir, I 
just came out of jail and I’m looking for a job’. That’s how he started. 
‘Um, I have decided to turn my life around and this is the name and 
number of my probation officer. You can call him and have a talk with 
him’. And so I got in touch with his probation officer, and we decided 
to give the guy a chance.  A guy name [Johnny]. And he started to 
work at the Gray’s Hill reservoir, and that guy worked his way up 
from right at the bottom until he came in charge of the reservoir and 
let me tell you something, that reservoir was his. You could not go 
there contrary on that reservoir compound. And so, I think you have to 
err on the side giving people a chance but you have to give them a real 
opportunity. 
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III 
 
Summary 
The Faulty System frame is the strongest performing frame among all newspaper 
articles included in this study. As compared to the Criminal Culture frame, the 
disparity is significant.   While less than one-fifth of all newspaper articles included in 
this study display components of the Criminal Culture frame, arguments associated 
with Faulty System appear in almost half. This disparity suggests that when it comes 
to governance, culture and crime, more writers appear concerned with the failure of 
the criminal justice system to apprehend and punish offenders generally than they are 
with the perceived corruption that may simply be one of many specific reasons for this 
failure. In peer group discussions, however, the Criminal Culture frame performs 
much better.  
Because the Criminal Culture frame emerged organically, unprompted by the 
interview guide, there are no mixed or weak reactions to the frame. Notwithstanding, 
this methodological difference, given that both frames enjoy enthusiastic support in 
eight out of ten peer group discussions and no peer group discussions unanimously 
rejected the Faulty System frame, it still seems fair to suggest that the reaction to both 
frames are very strong.  That is, it seems that Antiguans and Barbudans are as 
concerned about the corruption they describe as pervasive as they are with the criminal 
justice system’s failure to apprehend and punish offenders.  But, beyond this basic 
observation, it is clear from the solutions participants proffer that the underlying 
concern with respect to both frames is the same – ultimately for proponents of both 
frames the macro issue appears to be the need for a functioning criminal justice system 
that is efficient, certain and fair.   
In the final chapter, the performance of the Criminal Culture and Social 
Breakdown Frames in newspaper discourse as well as in peer group discussions are 
compared with that of each other frame in this study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
‘If actors define situations as real they are real in their consequences’. 
-- William Isaac Thomas (1958: 81) 
 
Introduction 
This study was informed by Gamson’s (1992) insights that contrary to the way in 
which the public is often characterised, people are neither ‘passive’ nor ‘dumb’ and 
they make sense of their reality in nuanced and complicated ways.  From the 
participants who use language reminiscent of Beccaria (1738-1794) and Bentham 
(1748-1833) to rationalise their call for stiffer penalties, to the participants who argue 
very much like Hirschi (1969) that children who hurt, hurt others, this study illustrates 
that public crime discourse in Antigua and Barbuda is characterised by the rich 
sociological conversations that have been at the fore of criminology.  Such findings 
are a testament to Downes and Rock’s (2011) observations that sociological theories 
of crime are often grandiloquent statements of the common-sense understandings that 
have currency in everyday life.  Indeed, for each intuitive explanation of crime that 
participants in this study put forth as an explanation for Antigua and Barbuda’s 
perceived crime problem, there exists a modified sociological expression.  Similarly, 
this study generally confirms the extant literature on crime and the media, 
demonstrating that the news media in Antigua and Barbuda construct crime as violent, 
on the rise, and in ways that appear antithetical to what police recorded crime figures 
suggest.  
This concluding chapter examines these broad conclusions in greater detail and 
discusses their contribution to the existing literature. Section I provides an overview of 
the primary and secondary research questions and discusses the findings in relation to 
each.  Additionally, this section will consider the contributions of these findings to the 
existing literature.  Section II assesses the significance of this study and associated 
policy implications.  In this section I will make an argument for a constructionist 
understanding of crime in Antigua and Barbuda and the importance of avoiding 
hyperbole, unsubstantiated claims and ‘moral panics’.  Additionally, I will suggest 
more productive strategies for engaging in crime talk. Section III acknowledges the 
limitations of this study and recommends directions for future research.  
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I 
 
Summary of Main Findings 
Primary Research Question 
The study sought to develop a more comprehensive understanding of Antigua and 
Barbuda’s crime situation by investigating how crime and associated policy responses 
are constructed. As such, the primary research question was: 
How do the news media and members of the public in Antigua and 
Barbuda describe and explain crime and criminal justice policy? 
The data revealed that the news media and members of the public in Antigua and 
Barbuda describe and explain crime and criminal justice policy in ways that are 
largely, although not entirely, consistent with the working catalogue of culturally 
available criminal justice frames that are described in the extant literature.  The 
subsections below report which frames are most prevalent in both the newspaper and 
public discourse. 
 
Newspaper Discourse 
With nearly half of all newspaper articles suggesting that crime stems from the failure 
of the criminal justice system to apprehend and punish offenders, Faulty System was 
the most prevalent frame in the newspaper sample.  Of the articles displaying the 
Faulty System frame, approximately half associated high crime rates with police 
ineptitude and ineffectiveness while slightly less than half argued for stiffer penalties.  
As seen in Figure 9, Faulty System was followed most closely by Social Breakdown, 
which appeared in just over one-third of the newspaper articles included in the sample.  
These articles unanimously supported the idea that crime stems from a breakdown of 
the traditional family and traditional communities.  Over two-thirds of these articles 
were prescriptive calling for collective action as a means of restoring order while 
slightly less than one-third were diagnostic arguing that Antigua and Barbuda had 
experienced such moral degradation over time that crime was the inevitable result.  
Thus, in keeping with Sasson’s (1994) work in the United States, Antiguan and 
Barbudan newspaper discourse appears overwhelmingly to blame crime on a poorly 
functioning criminal justice system and moral failure. 
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However, just as important as what Antigua and Barbuda’s newspaper discourse 
blamed for the country’s perceived crime problem is what it rejected and ignored as 
possible causes.  Blocked Opportunities was one of the least prevalent frames found in 
the newspaper discourse, appearing in just over seven per cent of all articles.  Each 
article that conjured the frame did so for the purpose of rejecting it.  Consequently, the 
only newspaper articles in which the Blocked Opportunities frame appeared, rejected 
the idea that crime stems from such structural impediments as poverty, unemployment, 
poor education, bad housing and class discrimination. The Poor Immigration Control 
frame had an equally poor showing in the newspaper discourse also appearing in just 
over seven per cent of all articles.  These articles associated crime not with increased 
immigration but with indiscriminate immigration.  In this discourse, certain 
immigrants were to blame for increased crime.  While the news media locates the 
causes of crime within individuals, it rejects overtly structural explanations.  The 
Violent Media, Racist System and Cruel World frames were not present at all in the 
newspaper discourse.  Elements of the Faulty Politics frame, was present but as 
previously explained, those elements were subsumed under the Criminal Culture 
frame, which captured the sentiments of the discourse more precisely. 
  
Criminal	  Culture	  Faulty	  System	  
Foreign	  Cultural	  Indluences	  Poor	  Immigration	  Control	  
Blocked	  Opportunites	  Social	  Breakdown	  
13.2%	  
48.5%	  
10.3%	  
7.4%	  
7.4%	  
33.8%	  
Figure 10: Frame Performance in Newspaper Discourse 
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Public Discourse 
Faulty System was the most successful frame in public discourse.  This success was 
determined not only by the frame’s unanimous support in eight out of ten peer group 
discussions, but also by the unparalleled support it received from the vast majority of 
discussion participants  (more than nine out of 10) and the fact that it was the only 
frame that garnered support from participants in every peer group discussion. Nearly 
all of the participants enthusiastically argued that the institutions comprising Antigua 
and Barbuda’s criminal justice system are broken and thus antithetical to ensuring 
swift, certain and severe punishment.  Additionally, most participants called for stiffer 
penalties, including increased use of the death penalty. In this regard, these results are 
in line with the penal populism that has come to characterise such places as the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  As was the case with the newspaper discourse, 
Violent Media, Racist System and Cruel World were not present at all in the public 
discourse.  Although participants invoked elements of the Faulty Politics frame, again, 
those elements were subsumed under the Criminal Culture frame. 
Although the Social Breakdown frame received unanimous support in seven 
out of ten peer group discussions, the Criminal Culture and Foreign Cultural 
Influences frames were slightly more successful (Figure 11).  Emerging without any 
prompts from the interview guide, Criminal Culture and Foreign Cultural Influences 
appeared spontaneously in eight out of ten peer group discussions.  While these frames 
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Figure 11: Frame Performance in Peer Group Discussions (N=10) 
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were mostly offered as explanations for crime independent of any other frame, many 
participants invoked the Criminal Culture frame to highlight the failings of the 
criminal justice system and the Foreign Cultural Influences frame to show how 
adopting foreign influences contributes to the breakdown of traditional cultural values. 
As such, the support for these frames provides further evidence of the notion that 
Antiguans and Barbudans largely blame crime on a poorly functioning criminal justice 
system and moral failure.  At first glance this finding, coupled with the negative 
reactions to the Blocked Opportunities frame, confirms Sasson’s (1994: 162) research 
demonstrating that public discourse reflects an ‘ingrained aversion to structural 
criminology’.  However, a closer look at the peer group discussions also revealed an 
understanding that is more nuanced.  While there was a general aversion to structural 
explanations of crime, at least one participant in five discussion groups articulated 
support for the Blocked Opportunities frame and participants in a small number of 
peer group discussions added a structural dimension to discourse that was otherwise 
very individual.  For example, a small number of participants located family 
breakdown within the context of a flailing economy that forced single mothers to work 
two jobs.  Similarly, a small number of participants suggested that some parents parent 
poorly because they were parented poorly themselves.  Despite its absence from the 
media discourse, the presence of a structural understanding of crime in the public 
discourse, suggests the possibility for a broader political discourse – a more mature 
political discourse – and by extension better policy decisions. 
Secondary Research Question 
A secondary purpose of this study was to create a longitudinal account of crime in 
Antigua and Barbuda in order to better assess the claims made by the news media and 
members of the public. The goal of this part of the study was to establish – as best as 
possible given inherent limitations previously acknowledged – the overall scale of 
crime, the relative incidence of different types of offences, trends in those offences 
from 1970 to 2010 and their geographical distribution. Accordingly, the secondary 
research question guiding this study was:  
What are the basic crime trends and patterns in Antigua and Barbuda 
from 1970 to 2010? 
The data suggest that that the rate of recorded property crime increased significantly 
from 1970 to its peak in 1995 and declined, albeit unsteadily, from 1995 to 2010. 
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Unlike most other countries in the Caribbean, property crime reports in Antigua and 
Barbuda have remained more prevalent than those of violent crime. In fact, since 
1974, at least 70 per cent of all crimes reported have been property related.  The vast 
majority of these property-related reports involve larceny and appear to be largely 
opportunistic crime.  Reports of this type of crime appear to more frequently involve 
the three streets in downtown St. John’s most travelled by tourists.  Although property 
crime reports are more prevalent than those of violent crime, the data nevertheless 
revealed disconcerting trends with respect to violent crime.   
Over the course of the 40-year time period, the overall rate of reports of violent 
crime remained relatively stable although there was a slight downward trend from 
2007 to 2010.  However, although the level of violent crime reports has remained 
relatively stable, there have been significant changes in the ways in which the violence 
manifests.  That is, there have been changes in the types of violent crimes reported.   
Since the mid-1990s there has been a slight upturn in the incidence of homicides while 
there has been a corresponding decline in reports of wounding.   With the 
simultaneous increase in reported gun crime, it seems plausible that the number of 
violent altercations may not have changed significantly, but the increasing use of guns 
may have ensured more deadly outcomes.  That is, the use of guns may have caused 
death in cases where the victim in earlier years may otherwise have been wounded. 
The most dramatic increase in homicides occurred between 2007 and 2009 during 
which time police documented a major conflict between international illegal drug 
suppliers and local drug dealers.  The homicide rate in 2010 decreased dramatically 
returning to a rate more in line with pre-2007 levels.  While homicide continues to 
account for a very small percentage of total crime and of violent crime more 
specifically, since 1990 there has been a relatively steady increase in robbery, which 
comprised approximately one-third of violent crime from 2006 to 2010.  The data also 
suggest that, compared to other Caribbean countries, the rate of sexual violence in 
Antigua and Barbuda is high.  In recent years rape and indecent assault have accounted 
for as much as 20 per cent of violent crime. This trend became more acute between 
2006 and 2009 when the incidence of rape doubled.  During this time it is alleged that 
there was ‘serial rapist’ at large.  Even with these trends in violent crime, however, at 
no point since 1982 have reports of violent crime exceeded 18 per cent of total crime 
reports.  
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Contributions to the Literature 
This study adds to the existing Caribbean crime literature by providing one of the first 
case studies of Antigua and Barbuda.  It is also one of the very few studies focused 
exclusively on a country belonging to the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(“OECS”).  In this way, the study extends the literature beyond Jamaica, Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago providing the OECS with an example that may be more 
applicable than studies from the larger Caribbean countries. With respect to the 
broader crime literature, this study adds to the social construction literature by 
expanding the working catalogue of culturally available crime frames.  Additionally, 
the study extends the literature on frame analysis beyond Europe and North America 
to a much smaller region.   
Public Knowledge of Crime 
Although further research is required, this study suggests that Antiguans and 
Barbudans are generally ill informed about crime though they may have a clearer 
sense of the trends in the crimes that matter most to them.  In keeping with the 
findings of Hough and Roberts (2012) covering England and Wales, the participants in 
this study overestimated the magnitude and direction of crime when compared to 
official crime data.  Amidst falling property crime rates and a relatively stable but 
downward trend in rates of violent crime, the vast majority of the participants in the 
study claimed that crime was increasing.  Similarly, the claims that participants made 
with respect to the Social Breakdown frame, that there was much less violence in the 
past and homicides in the 1970s and 1980s were virtually non-existent, are not borne 
out by the data.  Official crime data suggest that in fact violent crime was as prevalent 
in the 1970s and 1980s as it is now and there were as many as 10 and 14 homicides 
per 100,000 people in the 1970s and the 1980s respectively.  Additionally, official 
crime data disproves claims that crime has ‘skyrocketed’ or ‘increased tremendously’ 
since 2004 when the United Progressive Party won the national election.  In fact, as 
stated earlier, property crime reports were on the decline and, with few exceptions, the 
general trend for violent crime is downward.  
The study also suggests, however, that Antiguans and Barbudans may have a 
better sense of contemporary crime trends with regard to robbery, homicide and rape. 
Despite the sharp decline in the robbery and homicide rates in 2010, the general 
upward trend confirms claims that both offences are increasing.  Similarly, the 
prevalence of reported sexual offences and the increase in reports of rape between 
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2006 and 2009 confirm claims that rape had increased.  However, as is the case in 
Barbados (see Nuttall et al. 2003), it is likely that most participants overestimate the 
level of increase. More research is required in this area.  
Newspaper Portrayals of Crime 
This study confirms Surette’s (2003: 41; 2015: 59) ‘law of opposites’ or ‘backwards 
law’.  Antigua and Barbuda’s newspaper crime articles overwhelmingly emphasise the 
opposite of whatever crime trends and patterns emerge from official crime data.  
While official crime data suggest that incidents of property crime outstrip those of 
violent crime at a ratio as great as 8 to 1, newspaper articles reflect almost exactly the 
opposite.  With nearly 60 per cent of the newspaper sample focused on incidents of 
violent crime and less than 10 per cent focused on incidents of property crime, the 
ratio of property crime stories to violent crime stories is roughly 1 to 8.  These 
findings are also in keeping with Chadee and Ditton’s (2005) work in Trinidad and 
Tobago.  The ‘law of opposites’ similarly holds true with respect to homicides, violent 
crime and characteristics of the victims.  While official crime data suggest that 
homicides represent less than 1 per cent of all recorded crimes, in the newspaper, 
stories about homicide account for approximately 13 per cent of crime related articles.  
While official crime data suggest a relatively stable rate of violent crime, newspaper 
crime articles suggest that this rate is increasing by making such declarations as ‘...the 
ever-increasing incidences of violent crimes...seems to be gaining a toe-hold in this 
once peaceful country’ (The Daily Observer 2/23/95: 7) and ‘the trend [of elderly 
women being brutally attacked in their homes] is disturbing.  It would seem that 
violent crime is on the rise in Antigua’ (The Daily Observer 2/13/96: 1).  The latter 
article is also an example of this newspaper’s tendency to exaggerate the risk of 
victimisation for the elderly and others who are the least likely to be victimised.  
Nearly one-third of the articles in the sample reflected this tendency, which also 
confirms Greer and Reiner’s (2012) findings in Britain.  
The Social Construction of Crime in Antigua and Barbuda 
Only three out of five of Sasson’s (1994) crime frames – Social Breakdown, Blocked 
Opportunities and Faulty System – were deployed in Antigua and Barbuda’s 
newspaper and public discourse. The Violent Media and Racist System frames were 
noticeably absent although the underlying concerns of both frames manifested in the 
form of the Foreign Cultural Influences and Criminal Culture frames.  For example, 
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the primary concern of Sasson’s (1994) Violent Media is with the violence depicted in 
television, the movies, popular music and video games.  In Antigua and Barbuda, 
participants expressed similar concerns but because virtually all of Antigua and 
Barbuda’s television, movies, video games, and (to a lesser extent) popular music are 
imported, participants were concerned about the foreign nature of these media and the 
perceived transmission of foreign culture and values.  This set of concerns is best 
captured by Foreign Cultural Influences.   Similarly, at the heart of Sasson’s (1994) 
Racist System frame is a preoccupation with legitimacy and procedural justice. The 
frame’s proponents argue that Black offenders are more likely than Whites who 
commit comparable offences to be arrested, convicted and sentenced to prison.  Given 
Antigua and Barbuda’s relative racial homogeneity (91 per cent of all inhabitants are 
Black), it is unsurprising that participants did not express this concern in terms of race.  
However, in arguing that Antigua and Barbuda’s criminal justice system favours 
corrupt politicians and those perceived to be wealthy and ‘powerful’, similar concerns 
about legitimacy and procedural justice were evident.  Also absent from Antigua and 
Barbuda’s newspaper and public discourse was Boda et al.’s (2011) Cruel World 
frame.  Although participants mentioned the political corruption at the heart of Boda et 
al.’s (2011) Faulty Politics frame, they did so in ways that were more precisely 
captured by the Criminal Culture frame that emerged from the analysis.  This finding 
suggests that crime frames are not universally applicable but are context specific.  
While the fundamental concerns may be similar, their manifestations are rooted in 
environmental particularities.   
 The findings of this study also suggest that Antiguans and Barbudans are not 
passive consumers of news media.   While over 90 per cent of the participants in the 
group discussions cited the news media as their source of crime and criminal justice 
knowledge, the frames that were most prevalent in the newspaper discourse were not 
the frames that participants most widely embraced (Figure 3).  For example, Foreign 
Cultural Influences and Criminal Culture, two of the least prevalent frames in the 
newspaper discourse, were among the strongest performing frames in the public 
discourse.  As was the case in Boda and Szabó’s (2011) research in Hungary, some 
Antiguans and Barbudans had little faith in the news media expressing extreme 
scepticism about many of the criminal justice claims made in the newspaper.  
Antiguans and Barbudans were more inclined to trust the information they received 
from close friends, family and acquaintances.  Indeed, 95 per cent of participants cited 
‘word of mouth’, ‘reports from friends’ and the experiences of family members as the 
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sources of their crime knowledge while a much smaller minority cited their own 
personal experiences with the criminal justice system.  As such, there is support for the 
proposition that Antiguans and Barbudans acquire social knowledge and construct 
their own version of reality in much the same way that Gamson (1992), Surette (2015) 
and others have described elsewhere.  That is, Antiguans and Barbudans derive their 
crime knowledge from a combination of what Surette (2015) calls the ‘engines of 
social construction’ – direct first-hand experience with crime, information received 
directly from close friends, family and acquaintances (“Engine 1”), the news media 
(“Engine 2”), and statistical and other crime information disseminated by criminal 
justice agencies and organisations (“Engine 3”) (Figure 12).   Gamson (1992: 180-1) 
sheds additional light on this point by suggesting: 
People who [derive their crime knowledge from a combination of 
sources] are selectively influenced by the relative prominence of 
media frames, responding to the degree that these frames are 
consistent with their popular wisdom and experiential knowledge.  
They are constrained by omissions from media discourse but relatively 
immune to differences in the relative prominence of visible frames. 
 
 Beyond the suggestion that Antiguans and Barbudans do not passively receive 
the news media, the inverse relationship that exists between certain frames in the 
newspaper and public discourse may have another meaning.  This disconnect provides 
support for the structural argument that Antigua and Barbuda’s newspaper reproduces 
dominant ideology, promotes the interests of the ruling elite and legitimates the 
existing system (see for example Greer and Reinder 2012).   Put differently, Antigua 
and Barbuda’s newspaper appears to frame crime in ways that do not significantly 
undermine the Members of Parliament responsible for public safety and other high-
ranking government officials. For example, the Foreign Cultural Influences, Poor 
Immigration Control and Criminal Culture, the frames most critical of the criminal 
justice and political systems, are the frames that are least prevalent in the newspaper 
discourse.  Similarly, every article that displayed the Blocked Opportunities frame in 
the newspaper discourse did so in order to reject its veracity.   This finding is 
consistent with the structuralist approach to news media research, which is informed 
by Marxist and critical theory.  Greer and Reiner (2012) argue that the most coveted 
sources of statements and crime information are the police, Members of Parliament 
responsible for public safety and other high-ranking government officials who are 
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deemed to be most credible.  As such, crime reporters become the mouthpiece of the 
police and the criminal justice system as they depend on an amicable relationship with 
these sources.  The result is crime reporting that inevitably relies on and reproduces 
the institutional views of these sources.  But, the relationship is a symbiotic 
relationship because these sources also rely on the media to disseminate their claims.  
As Surette (2015: 53) explains,  
‘[l]ittle knowledge can be disseminated directly from these institutions 
and organisations to individuals, so agencies and institutions of the 
third engine must utilize the media for effective distribution of their 
factual and interpretative claims’. 
Figure 12: Surette's Engines of Social Construction 
SOURCE: Adapted from Surette, R. 2015. Media, Crime and Criminal Justice. Pg. 54. Stamford, CT: Cengage 
II 
Significance of the Study 
This study is important because of its contribution to the body of Caribbean crime 
literature specifically and the body of literature on crime and criminal justice more 
generally.   The addition of the Criminal Culture and Foreign Cultural Influences 
frames to the working catalogue of culturally available crime frames is particularly 
helpful for smaller developing countries with economic and political realities that are 
closer to those of Antigua and Barbuda than to the United Kingdom and the United 
States.  Beyond its contribution to the literature, however, this study has practical 
implications for Antigua and Barbuda and its residents.  These implications are 
explored further below. 
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Policy Implications and Recommendations  
As Sasson (1995) and others explain, constructionist investigations of crime are 
important because understanding how crime is framed in terms of causes and remedies 
necessarily influences who we criminalise, what legislation we pass and how we 
allocate our tax dollars.  As such, framing crime in ways that are tinged with 
hyperbole, or that run contrary to evidence is unlikely to result in effective policy 
responses.  The way in which crime is currently framed in Antigua and Barbuda – as a 
relatively recent phenomenon that is spiralling out of control and is characterised by 
increasing violence, as a phenomenon that is perpetuated by predatory young people 
with individual pathologies, as a phenomenon that is increasing largely because police 
and politicians are corrupt and young people are being inculcated with foreign cultural 
values – has resulted in punitive policy and ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric that do not 
appear to have had a substantial effect on the country’s crime rate. However, this study 
finds that there might be room for more progressive crime policy – policy that is 
informed by an understanding of crime that does not have at its heart notions of law 
and order or getting ‘tough on crime’.   
First, criminal justice policy that is rooted in overtly structural conceptions of 
crime is not likely to succeed in Antigua and Barbuda.  As the Blocked Opportunities 
frame was the worst performing frame in the study, both the news media and the 
public seem to have an aversion to explicit causal connections between crime and 
poverty, unemployment, poor education, bad housing and class discrimination.  This 
finding is hardly surprising given that Antigua and Barbuda is not a country with many 
social safety nets or the expectation thereof.  While there are national social security 
and medical benefits schemes, there is no welfare, unemployment insurance or 
universal healthcare scheme. Government subsidies are few and far between.  Personal 
responsibility is a strong cultural meme. You pull yourself up by your bootstraps 
because there is no one else who will pull you up. Government surely does not have 
the means to assist when there have been so many times that government has been 
unable to pay its own workers.  Against the backdrop of Antigua and Barbuda’s slave 
and colonial history, as one participant explained, most Antiguans and Barbudans are 
not more than a generation or two removed from poverty. Most Antiguans at some 
point would have had to overcome structural obstacles. Structural obstacles then are 
not excuses to turn to crime, they are the impetus to better oneself and get ahead.  It is 
important to note that rejecting this frame also insulates and protects politicians and 
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public figures.  Politicians and government agents are not held accountable in ways 
they might be if crime was seen more as a public failing.  
Interestingly, however, attributing crime to a breakdown of the traditional 
family and traditional community resonates strongly with both the public and the news 
media. One could argue, that this is very much a structural argument especially given 
that some members of the public demonstrated a more nuanced understanding by 
locating the causes of this social breakdown in economic insecurity and inequality. As 
such, reframing the crime debate in terms of the Social Breakdown frame while 
incorporating subtle structural arguments will likely allow for more mature political 
discourse and as a result, a criminal justice policy differently oriented.  It may be that 
Antiguans and Barbudans do not see this frame in such stark structural terms because 
the frame seems to contemplate a public private divide.  That is, there is no reliance on 
or expectation of government.  The unemployment, discrimination, poverty, and 
inadequate schools described by the Blocked Opportunities frame may well feel more 
like public problems falling squarely within the ambit of government while family, 
parenting and neighbours looking out for each other may better comport with 
individual choice and personal responsibility.  The government has no control over 
how and by whom children are disciplined and whether neighbours speak to each 
other. The components of Social Breakdown may initially be understood as private 
issues within the private domain. As such, although a recent evaluation of the Chicago 
Area Project did not support its crime preventive effects, criminal justice policy should 
nevertheless exploit the resonance of the Social Breakdown frame by incorporating a 
bottom-up approach focused on social organisation and community stability.   
This study also finds that members of the public have a deep concern with 
issues of procedural justice, legitimacy and ‘broken’ institutions even where media 
discourse does not.  The Daily Observer may be less inclined to print articles invoking 
the Criminal Culture frame because newspapers rely on politicians and government 
officials in ways previously discussed.   Again, ignoring such issues as procedural 
justice and ‘broken’ institutions may be a way to insulate politicians and government 
officials from being accountable. But given the purchasing power that the frame 
enjoys with members of the public, criminal justice policy should focus in part on 
transparency and reflect as much concern about corruption and white-collar crime as it 
does about street crime and low-level drug offending.  Additionally, the criminal 
justice system must be seen to treat everyone equally irrespective of wealth or status.  
A recent UNDP (2012) found that Antigua and Barbuda is the only Caribbean country 
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included in the study not to have an internal police investigative unit aimed at 
investigating corruption and ensuring professional standards.  This deficit should be 
rectified as a first step towards transparency and repairing the negative perceptions 
that Antiguans and Barbudans have with respect to notions of a ‘criminal culture’. 
Finally, Surette (2015) and others have found that while the news media are 
not often found to be direct causes of criminal justice policy shifts, they do contribute 
to a larger social system that generates and preserves the dominant attitudes about 
crime and criminal justice.  In Antigua and Barbuda, as is the case in other 
jurisdictions, the news media constructs crime as being divorced from other social 
realities, perpetrated by predatory young people with individual pathologies, who have 
free will and a wide range of choices.  News coverage of crime does not often provide 
the public with enough contextual insight to evaluate the criminal justice system’s 
performance or better understand individual criminal incidents.  Given that the vast 
majority of participants (more than nine out of 10) cited newspapers as one of their 
sources of crime knowledge, better crime coverage could influence shifts in criminal 
justice policy.  Following Surette’s (2015) suggestion, that the news media cover 
crime in the manner in which they cover sports, may positively influence criminal 
justice policy in Antigua and Barbuda.  According to Surette (2015), the news media 
provide comprehensive, contextual coverage for sporting events on a daily basis.  
Reporting may still focus on individual events, but reports include statistics, trend 
analysis, forecasts, commentary and discussion.  In much the same way that sporting 
events are constructed to emphasise both historical understanding and current 
significance, so too should incidents of crime.   
The point of this study is not so much that Antiguans and Barbudans ought not 
concern themselves with the country’s perceived crime problem because the crime 
situation is so much better than they think it is.  To the contrary, this study suggests 
that Antigua and Barbuda has always had disconcerting levels of crime deserving of 
attention.  And, such historical understanding can temper the hysteria and impulse to 
‘just do something’ without thinking through solid evidence-based approaches.  
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III 
Limitations of This Study 
While this study makes important contributions to the existing body of crime 
literature, it is not without limitations.  The first limitation deals with the sample of 
newspaper articles that was used in this study.  Because Antigua and Barbuda does not 
have a digitised archive of newspapers and because a number of individual issues were 
missing – including entire months – I was forced to use what amounted to a 
convenience sample of sorts.  While the convenience sample used was sufficient, it is 
possible that my analysis does not include every relevant article or commentary 
expressing a crime frame.  My research would have benefited from a complete 
digitised database of newspapers.  Additionally, given that Antigua and Barbuda has a 
vibrant radio culture and so many Antiguans and Barbudans receive their news and 
information from radio, it would have been ideal to include news radio in the sample 
of news media discourse.  
 A second limitation of this study is the omission of Barbuda.  This study is 
essentially one of Antigua rather than Antigua and Barbuda.  Ideally, I would have 
liked to travel to Barbuda to conduct research on that island as well.  As Antigua’s 
smaller sister island, Barbuda is often marginalised in the country’s national discourse. 
While Barbuda does not represent a large percentage of the country’s population, 
Barbudans share different cultural realities, sensitivities and lived experiences. 
Barbudans may well blame all of the country’s crime on Antiguans.  Accordingly, it is 
not possible to generalise these findings to Barbuda. My research would have 
benefitted from including Barbudan perspectives.  
 A third limitation of this study concerns the interview sample.  The interview 
sample is more female, Antiguan, white and middle eastern than the general 
population.  Additionally, participants between the ages of 30 and 59 are 
overrepresented.  Notwithstanding the skew of the sample, given the homogeneity of 
crime views and beliefs in Barbados, a country culturally and geographically similar to 
Antigua and Barbuda, as well as the findings of the UNDP crime study, as previously 
discussed I am confident that this study is able to tell us something useful about the 
common sense of Antiguan and Barbudan culture.  
Finally, a fourth limitation of this study is the scarcity of evaluative judgments 
with respect to claims made in the media and public discourse.  Throughout the media 
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and public discourse authors and participants make specific claims – claims that crime 
increases whenever there is a period of political crisis in Antigua, claims about prison 
conditions, claims about the effectiveness of certain policies – and part of 
understanding the social construction of crime is the ability to identify falsehoods and 
alternative interpretations.  The dearth of primary and secondary research on Antigua 
and Barbuda makes assessing the validity of some of these claims extremely difficult.  
In many instances, it was not my intention to accept what was claimed in an 
unproblematic way, but, I lacked the research to make a proper evaluative judgment. 
Where I could draw on international research, I did, but certain specific claims 
pertaining to Antigua and Barbuda did not allow me to do so.   Including the 
longitudinal analysis of crime was a partial attempt to cure this defect. 
 Rather than diminish the value of this study, however, these limitations provide 
an impetus for further research on Antigua and Barbuda’s crime situation. 
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APPENDIX A: CODING GUIDE 
 
Virtually all of the media and public discourse in this study were coded using the 
following catch phrases and key ideas. Discourse was coded to each frame if it 
contained at least one element of the key ideas or catch phrases listed below.  As 
previously discussed, some discourse was cross-coded.  
Faulty System 
Crime stems from the failure of the criminal justice system to apprehend and punish 
offenders.  It’s no wonder there’s so much crime, criminals know they can do 
whatever they want to do and get away with it.  If we’re serious about fighting crime 
then the police need to get ‘tough’. Only when more criminals are made to do hard 
time will the message get out that ‘crime doesn’t pay’. 
A. Catch Phrases 
i. Get tough on crime 
ii. Castration for rapists 
iii. Community policing 
iv. Police ineptitude 
v. Spare the rod, spoil the child 
vi. The sentences must send a message loud and clear 
vii. The system is inefficient 
viii. The system is ineffective 
ix. Antiquated laws 
x. Education 
xi. The system ‘re-victimises’ you 
xii. Insufficient resources 
xiii. Death penalty 
xiv. Professional apathy 
xv. Broken institutions 
B. Key Ideas (Support) 
i. The system is too lenient especially with young people 
ii. Lack of police visibility and community policing 
iii. Lack of resources allocated to law enforcement 
iv. Lack of public confidence in law enforcement 
v. Abuse of process and police discretion 
vi. Inconsistent sentencing 
vii. Call for increased use of the death penalty 
viii. Solutions should focus on military or boot camp interventions for 
young offenders 
ix. Criminal justice institutions are broken 
x. Lack of confidentiality across entire criminal justice system 
xi. Conditions in the prison and juvenile facilities are deplorable 
xii. Offenders leave correctional facilities worse than they when they 
entered 
xiii. Prison is a country club – offenders purposely try to go to prison 
especially during Christmas  
C. Key Ideas (Rebuttal) 
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i. Costs of long term incarceration are greater than alternatives to prison 
and rehabilitation 
ii. Offenders are not rational 
iii. Violence spawns violence 
iv. The police are solving more crimes and are inspiring greater trust 
amongst the public 
v. Punishment is not a deterrent to crime 
vi. Government can’t do it by itself, people need to help law enforcement 
and other government agents 
vii. It’s not the system, some people just bad 
Blocked Opportunities 
Crime stems from poverty, unemployment, poor education, bad housing and class 
discrimination.  Kids come from places like Gray’s Farm and Point turn to crime when 
they don’t see any opportunities for legitimate work.  If we’re serious about fighting 
crime, we need to create more opportunities for disadvantaged kids.  We’ll only make 
progress in the fight against crime when we begin to seriously address these ‘root 
causes’. 
A. Catch Phrases 
i. Crime and poverty 
ii. Victims of circumstance 
iii. Gray’s Farm 
iv. Point 
v. Lack of opportunity 
vi. Selective employment 
vii. Brain drain 
viii. Unequal Opportunity 
B. Key Ideas (Support) 
i. Crime is born of necessity  
ii. Stressors push people toward crime 
iii. Jobless youth turn to crime 
iv. Cultural symbols of success are only attainable to some through crime 
C. Key Ideas (Rebuttal) 
i. Young people do not want to work 
ii. Young people want fast money 
iii. There are enough existing opportunities you just have to look for them 
iv. People feel certain types of jobs are beneath them 
v. There is a stigma attached to manual labour 
vi. Antiguans do not pump gas 
vii. There is not a causal connection between crime and poverty 
viii. It’s not only kids from Gray’s Farm and Point who commit crime 
ix. Criminals come from all communities 
x. There are good people from Gray’s Farm 
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Social Breakdown 
Crime stems from a breakdown of the traditional family and traditional community.  In 
the past there was less crime because neighbours looked out for one another and 
parents supervised and disciplined their children.  The best way to fight crime is for 
neighbours, in partnership with the police, to band together to restore order to their 
communities. 
A. Catch Phrases 
i. Before time 
ii. Church 
iii. Single mothers, absent men 
iv. Take our country back 
v. It takes a village 
vi. Cultural values 
vii. ‘Licks’ (e.g. corporal punishment) 
viii. Kids are having kids 
ix. Children who hurt, hurt others 
x. Our brother’s keeper 
xi. Gangs 
xii. Shifting cultural values 
xiii. Poor in pocket but not in spirit 
xiv. Our population now is transient 
B. Key Ideas (Support) 
i. Neighbourhoods were ethnically homogenous 
ii. People do not have shame like they used to have 
iii. Neighbours knew each other and everyone in the neighbourhood 
iv. Interdependence rather than individualism 
v. Ineffective/’lax’ parenting 
vi. Mothers are working two and three jobs and have no time for the 
children 
vii. If you never received love you can’t give love 
viii. Parents rely on financial help from children and therefore condone 
illicit activity  
ix. Community members must resort to self help 
x. Teachers are not teaching, they’re simply lecturing and not reaching the 
children 
xi. Teachers are not trained and are not properly equipped to teach 
C. Key Ideas (Rebuttal) 
i. We’re a slavesome society, our families were never in tact 
ii. Children need a support network, if the mother or father is not present 
aunts and uncles can fill the void 
iii. The traditional family and traditional community were sites of such 
crimes and violence as incest, domestic violence, child abuse 
iv. Cultural arguments about tradition facilitate corporal punishment and 
other forms of violence 
v. No causal connection between fragmented community or family and 
crime 
vi. The good ol’ days were horrible 
vii. Neighbourhood watches do exist 
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Poor Immigration Control 
Crime stems from poor immigration control.  Most of the crime that occurs is 
committed by ‘non-nationals’.  If we’re serious about fighting crime, we need to 
crackdown on the number of non-nationals that come into this country – especially 
those from Jamaica and Guyana. 
A. Catch Phrases 
i. The wrong immigrants 
ii. Mafia Hill 
iii. Free movement of people 
iv. The bottom of the barrel 
v. Foreigners 
vi. Non-nationals 
vii. Human trafficking 
viii. Whore houses 
ix. Prostitution 
x. Demographic shift 
xi. Cultural differences 
B. Key Ideas (Support) 
i. Certain nationalities commit certain types of crime 
ii. Immigration causes crime 
iii. We do not attract highly skilled migrants 
iv. There is a hierarchy of Caribbean immigrants – those from the Eastern 
Caribbean are perfectly acceptable but those from Jamaica and Guyana 
are not  
v. Immigrants put stress on the system 
vi. Immigrants do not contribute to the economy 
vii. Violent crimes are committed by non-Antiguans 
viii. Some immigrants are working in tandem with Antiguans 
ix. A significant number of crimes committed are committed by non-
Antiguans 
C. Key Ideas (Rebuttal) 
i. It’s mostly Antiguans involved in crime 
ii. It’s mostly Antiguans in the prison 
iii. There is nothing different about Guyanese and Jamaican immigrants – 
immigrants come to a new country for more opportunity and to work 
hard 
iv. There is no causal connection between immigration and crime 
v. The statistics do not bear out the connection 
Criminal Culture 
Crime stems from excessive contact with systems and authorities that send pro-crime 
messages.  It’s no wonder there is so much crime, when there is widespread corruption 
among government officials, prominent business people and in government 
institutions, and when the justice system treats people differently based on who they 
are and who they know, people feel justified in cutting corners and breaking the law 
themselves.  If we are serious about fighting crime, we need to stamp out corruption, 
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in all of its forms, wherever it occurs and maintain a transparent justice system that 
treats everyone equally irrespective of wealth or status. 
A. Catch Phrases 
i. Corruption 
ii. All men are created equal but some are more equal than others 
iii. It’s all about who you know 
iv. ‘Friendism’ 
v. Who’s policing the police? 
vi. Blue collar crime 
vii. White collar crime 
viii. Check book settlement 
ix. If the top is slack, the bottom can’t be tight 
x. ‘Victimless crime’ 
B. Key Ideas (Support) 
i. The criminal justice system is not transparent 
ii. There is a set of rules for the wealthy and another set for the poor 
iii. Politicians and government agents are easily bribed 
iv. Government officials break the law with impunity 
v. Members of the police force are engaged in criminal activity 
vi. Politicians encourage crime 
C. Key Ideas (Rebuttal) 
i. Antigua and Barbuda is no more corrupt than anyplace else 
 
Foreign Cultural Influences 
Crime stems from foreign cultural influences.  Most of the crime that occurs reflects 
patterns of criminality that are not indigenous to Antigua and Barbuda.  If we are 
serious about fighting crime we need to protect our culture from outside influences 
that have crept into our society through the Trojan Horse of criminal deportees 
returned from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as the 
Internet, American cable television, music and Caribbean immigrants. 
A. Catch Phrases 
i. Dancehall music 
ii. Cosmopolitan society 
iii. Deportees 
iv. BET 
v. Gaza v. Gully 
vi. MTV 
vii. Americanised 
viii. Other Caribbean islands 
ix. Bigger islands 
B. Key Ideas (Support) 
i. Our culture is under threat 
ii. Television is playing the role of parents 
iii. Antiguan children are learning North American values from cable 
television 
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iv. Deportees may not be causing more crime but when they do reoffend 
they do so with greater sophistication and help home grown criminals 
to become more sophisticated in their offending 
v. Young people are becoming more materialistic as a result of North 
American influences 
vi. Deportees must be returned to the country with full details as to their 
offending background 
C. Key Ideas (Rebuttal) 
i. There is no evidence to suggest that deportees are involved in crime at 
higher rates than anyone else 
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